SpaceX Consolidated MOD Opposition OPPOSITION by Space Exploration Holdings, LLC SAT-MOD-20181108-00083 SpaceX Consolidated

SpaceX Consolidated

OPPOSITION submitted by Space Exploration Holdings, LLC

SpaceX Consolidated MOD Opposition

2019-02-11

This document pretains to SAT-MOD-20181108-00083 for Modification on a Satellite Space Stations filing.

IBFS_SATMOD2018110800083_1625055

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

___________________________________
)
Application of )
)
SPACE EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, LLC ) Call Signs: S2983 and S3018
)
For Modification of Authorization for the ) File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083
SpaceX NGSO Satellite System )
____________________________________)

CONSOLIDATED OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS AND RESPONSE
TO COMMENTS OF SPACE EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, LLC

In this response, Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Space

Exploration Technologies Corp. (collectively, “SpaceX”), opposes the petitions to defer or deny

the above-referenced application for modification of SpaceX’s authorization to launch and operate

a non-geostationary orbit (“NGSO”) satellite system. 1 Four operators of small NGSO satellites

(“smallsats”) and their trade association (collectively, “Petitioners”) raise a set of issues in the

petitions and comments about collision avoidance—that they acknowledge are better suited for an

industry-wide proceeding. Because SpaceX is already obligated to comply with the results of that

proceeding, the Commission should follow its general practice and not delay deployment of this

new broadband service for consumers based on issues applicable industry-wide.

Specifically, most of the issues raised by Petitioners combine to form a broad policy

proposal to assign disproportionate responsibility to avoid on-orbit collisions among systems

1
See Comments and Petition to Defer (“CSSMA Comments”); Petition to Defer (“Astro Digital Petition”);
Comments and Conditional Petition to Deny of Kepler Communications Inc. (“Kepler Comments”); Petition to
Defer (“Planet Labs Petition); and Petition to Defer (“Spire Petition”). All these filings were submitted in IBFS
File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083 on January 29, 2019.

1

operating at 400 km to 600 km altitude principally to propulsive systems like SpaceX, and away

from smallsat operators. In effect, this new policy would skew incentives by tilting the benefits

of operating at these self-cleaning altitudes to non-propulsive smallsats to the great detriment of

systems that invested in more capable collision-avoidance technologies. But regardless of the

flaws in the merits of such assertions, these kinds of far-reaching policy claims are not specific to

SpaceX and are better addressed within the separate pending proceeding on orbital debris

mitigation rules.

Moreover, the Commission already addressed Petitioners’ request for a requirement that

SpaceX coordinate its physical operations with other NGSO systems at similar orbital altitudes by

imposing that very condition as part of SpaceX’s original. Because SpaceX satellites are able to

dodge other satellites and debris, the Commission appropriately considers the risk of collision

between SpaceX satellites and other spacecraft to be zero—obviating the need for any further

analysis. Finally, while one Petitioner raises spectral interference concerns, the application for the

proposed modification includes analysis that demonstrates that it will not increase interference

from the original license. Accordingly, Petitioners have raised no reason to deny or defer the

application, and the Commission should grant it promptly.

BACKGROUND

Last year, the Commission authorized SpaceX to construct, deploy, and operate an NGSO

constellation consisting of 4,425 satellites operating in 83 orbital planes at five different altitudes

ranging from 1,110 km to 1,325 km, using Ku- and Ka-band spectrum. 2 By its own terms, that

authorization “is subject to modification to bring it into conformance with any rules or policies

2
See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 33 FCC Rcd. 148 (2018) (“SpaceX Authorization”).

2

adopted by the Commission in the future.” 3 In addition, SpaceX is subject to “the requirement

that it coordinate its physical operations with space stations of NGSO systems operating at similar

orbital altitudes.” 4

To accelerate its deployment schedule, SpaceX has proposed a modification of its license

that would relocate 1,584 satellites previously authorized to operate at an altitude of 1,150 km to

an altitude of 550 km. 5 SpaceX demonstrated, among other things, that this move will enhance

the considerable space safety attributes of its constellation by ensuring that any orbital debris will

undergo rapid atmospheric re-entry and demise, even in the unlikely event that a spacecraft fails

in orbit. 6 Critically, SpaceX did not request relief from the obligations to comply with rules

adopted in the future and to coordinate its physical operations in good faith with other NGSO

systems.

