Revised Orbital Debris Assessment

1004-EX-ST-2013 Text Documents

BlackSky Global, LLC

2014-05-15ELS_149304

SCOUT-1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report
(ODAR)
This report is presented in compliance with NASA-STD-8719.14, APPENDIX A.

Report Version: 2 , May 14, 2014

Revision history:
Version Date Author Description
1 10/29/13 Eric Lund ODAR for SCOUT spacecraft launched into an SSO orbit
2 5/14/14 John Springmann Modifications due to new launch plan, which is deployment
from the International Space Station

Document Data is Not Restricted.
This document contains no proprietary, ITAR, or export controlled information.

DAS Software Version Used In Analysis: v2.0.2

Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

VERSION APPROVAL and/or FINAL APPROVAL*:

Jason Andrews, CEO

*Approval signatures indicate acceptance of the ODAR-defined risk.

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Table Contents

Self-assessment of the ODAR using the format in Appendix A.2 of NASA-STD- 8719.14: ......... 4
Assessment Report Format:............................................................................................................. 5
ODAR Section 1: Program Management and Mission Overview ................................................... 5
ODAR Section 2: Spacecraft Description ....................................................................................... 6
ODAR Section 3: Assessment of Spacecraft Debris Released during Normal Operations ............. 7
ODAR Section 4: Assessment of Spacecraft Intentional Breakups and Potential for Explosions... 8
ODAR Section 5: Assessment of Spacecraft Potential for On-Orbit Collisions ............................ 12
ODAR Section 6: Assessment of Spacecraft Post-mission Disposal Plans and Procedures ......... 13
ODAR Section 7: Assessment of Spacecraft Reentry Hazards ..................................................... 16
ODAR Section 8: Assessment for Tether Missions....................................................................... 31

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Self-assessment of the ODAR using the format in Appendix A.2 of NASA-STD- 8719.14:
A self assessment is provided below in accordance with the assessment format provided in Appendix A.2 of NASA-STD-8719.14.

Orbital Debris Self-Assessment Report Evaluation: SCOUT 1 Mission

Launch Vehicle Spacecraft

Requirement # Compliant
Not
Incomplete
Standard
Non
Compliant Not
Incomplete
Comments
Compliant or N/A Compliant
Compliant
4.3-1.a No Debris Released in LEO.
4.3-1.b No Debris Released in LEO.
4.3-2 No Debris Released in GEO.
4.4-1 Not applicable. See note 1.
4.4-2 Not applicable. See note 1.
4.4-3 No planned breakups.
4.4-4 No planned breakups.
4.5-1 Collision probability 0.00000
4.5-2 No critical subsystems needed for EOM disposal
4.6-1(a) Natural forces cause atmospheric reentry
4.6-1(b) Not applicable.
4.6-1(c) Not applicable.
4.6-2 Spacecraft does not go to GEO.
4.6-3 Spacecraft does not go beyond LEO.
4.6-4 Requirements 4.6-1 through 4.6-3 are met
4.7-1 DAS reports human casualty probability < 1:10,000
4.8-1 No tethers used.
Notes:

1. The SCOUT satellite is being deployed from the International Space Station (ISS) and no explosive devices are involved.

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Time of release of each object, relative to launch time: N/A.
Release velocity of each object with respect to spacecraft: N/A.
Expected orbital parameters (apogee, perigee, and inclination) of each object after release:
N/A.
Calculated orbital lifetime of each object, including time spent in Low Earth Orbit (LEO):
N/A.

Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 (per DAS v2.0.2)
4.3-1, Mission Related Debris Passing Through LEO: COMPLIANT
4.3-2, Mission Related Debris Passing Near GEO: COMPLIANT

ODAR Section 4: Assessment of Spacecraft Intentional Breakups and
Potential for Explosions.
Potential causes of spacecraft breakup during deployment and mission operations:
There is no credible scenario that would result in spacecraft breakup during normal
deployment and operations.
Summary of failure modes and effects analyses of all credible failure modes which may
lead to an accidental explosion:
In-mission failure of a battery cell protection circuit could lead to a short circuit resulting
in overheating and a very remote possibility of battery cell explosion. The battery safety
systems discussed in the FMEA (see requirement 4.4-1 below) describe the combined
faults that must occur for any of seven (7) independent, mutually exclusive failure modes
to lead to explosion.
In addition to the battery protection mentioned about, the SCOUT battery unit features two
thermal switches which completely isolate the battery electrically if the temperature gets
too high.
Detailed plan for any designed spacecraft breakup, including explosions and intentional
collisions:
There are no planned breakups.
List of components which shall be passivated at End of Mission (EOM) including method
of passivation and amount which cannot be passivated:
The butane propulsion system shall be passivated at the end of mission by operating the
system to propellant depletion in a deorbit / perigee lowering maneuver.
Rationale for all items which are required to be passivated, but cannot be due to their
design:

