SpaceX Response to F

LETTER submitted by Space Exploration Holdings, LLC

SpaceX Response to FCC Information Request

2019-03-13

This document pretains to SAT-MOD-20181108-00083 for Modification on a Satellite Space Stations filing.

IBFS_SATMOD2018110800083_1636825

March 13, 2019


BY ELECTRONIC FILING

Jose P. Albuquerque
Chief, Satellite Division
International Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
445 Twelfth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20554

         Re:      Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083

Dear Mr. Albuquerque:

        On behalf of Space Exploration Holdings, LLC (“SpaceX”), we hereby respond to your
letter dated February 26, 2019, in which you have requested additional information with respect
to the above referenced application to modify SpaceX’s existing authorization to deploy and
operate a non-geostationary orbit (“NGSO”) satellite system. 1

1. Please provide an estimate of the collision risk, using NASA Debris Assessment Software or
   another recognized estimation tool, for a single satellite, assuming a propulsion or other
   system failure that renders the satellite incapable of collision avoidance immediately
   following orbital injection. Please provide that estimate assuming a satellite in both a stowed
   and a fully deployed configuration.

         Due to SpaceX’s decision to minimize risk by using the low injection altitude of 350 km,

in the unlikely event any satellites after the initial launch experience immediate failure upon

deployment, they would decay to the point of demise very quickly – as little as two weeks to at

most eight months depending on the solar cycle. Consistent with the prevailing NASA safety

standard, which the Commission has regularly relied upon for orbital debris mitigation

assessments, 2 the probability of accidental collision between a spacecraft passing through low-


1
    Letter from Jose P. Albuquerque to William M. Wiltshire and Paul Caritj, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-
    00083 (Feb. 26, 2019).
2
    See Requirement 4.5-1, NASA Technical Standard, Process for Limiting Orbital Debris, NASA-STD-8719.14A
    (with Change 1), at 32 (May 25, 2012), available at https://standards nasa.gov/standard/nasa/nasa-std-871914.

HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP | 1919 M STREET | EIGHTH FLOOR | WASHINGTON DC 20036 | T 202 730 1300 | F 202 730 1301


HarRs, WiLtsHIRE & GRaNNIS LLP

Jose P. Albuguerque
March 13, 2019
Page 2 of 6

Earth orbit and space objects larger than 10 em in diameter is calculated to be less than 0.001.

Specifically, using NASA‘s Debris Assessment Software ("DAS"), the probability of collision

between a space object larger than 10 cm in diameter and a SpaceX satellite if rendered totally

incapacitated immediately following orbital injection is shown in Table 1 below:




                                                                                          0.000000114


                                                  0.000000274                             0.000000137

                          Table 1. Collision Risk of Incapacitated Satellite

Accordingly, SpaceX satellites satisfy the NASA safety standard by several orders of magnitude.

Indeed, even assuming a highly unlikely and apocryphal case in which all 1,584 satellites proposed

for deployment at 550 km were immediately incapable of maneuvering upon orbital injection,

remained in a stowed configuration, and were de—orbiting during a period of solar minimum, the

aggregate probability of collision would be 1,584 x 0.000000303 = 0.00048 — which is still less

than half the 0.001 probability standard established by NASA.                     This extreme case is highly

improbable given that SpaceX will deploy satellites in considerably smaller increments per launch,

allowing SpaceX to halt deployments until it can address the root cause of such an extreme and

unlikely widespread fault.




   See also Mitigation ofOrbital Debris in the NewSpace Age, FCC 18—159, 4 6 (2018) ("Both applicants and the
   Commission, however, have relied in a number of cases on standards and related assessment tools, such as the
   technical standards and related software tools developed byNASA for its space activities, to, respectively, prepare
   such orbital debris plans and assess their adequacy.").


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Jose P. Albuquerque
March 13, 2019
Page 3 of 6

        As is clear from Table 1, one of the key assumptions in the DAS analysis is the stage of

the solar cycle at the time of de-orbit. 3 During solar-max, the atmosphere swells up, making re-

entry occur much more rapidly than during periods of solar-min. SpaceX expects a majority of its

launches will happen at or near periods of solar-max. However, in the interest of showing a full

range of outcomes, SpaceX has also provided a collision estimate assuming a local solar minimum

such as that expected in the year 2029. As Table 1 demonstrates, the probability of collision

satisfies the NASA standard under all of these scenarios.