Petitioners now request that the Commission defer a decision on SpaceX’s application

pending the conclusion of the recently initiated rulemaking on orbital debris mitigation. 7

Petitioners also suggest that the Commission should impose a new obligation that SpaceX submit

a collision risk analysis. In addition, one Petitioner (Kepler) asserts that lowering the altitude of

SpaceX’s satellites and temporarily using Ku-band for both user terminals and gateways would

result in increased interference.

3
Id. ¶ 40(r).
4
Id. ¶ 11.
5
See Application for Modification of Authorization for the SpaceX NGSO Satellite System, IBFS File No. SAT-
MOD-20181108-00083 (Nov. 8, 2018) (“SpaceX Modification”).
6
SpaceX also noted other benefits of operating at lower altitude, including reduced signal latency and improved
spectral efficiency. See, e.g., id. at 8.
7
See Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, FCC 18-159 (rel. Nov. 19, 2018) (“Orbital Debris
NPRM”).

3

DISCUSSION

I. THE COMMISSION DOES NOT DEFER APPLICATIONS BASED ON CONCERNS OF GENERAL
APPLICABILITY THAT WILL BE ADDRESSED IN ONGOING RULEMAKINGS

CSSMA is correct that many of its arguments amount to wide-ranging policy proposals.

CSSMA notes that these types of “policy issues regarding the sharing of valuable orbital resources

. . . are more appropriately addressed in the Commission’s pending proceeding on the mitigation

of orbital debris.” 8 SpaceX agrees, and more importantly, so does the Commission. But insisting

that the Commission not act on a specific application because of these broad policy proposals runs

wholly counter to Commission precedent—and good policy. Rather than defer applications

pending the completion of a rulemaking proceeding, the Commission routinely grants them subject

to any new policies or rules that it may adopt. Any other approach would open the door to mischief

by competitors and make the regulatory burden on deploying new services nearly insurmountable.

Indeed, that reasoning led the Commission to choose this course with respect to SpaceX’s

original application. Several parties (including one of the Petitioners, Spire) raised concerns that

touched on larger, industry-wide issues—including some related to orbital debris. As the

Commission explained, these concerns did not warrant delay in granting SpaceX’s application.

[G]rant of the SpaceX application will not prejudge any decision, including a
contrary action, in any future rulemaking proceedings. Rather, decisions of general
applicability in such proceedings will be based on the totality of comments and
proposals in those proceedings, including SpaceX’s. Accordingly, in addition to
being subject to any future proceedings, SpaceX would have to comply with any
new orbital debris requirements. 9

8
CSSMA Comments at 1. Other Petitioners echo this assertion that SpaceX’s proposed modification “raises
significant policy issues that are likely to be addressed in the Commission’s pending proceeding on the mitigation
of orbital debris.” See Astro Digital Petition at 2; Planet Labs Petition at 2; Spire Petition at 2.
9
SpaceX Authorization, ¶ 17.

4

The Commission’s policy wisely ensures that the deployment of valuable services is not unduly

delayed while issues that affect the entire industry are debated in the larger context of a proceeding

for all operators. Indeed, the Commission may decide in that proceeding to adopt rules that allocate

responsibility for collision avoidance maneuvers or rules that dramatically affect smallsats’

collision avoidance capabilities. In this context, physical coordination among NGSO systems in

the 400-600 km region could undergo dramatic alterations. 10 Thus, Petitioners’ request for deferral

while that larger debate takes place stands on its head both Commission precedent and intentions,

and the request should be rejected.