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

SCOUT battery charge circuits include overcharge protection and a parallel design to
limit the risk of battery failure. However, in the unlikely event that a battery cell does
explosively rupture, the small size, mass, and potential energy, of these small batteries is
such that while the spacecraft could be expected to vent gases, most debris from the
battery rupture should be contained within the vessel due to the lack of penetration
energy.

Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.4-1 through 4.4-4:
Requirement 4.4-1: Limiting the risk to other space systems from accidental explosions
during deployment and mission operations while in orbit about Earth or the Moon:

For each spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stage employed for a mission, the program
or project shall demonstrate, via failure mode and effects analyses or equivalent analyses,
that the integrated probability of explosion for all credible failure modes of each
spacecraft and launch vehicle is less than 0.001 (excluding small particle impacts)
(Requirement 56449).

Compliance statement:

Required Probability: 0.001.
Expected probability: 0.000.

Supporting Rationale and FMEA details:
Battery explosion:
Effect: All failure modes below might theoretically result in battery explosion
with the possibility of orbital debris generation. However, in the unlikely event
that a battery cell does explosively rupture, the small size, mass, and potential
energy, of the selected COTS batteries is such that while the spacecraft could be
expected to vent gases, most debris from the battery rupture should be contained
within the vessel due to the lack of penetration energy.
Probability: Extremely Low. It is believed to be a much less than 0.1%
probability that multiple independent (not common mode) faults must occur for
each failure mode to cause the ultimate effect (explosion).

Failure mode 1: Internal short circuit.
Mitigation 1: Qualification and acceptance shock, vibration, thermal cycling, and
vacuum tests followed by maximum system rate-limited charge and discharge to
prove that no internal short circuit sensitivity exists.
Combined faults required for realized failure: Environmental testing AND
functional charge/discharge tests must both be ineffective in discovery of the
failure mode.

Failure Mode 2: Internal thermal rise due to high load discharge rate.
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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Mitigation 2: Cells were tested in lab for high load discharge rates in a variety of
flight-like configurations to determine like likelihood and impact of an out of
control thermal rise in the cell. Cells were also tested in a hot environment to test
the upper limit of the cells capability. No failures were seen.
Combined faults required for realized failure: Spacecraft thermal design must be
incorrect AND external over-current detection and disconnect function must fail
to enable this failure mode.

Failure Mode 3: Excessive discharge rate or short circuit due to external device
failure or terminal contact with conductors not at battery voltage levels (due to
abrasion or inadequate proximity separation).
Mitigation 4: This failure mode is negated by a) qualification-tested short circuit
protection on each external circuit, b) design of battery packs and insulators such
that no contact with nearby board traces is possible without being caused by some
other mechanical failure, c) obviation of such other mechanical failures by proto-
qualification and acceptance environmental tests (shock, vibration, thermal
cycling, and thermal-vacuum tests).
Combined faults required for realized failure: An external load must fail/short-
circuit AND external over-current detection and disconnect function failure must
all occur to enable this failure mode.

Failure Mode 4: Inoperable vents.
Mitigation 5: Battery vents are not inhibited by the battery holder design or the
spacecraft.
Combined effects required for realized failure: The final assembler fails to install
proper venting.

Failure Mode 5: Crushing.
Mitigation 6: This mode is negated by spacecraft design. There are no moving
parts in the proximity of the batteries.
Combined faults required for realized failure: A catastrophic failure must occur
in an external system AND the failure must cause a collision sufficient to crush
the batteries leading to an internal short circuit AND the satellite must be in a
naturally sustained orbit at the time the crushing occurs.