2. Please indicate whether, as currently designed, the proposed satellites are capable of a
   controlled re-entry, i.e., re-entry specifically and reliably targeted at broad ocean areas, away
   from human populations.

        SpaceX assumes that this question arises in connection with the system’s imputed human

casualty risk. As indicated in earlier filings, SpaceX has been working continuously towards the

most direct method to minimize any such risk from its existing architecture to maximize the safety

of the system by achieving 100% demisability of each of its spacecraft. After extensive research

and investment, SpaceX has now developed a system architecture that will be completely

demisable in versions subsequent to the initial deployment of satellites, which will be comprised

of fewer than 75 satellites. As discussed below, after deploying that initial design of spacecraft,

no components of subsequent iterations of the satellite will survive atmospheric re-entry, reducing

casualty risk to zero.




3
    By contrast, the vehicle configuration (i.e., stowed vs. deployed) has relatively little effect on collision risk
    because the risks involved are offsetting. In other words, the smaller area of a stowed satellite reduces the
    likelihood of collision but also increases the time required for atmospheric demise. A fully deployed satellite
    presents a larger area for collision but experiences more drag and thus de-orbits more quickly.


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Jose P. Albuquerque
March 13, 2019
Page 4 of 6

       All versions of the SpaceX spacecraft will leverage Hall-effect electric propulsion. These

efficient propulsion systems are ideal for orbit raising, station-keeping maneuvers including the

ability to avoid other satellites and debris, and initiating the de-orbit process by lowering the

satellites’ perigee from 550 km to approximately 300 km. In fact, the efficiency of these ion

thrusters improves the overall safety of the system by enabling the vehicles to perform a vastly

greater number of maneuvers for the same amount of fuel compared to alternative systems. These

advanced systems achieve this level of efficiency by employing very low thrust, which on the other

hand limits the ability to target re-entry precisely. Adding that type of functionality for the initial

spacecraft design would involve a distinct trade-off.       Specifically, the addition of secondary

propulsion systems necessary for targeted re-entry would also require larger tanks and additional

fuel that in turn bring a significantly higher risk of explosion, undercutting the relative safety

benefits of targeted re-entry.


3. Please provide any updates concerning the additional, high fidelity studies of casualty risk
   during re-entry mentioned at Application, Technical Information Exhibit, p. 47.

       The higher fidelity study using NASA’s Object Reentry Survival Analysis (“ORSAT”) tool

of the fewer than 75 first-generation SpaceX satellites that will not fully demise in the atmosphere

has not been completed at this time.


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Jose P. Albuquerque
March 13, 2019
Page 5 of 6

4. In the event a high fidelity study has not been completed:

    a. Please state SpaceX’s current plans with respect to the number of satellites that will
       carry each of the alternative components discussed at pages 45-46 of the Technical
       Information Exhibit.

        As discussed in its application, SpaceX plans to deploy two versions of its initial satellites

with configurations that include a slightly different set of components.          The first version,

comprising fewer than 75 satellites, will include an iron thruster and steel reaction wheels on each

satellite. As a result of its continuing efforts to attain full demisability, SpaceX now expects to

replace the thruster and reaction wheel components in subsequent satellites to use components that

will demise fully in the atmosphere. SpaceX no longer intends to deploy any satellites that include

the silicon carbide component originally contemplated.


    b. Please provide any additional information and analysis to support the choice of
       materials that will not demise upon re-entry.

        At present, a small number of components incorporated in the initial satellite design version

will be more resistant to demise in re-entry. Only a limited number of this version of satellites

will be deployed. Thereafter, as discussed above, SpaceX’s drive towards complete demisability

has led to great strides across the spacecraft such that SpaceX now plans for a fully demisable

spacecraft after the initial design version.


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Jose P. Albuquerque
March 13, 2019
Page 6 of 6

                        *                      *                     *

       Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.


                                            Sincerely,




                                            William M. Wiltshire
                                            Counsel to SpaceX



Document Created: 2019-04-28 04:33:02
Document Modified: 2019-04-28 04:33:02

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