II. PETITIONERS’ PHYSICAL COORDINATION CONCERNS CANNOT JUSTIFY USING SPACEX’S
APPLICATION TO ESSENTIALLY RESERVE 200 KM OF SPACE FOR SMALLSATS ONLY

Petitioners focus their concern on the region of space from 400-600 km—altitudes used by

many smallsat operators including Petitioners—and on whether moving a portion of SpaceX’s

NGSO system to 550 km would introduce a new source of potential complications. As an initial

matter, Petitioners’ claims are not specific to SpaceX and apply to any new system applying to

operate in these 200 km of space. As such, these arguments are better considered as part of the

larger proceeding and should not delay consideration of SpaceX’s application.

Even so, the arguments raised lack merit. CSSMA asserts that the 400-600 km orbital range

“is ideal for many cubesat systems and other similar-sized systems that do not have propulsion”

because “[a]t these altitudes, such systems would be able to operate for several years before

naturally de-orbiting within NASA’s recommended 25-year guideline.” 11 Yet this very same

characteristic makes this orbital range ideal for other systems as well. As the Commission has

10
See, e.g., Streamlining Licensing Procedures for Small Satellites, 33 FCC Rcd. 4152, ¶ 34 (2018) (proposing that
systems operating above the International Space Station be required to have propulsion in order to perform
collision avoidance maneuvers).
11
CSSMA Comments at 4.

5

recognized, satellites deployed below 650 km will typically re-enter Earth’s atmosphere within

25 years, even absent any propulsive or other special de-orbit capabilities. “Thus, the collision

risks presented by such satellites are generally lower, even if the satellites fail on-orbit and are

unable to perform any affirmative de-orbiting maneuvers.” 12 These favorable orbital debris

qualities are one of the primary reasons SpaceX has proposed to operate at 550 km. Moreover, in

its Orbital Debris NPRM, the Commission has proposed several rules designed specifically to

encourage heavier use of orbital altitudes below 650 km in light of the fact that atmospheric drag

will quickly result in de-orbit of debris. 13 Petitioners’ proposals would effectively lay claim to the

400-600 km range of altitudes on behalf of smallsats—a clearly inequitable and unjustified

outcome—and undermine the Commission’s larger orbital debris mitigation efforts.

As the Commission has made clear, the 400-600 km region of space has characteristics that

are attractive from a wide range of operational and regulatory perspectives. Every NGSO operator

has an obligation to coordinate its physical operations in good faith, and thereafter operate in a

manner that optimizes safety and minimizes the potential for orbital debris. Only by doing so can

the full potential of this valuable region of space be realized. In these circumstances, no one can

expect to reserve tens or hundreds of kilometers of space for their own use to the exclusion of other

types of NGSO systems. Moreover, doing so would set the wrong incentives. These sorts of

12
Orbital Debris NPRM, ¶ 31. CSSMA argues that SpaceX’s plan to replace de-orbited satellites “completely
negates the benefits that a shortening of orbital lifetimes would typically have on the overall risk of collision.”
CSSMA Comments, Technical Annex at 1. This argument completely misses the mark, as the benefit of rapid
demise applies to passive objects (including malfunctioning satellites), which increases the reliability of de-orbit
– satisfying the new, stricter parameters NASA recently proposed for safe operation of large NGSO constellations.
See J.-C. Liou, et al., NASA ODPO’s Large Constellation Study, ORBITAL DEBRIS QUARTERLY NEWS, at 4-7
(Sept. 2018) (suggesting that post-mission disposal within five years at a 99% success rate would mitigate the
debris concern related to large NGSO constellations), available at https://orbitaldebris.jsc nasa.gov/quarterly-
news/pdfs/odqnv22i3.pdf.
13
See, e.g., Orbital Debris NPRM, ¶¶ 31 (requiring explanation for choosing orbital altitude above 650 km), 43
(imposing reliability requirement for satellites operating above 600-650 km), 46 (requiring showing on reliability
of post-mission disposal), 48 (requiring initial deployment and testing below 650 km before orbit raise to
operational altitude).