Failure Mode 6: Low level current leakage or short-circuit through battery pack
case or due to moisture-based degradation of insulators.
Mitigation 7: These modes are negated by a) battery holder/case design made of
non-conductive plastic, and b) operation in vacuum such that no moisture can
affect insulators.
Combined faults required for realized failure: Abrasion or piercing failure of
circuit board coating or wire insulators AND dislocation of battery packs AND
failure of battery terminal insulators AND failure to detect such failure modes in
environmental tests must occur to result in this failure mode.

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Failure Mode 7: Excess temperatures due to orbital environment and high
discharge combined.
Mitigation 8: The spacecraft thermal design will negate this possibility. Thermal
rise has been analyzed in combination with space environment temperatures
showing that batteries do not exceed normal allowable operating temperatures
which are well below temperatures of concern for explosions.

Combined faults required for realized failure: Thermal analysis AND thermal
design AND mission simulations in thermal-vacuum chamber testing AND over-
current monitoring and control must all fail for this failure mode to occur.

Requirement 4.4-2: Design for passivation after completion of mission operations while
in orbit about Earth or the Moon:

Design of all spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages shall include the ability to
deplete all onboard sources of stored energy and disconnect all energy generation
sources when they are no longer required for mission operations or postmission disposal
or control to a level which can not cause an explosion or deflagration large enough to
release orbital debris or break up the spacecraft (Requirement 56450).

Compliance statement:
SCOUT battery charge circuits include overcharge protection and a parallel
design to limit the risk of battery failure. However, in the unlikely event that a
battery cell does explosively rupture, the small size, mass, and potential energy,
of these small batteries is such that while the spacecraft could be expected to vent
gases, most debris from the battery rupture should be contained within the vessel
due to the lack of penetration energy.

Requirement 4.4-3. Limiting the long-term risk to other space systems from planned
breakups:

Compliance statement:
This requirement is not applicable. There are no planned breakups.

Requirement 4.4-4: Limiting the short-term risk to other space systems from planned
breakups:

Compliance statement:
This requirement is not applicable. There are no planned breakups.

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

ODAR Section 5: Assessment of Spacecraft Potential for On-Orbit
Collisions
Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.5-1 and 4.5-2 (per DAS v2.0.2,
and calculation methods provided in NASA-STD-8719.14, section 4.5.4):
Requirement 4.5-1: Limiting debris generated by collisions with large objects when
operating in Earth orbit:
For each spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stage in or passing through LEO, the
program or project shall demonstrate that, during the orbital lifetime of each spacecraft
and orbital stage, the probability of accidental collision with space objects larger than 10
cm in diameter is less than 0.001 (Requirement 56506).

Large Object Impact and Debris Generation Probability:
Collision Probability: 0.00000; COMPLIANT.

Requirement 4.5-2: Limiting debris generated by collisions with small objects when
operating in Earth or lunar orbit:
For each spacecraft, the program or project shall demonstrate that, during the mission of
the spacecraft, the probability of accidental collision with orbital debris and meteoroids
sufficient to prevent compliance with the applicable postmission disposal requirements is
less than 0.01 (Requirement 56507).

Small Object Impact and Debris Generation Probability:
Collision Probability: 0.001479; COMPLIANT.

Identification of all systems or components required to accomplish any postmission
disposal operation, including passivation and maneuvering:
No satellite operations are required for post-mission disposal. In the case that the
spacecraft was non-functional after deployment into orbit at 415 x 415 km, its orbit
would completely decay within 3.7 years (according to DAS software and assumptions of
Section 6.3. From the planned operational orbit of 400 x 400 km, time-to-disposal is
reduced to 3.4 years.

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

ODAR Section 6: Assessment of Spacecraft Post-mission Disposal Plans
and Procedures
6.1 Description of spacecraft disposal option selected: The satellite will de-orbit naturally by
atmospheric re-entry. At the end of SCOUT’s operational life (i.e. at EOM) the attitude control
system will stop counteracting the aerodynamic disturbance torques and will rotate the satellite into
the maximum drag configuration. This will result in SCOUT gradually assuming a dynamically
stable configuration. For atmospheric drag / re-entry calculations in DAS, a minimum cross-section drag
area of 40x40 cm was assumed. This is conservative because it represents the minimum cross section
possible with the satellite in any orientation, ignores protuberances, and ignores gravity gradient, ignores
solar pressure torques, and ignores the high-drag orientation set at EOM.

6.2 Plan for any spacecraft maneuvers required to accomplish postmission disposal:
The stable drag/gravity gradient configuration enables aerodynamic reentry. To accelerate the orbital
decay we plan to orient the satellite in this maximum drag configuration at the end of operations.

6.3 Calculation of area-to-mass ratio after postmission disposal, if the controlled reentry option is
not selected:
Spacecraft Mass: ~47kg
Cross-sectional Area: 0.16 m2
Area to mass ratio: 0.003721 m2/kg
6.4 Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.6-1 through 4.6-5 (per DAS
v 2.0.2 and NASA-STD-8719.14 section):
Requirement 4.6-1: Disposal for space structures passing through LEO:
A spacecraft or orbital stage with a perigee altitude below 2000 km shall be disposed of by one
of three methods:
(Requirement 56557)
a. Atmospheric reentry option:
 Leave the space structure in an orbit in which natural forces will lead to atmospheric
reentry within 25 years after the completion of mission but no more than 30 years after
launch; or
 Maneuver the space structure into a controlled de-orbit trajectory as soon as practical
after completion of mission.
b. Storage orbit option: Maneuver the space structure into an orbit with perigee altitude greater
than 2000 km and apogee less than GEO - 500 km.
c. Direct retrieval: Retrieve the space structure and remove it from orbit within 10 years after
completion of mission.

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Post-ops Life 3.4 years
* assumes no de-orbit propulsion maneuver, which would be done with any remaining propellant and reduce the
post-ops on-orbit lifetime

Requirement 4.6-2. Disposal for space structures near GEO.
Analysis: Not applicable.

Requirement 4.6-3. Disposal for space structures between LEO and GEO.
Analysis: Not applicable.

Requirement 4.6-4. Reliability of Postmission Disposal Operations
Analysis: The minimum drag configuration is the aerodynamically stable state, meaning
that even under massive subsystem failure we would eventually assume this orientation.
This minimum drag configuration was assumed for atmospheric re-entry analysis.

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$Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR) ODAR Section 7: Assessment of Spacecraft Reentry Hazards Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirement 4.7-1: Requirement 4.7-1: Limit the risk of human casualty: The potential for human casualty is assumed for any object with an impacting kinetic energy in excess of 15 joules: a) For uncontrolled reentry, the risk of human casualty from surviving debris shall not exceed 0.0001 (1:10,000) (Requirement 56626). Summary Analysis Results: DAS v2.0.2 reports that SCOUT-1 is compliant with the requirement. According to DAS calculations, there is a low probability that some1 spacecraft components (primary mirror, a machined disk of Invar, and machined blocks of aluminum) may reach the ground (see DAS input data below for input parameters). However, the DAS software does not currently allow explicit modeling of a the specific geometries for these components, so these numbers are expected to be larger than anticipated due to conservatism in the inputs provided to DAS. Total human casualty probability is reported by the DAS software as 1:11,300 for each SCOUT spacecraft. This is expected to represent the absolute maximum casualty risk, as calculated with DAS's limited modeling capability. Analysis (per DAS v2.0.2): 05 14 2014; 14:56:53PM Opened Project U:\Orbital Debris assessment\SCOUT_fromISS\ 05 14 2014; 14:57:00PM Processing Requirement 4.3-1: Return Status : Not Run ===================== No Project Data Available ===================== =============== End of Requirement 4.3-1 =============== 05 14 2014; 14:57:03PM Processing Requirement 4.3-2: Return Status : Passed ===================== No Project Data Available ===================== =============== End of Requirement 4.3-2 =============== 05 14 2014; 14:57:06PM Requirement 4.4-3: Compliant =============== End of Requirement 4.4-3 =============== 05 14 2014; 14:57:09PM Processing Requirement 4.5-1: Return Status : Passed ============== Run Data ============== **INPUT** Space Structure Name = SCOUTv1.001 Space Structure Type = Payload Perigee Altitude = 415.000000 (km) 1 Other components that were modeled (i.e. wire harnesses, PM struts, shim, etc.) are not likely to survive reentry due to the inability to accurately model these with sufficient fidelity within the limitations imposed by DAS. Even with these components accounted for, SCOUT is still compliant with this requirement. Page16$

Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Apogee Altitude = 415.000000 (km)
Inclination = 51.600000 (deg)
RAAN = 0.000000 (deg)
Argument of Perigee = 0.000000 (deg)
Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg)
Final Area-To-Mass Ratio = 0.003721 (m^2/kg)
Start Year = 2015.100000 (yr)
Initial Mass = 46.860000 (kg)
Final Mass = 43.060000 (kg)
Duration = 3.000000 (yr)
Station-Kept = True
Abandoned = True
PMD Perigee Altitude = -1.000000 (km)
PMD Apogee Altitude = -1.000000 (km)
PMD Inclination = 0.000000 (deg)
PMD RAAN = 0.000000 (deg)
PMD Argument of Perigee = 0.000000 (deg)
PMD Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg)

**OUTPUT**

Collision Probability = 0.000000
Returned Error Message: Normal Processing
Date Range Error Message: Normal Date Range
Status = Pass

==============

=============== End of Requirement 4.5-1 ===============

05 14 2014; 14:58:43PM Processing Requirement 4.6 Return Status : Passed

==============
Project Data
==============

**INPUT**

Space Structure Name = SCOUTv1.001
Space Structure Type = Payload

Perigee Altitude = 415.000000 (km)
Apogee Altitude = 415.000000 (km)
Inclination = 51.600000 (deg)
RAAN = 0.000000 (deg)
Argument of Perigee = 0.000000 (deg)
Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg)
Area-To-Mass Ratio = 0.003721 (m^2/kg)
Start Year = 2015.100000 (yr)
Initial Mass = 46.860000 (kg)
Final Mass = 43.060000 (kg)
Duration = 3.000000 (yr)
Station Kept = True
Abandoned = True
PMD Perigee Altitude = 415.000000 (km)
PMD Apogee Altitude = 415.000000 (km)
PMD Inclination = 51.600000 (deg)
PMD RAAN = 0.000000 (deg)
PMD Argument of Perigee = 0.000000 (deg)
PMD Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg)

**OUTPUT**

Suggested Perigee Altitude = 415.000000 (km)
Suggested Apogee Altitude = 415.000000 (km)
Returned Error Message = Passes LEO reentry orbit criteria.

Released Year = 2021 (yr)

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Requirement = 61
Compliance Status = Pass

==============

=============== End of Requirement 4.6 ===============
05 14 2014; 14:58:55PM *********Processing Requirement 4.7-1
Return Status : Passed

***********INPUT****
Item Number = 1

name = SCOUTv1.001
quantity = 1
parent = 0
materialID = 5
type = Box
Aero Mass = 43.060001
Thermal Mass = 43.060001
Diameter/Width = 0.400000
Length = 0.850000
Height = 0.400000

name = Shell
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 27
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.415491
Thermal Mass = 0.415491
Diameter/Width = 0.280000
Length = 0.390000

name = SM baffle
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.054885
Thermal Mass = 0.054885
Diameter/Width = 0.074000
Length = 0.046000

name = SM cover
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.060781
Thermal Mass = 0.060781
Diameter/Width = 0.070000
Length = 0.023000

name = PM
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = -1
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.897660
Thermal Mass = 0.897660
Diameter/Width = 0.223330
Length = 0.223330

name = PM baffle
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.221353

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Thermal Mass = 0.221353
Diameter/Width = 0.116000
Length = 0.186500

name = SM spider
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 72
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.497591
Thermal Mass = 0.497591
Diameter/Width = 0.100000
Length = 0.100000

name = Shutter Housing
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 72
type = Box
Aero Mass = 0.664967
Thermal Mass = 0.664967
Diameter/Width = 0.100000
Length = 0.100000
Height = 0.024200

name = AMS upper plate
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 27
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.097069
Thermal Mass = 0.097069
Diameter/Width = 0.270000
Length = 0.270000

name = AMS core structure
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 7
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.085275
Thermal Mass = 0.085275
Diameter/Width = 0.270000
Length = 0.270000

name = AMS lower plate
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 27
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.097069
Thermal Mass = 0.097069
Diameter/Width = 0.270000
Length = 0.270000

name = Lens Tube Shim
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 54
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.021772
Thermal Mass = 0.021772
Diameter/Width = 0.020000
Length = 0.200000

name = PM Baffle AMS Lock Ring
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.014515
Thermal Mass = 0.014515
Diameter/Width = 0.020000
Length = 0.200000

name = Main PM Mount Flexure
quantity = 3
parent = 1
materialID = 9
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.083915
Thermal Mass = 0.083915
Diameter/Width = 0.101000
Length = 0.138000