6

policies would benefit those that do not invest in sharing-friendly technology at the expense of

those that do. These policies will drive all operators to invest less in collision avoidance, resulting

in fewer services for customers and more overall debris. A better approach would be to encourage

investment in better technologies, such as by imposing responsibility on systems with limited

propulsive abilities to demonstrate how their constellations minimize the risk of collision.

In contrast, SpaceX is committed to working with the Commission, all NGSO operators, the

Combined Space Operations Center, and other interested stakeholders to optimize space safety in

all altitudes where its satellites operate. Thus, the Commission should not exclude a portion of its

NGSO constellation from this desirable operational altitude.

III. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR DEFERRING THIS APPLICATION BECAUSE THE COMMISSION AND
SPACEX HAVE ALREADY ADDRESSED THE CONDITIONS REQUESTED BY PETITIONERS

While SpaceX questions the merits of the concerns raised by Petitioners, even if the

Commission were to accept those concerns, they still provide no basis for delay because Petitioners

already have the relief they request. For example, SpaceX stated in its original application that it

“will continue to stay current with the Space Situational Awareness community and technology

and, if appropriate, SpaceX will modify this mitigation statement to continue its leadership in this

area.” 14 Thereafter, the Commission conditioned SpaceX’s license on a requirement that SpaceX

comply with Commission rules adopted in the future and coordinate its physical operations in good

faith with other NGSO systems. 15

Petitioners’ other request for relief—that SpaceX be required to submit a collision risk

analysis for its proposed operations at 550 km—is not necessary. As the Commission recently

14
Application, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118, Technical Attachment A at 50.
15
See SpaceX Authorization, ¶¶ 11 and 40(r).

7

confirmed, if an operator’s orbital debris mitigation plan includes maneuvering to avoid collisions,

the Commission will consider the collision risk to be essentially zero. 16 SpaceX has made clear

that it intends to conduct active maneuvers to avoid collisions with both debris and other spacecraft

throughout the life of its satellites, even through the de-orbit phase until the spacecraft enters the

atmosphere. 17 Accordingly, consistent with the Commission’s licensing practice, the collision risk

for SpaceX satellites is deemed to be essentially zero no matter where they are deployed—

obviating the need for any further analysis and satisfying Petitioners’ request. 18

Petitioners’ other arguments revisit and re-litigate issues the Commission already resolved.

For instance, CSSMA seems to be particularly worried about potential collisions during the period

that SpaceX is raising its satellites from orbital insertion to their operational altitude. 19 Yet the

proposed modification will actually ameliorate this concern. Under its original license, SpaceX

has consistently stated it plans to transition all of its satellites from an insertion altitude of

approximately 400 km to their 1,150 km operational altitude. 20 In other words, the orbit raise

impact of the modified altitude of 550 km lessens that original concern, which itself was not

16
See Orbital Debris NPRM, ¶ 26 (seeking comment on “whether, if a spacecraft’s orbital debris mitigation plan
includes maneuvering to avoid collisions, we should, consistent with current licensing practice, consider this risk
to be zero or near zero during the period of time in which the spacecraft is maneuverable”). Moreover, contrary
to Petitioners’ assertion, SpaceX is not “proposing to operate in ‘identical’ or ‘very similar’ low-Earth orbits as
other constellations.” See, e.g., Astro Digital Petition at 2; Planet Labs Petition at 2; Spire Petition at 2. For
example, while SpaceX proposes to maintain its satellites at a fairly stable orbital altitude, smallsat operators
intentionally allow their satellites’ orbits to degrade over time. In addition, most smallsats are placed in near-
polar or sun synchronous orbits, while SpaceX proposes to operate at 550 km with an inclination of just 53
degrees.
17
See, e.g., SpaceX Modification, Exhibit A at 39.
18
This ability to maneuver also addresses CSSMA’s concern about greater spatial density of the SpaceX system
due to reduced in-track separation distance at 550 km. See CSSMA Comments at 3
19
See CSSMA Comments, Technical Annex at 2. Because SpaceX will be in contact with its satellites throughout
the process of orbit-raising and have access to detailed location information, there is no basis for CSSMA’s
assertions that “the accuracy of their positional information is reduced” during such transit periods. Id.
20
See SpaceX Modification, Attachment A at 44.