name = PM struts
quantity = 3
parent = 1
materialID = 72
type = Box
Aero Mass = 0.032205
Thermal Mass = 0.032205
Diameter/Width = 0.030000
Length = 0.030000
Height = 0.010000

name = Camera
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Box
Aero Mass = 0.160000
Thermal Mass = 0.160000
Diameter/Width = 0.046000
Length = 0.046000
Height = 0.040000

name = MLI
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 44
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.267624
Thermal Mass = 0.267624
Diameter/Width = 0.300000
Length = 0.450000

name = Propulsion Deck Base Plate
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 3.111296
Thermal Mass = 3.111296
Diameter/Width = 0.400000
Length = 0.400000

name = Avionics Deck Base Plate
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 2.481786
Thermal Mass = 2.481786
Diameter/Width = 0.400000
Length = 0.400000

name = Optical Bench Base Plate

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 1.421474
Thermal Mass = 1.421474
Diameter/Width = 0.400000
Length = 0.400000

name = Antenna Deck Base Plate
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.870080
Thermal Mass = 0.870080
Diameter/Width = 0.400000
Length = 0.400000

name = Antenna Deck Extension
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.079654
Thermal Mass = 0.079654
Diameter/Width = 0.029000
Length = 0.400000

name = Corner Rail 1
quantity = 4
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.366623
Thermal Mass = 0.366623
Diameter/Width = 0.045000
Length = 0.820000

name = Side Cross Brace
quantity = 2
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.141457
Thermal Mass = 0.141457
Diameter/Width = 0.035000
Length = 0.450000

name = Center Cross Brace
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.141457
Thermal Mass = 0.141457
Diameter/Width = 0.035000
Length = 0.450000

name = Optical Bench Corner Bracket Assembly
quantity = 4
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Box
Aero Mass = 0.046632
Thermal Mass = 0.046632
Diameter/Width = 0.037000
Length = 0.037000
Height = 0.037000

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Thermal Mass = 0.032400
Diameter/Width = 0.024000
Length = 0.032000

name = Pin Piller Bracket
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Box
Aero Mass = 0.058259
Thermal Mass = 0.058259
Diameter/Width = 0.022500
Length = 0.100000
Height = 0.015000

name = Fasteners
quantity = 150
parent = 1
materialID = 54
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.004370
Thermal Mass = 0.004370
Diameter/Width = 0.006000
Length = 0.020000

name = Light Band Fasteners and Support
quantity = 10
parent = 1
materialID = 54
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.003391
Thermal Mass = 0.003391
Diameter/Width = 0.005500
Length = 0.020000

name = Cortex
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Box
Aero Mass = 2.866799
Thermal Mass = 2.866799
Diameter/Width = 0.151000
Length = 0.161000
Height = 0.106000

name = Antenna Deck Bracket
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.009350
Thermal Mass = 0.009350
Diameter/Width = 0.098000
Length = 0.188000

name = Reaction Wheel 1
quantity = 3
parent = 1
materialID = 54
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.228400
Thermal Mass = 0.228400
Diameter/Width = 0.063000
Length = 0.025400

name = Reaction Wheel Bracket
quantity = 1
parent = 1

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Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Diameter/Width = 0.030000
Length = 0.030000
Height = 0.025400

name = Solar Panel 1
quantity = 6
parent = 1
materialID = 50
type = Flat Plate
Aero Mass = 0.482790
Thermal Mass = 0.482790
Diameter/Width = 0.180000
Length = 0.340000

name = Battery
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Box
Aero Mass = 2.823436
Thermal Mass = 2.823436
Diameter/Width = 0.108000
Length = 0.178000
Height = 0.065000

name = Harnesses
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 19
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 3.000000
Thermal Mass = 3.000000
Diameter/Width = 0.300000
Length = 2.000000

name = Tank
quantity = 2
parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 2.060604
Thermal Mass = 2.060604
Diameter/Width = 0.156000
Length = 0.238000

name = HEX / Insulation / Bracket Assembly
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 66
type = Box
Aero Mass = 0.360508
Thermal Mass = 0.360508
Diameter/Width = 0.054000
Length = 0.114000
Height = 0.023000

name = Propulsion Heat Sink Block Assembly
quantity = 1
parent = 1
materialID = 66
type = Box
Aero Mass = 0.017214
Thermal Mass = 0.017214
Diameter/Width = 0.022000
Length = 0.022000
Height = 0.012500

name = Propulsion Manifold Assembly
quantity = 1

Page25

Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

parent = 1
materialID = 8
type = Box
Aero Mass = 0.389909
Thermal Mass = 0.389909
Diameter/Width = 0.065000
Length = 0.075000
Height = 0.030000

name = Tubing Run 1
quantity = 2
parent = 1
materialID = 54
type = Cylinder
Aero Mass = 0.011045
Thermal Mass = 0.011045
Diameter/Width = 0.002000
Length = 0.800000

name = Tube Fitting
quantity = 8
parent = 1
materialID = 54
type = Sphere
Aero Mass = 0.007923
Thermal Mass = 0.007923
Diameter/Width = 0.010000

**************OUTPUT****
Item Number = 1

name = SCOUTv1.001
Demise Altitude = 77.999285
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Shell
Demise Altitude = 77.778441
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = SM baffle
Demise Altitude = 76.610832
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = SM cover
Demise Altitude = 75.769207
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = PM
Demise Altitude = 0.000000
Debris Casualty Area = 0.677872
Impact Kinetic Energy = 264.036987

*************************************
name = PM baffle
Demise Altitude = 76.494472
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = SM spider
Demise Altitude = 0.000000

Page26

Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Debris Casualty Area = 0.490000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 406.184113

*************************************
name = Shutter Housing
Demise Altitude = 0.000000
Debris Casualty Area = 0.460774
Impact Kinetic Energy = 676.782166

*************************************
name = AMS upper plate
Demise Altitude = 77.892637
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = AMS core structure
Demise Altitude = 77.507426
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = AMS lower plate
Demise Altitude = 77.892637
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Lens Tube Shim
Demise Altitude = 0.000000
Debris Casualty Area = 0.439895
Impact Kinetic Energy = 1.934034

*************************************
name = PM Baffle AMS Lock Ring
Demise Altitude = 77.401269
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Main PM Mount Flexure
Demise Altitude = 76.700136
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = PM struts
Demise Altitude = 0.000000
Debris Casualty Area = 1.169982
Impact Kinetic Energy = 15.642425

*************************************
name = Camera
Demise Altitude = 72.600902
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = MLI
Demise Altitude = 77.885840
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Propulsion Deck Base Plate
Demise Altitude = 65.495984
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

Page27

Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = OTA Cover - deployed
Demise Altitude = 75.167199
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Lid Hinge
Demise Altitude = 75.399691
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Pin Puller
Demise Altitude = 75.087683
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Pin Piller Bracket
Demise Altitude = 75.704840
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Fasteners
Demise Altitude = 74.831433
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Light Band Fasteners and Support
Demise Altitude = 75.312480
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Cortex
Demise Altitude = 63.263124
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Antenna Deck Bracket
Demise Altitude = 77.883558
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Reaction Wheel 1
Demise Altitude = 65.958378
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Reaction Wheel Bracket
Demise Altitude = 73.449707
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Torque Rod 1
Demise Altitude = 59.367343
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

Page29

Scout 1 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR)

Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Tubing Run 1
Demise Altitude = 77.429308
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************
name = Tube Fitting
Demise Altitude = 66.455019
Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000
Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000

*************************************

=============== End of Requirement 4.7-1 ===============

Requirements 4.7-1b, and 4.7-1c below are non-applicable requirements because
SCOUT does not use controlled reentry.

4.7-1, b) NOT APPLICABLE. For controlled reentry, the selected trajectory shall
ensure that no surviving debris impact with a kinetic energy greater than 15 joules is
closer than 370 km from foreign landmasses, or is within 50 km from the continental
U.S., territories of the U.S., and the permanent ice pack of Antarctica (Requirement
56627).
4.7-1 c) NOT APPLICABLE. For controlled reentries, the product of the probability of
failure of the reentry burn (from Requirement 4.6-4.b) and the risk of human casualty
assuming uncontrolled reentry shall not exceed 0.0001 (1:10,000) (Requirement 56628).

ODAR Section 8: Assessment for Tether Missions
Not applicable. There are no tethers in the Scout 1 mission.

END of ODAR for SCOUT 1

Page31

Document Created: 2014-05-15 13:14:23
Document Modified: 2014-05-15 13:14:23