8

sufficient to draw comments from CSSMA. By orbit raising only to the lower operational altitude

for its first deployment of spacecraft, SpaceX will eliminate any risk from physical interaction

with these transiting SpaceX satellites for other systems operating across the wide and busy orbits

from 550-1,150 km. Indeed, the modified altitude would remove any risk from orbit raise for any

smallsats operating from 550-600 km altitude.

CSSMA also asserts, “SpaceX should be required to take active responsibility for collision

avoidance during orbit raising and end-of-life de-orbiting through low-Earth orbit.” 21 SpaceX has

already stated that “it will maintain active control of its satellites” and that it will “perform any

collision avoidance maneuvers that might be required during this process,” 22 which should again

fully address CSSMA’s concern. 23 Here again, there is nothing more required.

IV. KEPLER’S INTERFERENCE CONCERNS DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY

Kepler raises interference arguments similar to those that the Commission considered and

resolved in SpaceX’s original licenses, but now adds—without analysis—that SpaceX’s proposed

modification would increase interference by moving to a lower altitude and temporarily using the

Ku-band for a limited number of gateways. Specifically, because Kepler operates its constellation

21
CSSMA Comments at 6.
22
See Letter from William M. Wiltshire to Jose P. Albuquerque, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118, at 2
(Apr. 20, 2017) (“SpaceX will maintain active control of its satellites as they are gradually lowered to orbits with
a perigee of at most 300 km, and allocate propellant budgets so that it can perform any collision avoidance
maneuvers that might be required during this process.”).
23
CSSMA also erroneously cites a SpaceX filing made in opposition to a 125 km “buffer zone” between NGSO
systems that OneWeb proposed, in which SpaceX noted that the systems were separated by at least 50 km and
argued that this should be more than sufficient to ensure safe operations. See CSSMA Comments, Technical
Annex at 2 (citing Letter from William M. Wiltshire to Marlene H. Dortch, IBFS File Nos. SAT-LOA-20161115-
00118 and SAT-LOA-20170301-00027 (Dec. 12, 2017) (“SpaceX Letter”)). From this, CSSMA reaches the
bizarre conclusion that by saying that 50 km is more than enough distance, SpaceX was somehow arguing that
50 km was the minimum sufficient distance. CSSMA Comments, Technical Annex at 2. SpaceX said no such
thing. Rather, SpaceX made clear that it opposed the entire buffer zone concept, arguing that “no justification
was provided for such enormous separations that would effectively sterilize a large swath of space from further
development.” SpaceX Letter at 1.

9

procedures would need to be implemented. Although Kepler also raises the somewhat conflicting

concern that SpaceX might not have enough satellite beams available to mitigate interference via

pointing, 27 the SpaceX constellation will still have sufficient satellite diversity at every point in its

service area to manage in-line events that do occur. Accordingly, gateway operations in the Ku-

band should have no material effect on Kepler’s operations.

CONCLUSION

Petitioners have provided no basis for deferring or denying SpaceX’s modification

application. Most of the concerns raised relate to industry-wide issues that even Petitioners

recognize are more appropriately resolved in ongoing rulemaking proceedings. In addition, the

relief Petitioners request is already in place as part of SpaceX’s existing authorization that makes

rules adopted in the future applicable and requires good faith coordination of physical operations.

Moreover, the addition of a few Ku-band gateways operating among a very large number of Ku-

band user terminals should have no material effect on Kepler’s operations. Accordingly, the

Commission should grant the modification application so that SpaceX can proceed with its plans

for expedited deployment of its NGSO constellation.

27
See Kepler Petition at 3.

11

Respectfully submitted,

SPACE EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, LLC

By: _/s/ Tim Hughes________
Tim Hughes
William M. Wiltshire Senior Vice President, Global Business
Paul Caritj and Government Affairs
HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP Patricia Cooper
1919 M Street, N.W. Vice President of Satellite Government
Suite 800 Affairs
Washington, DC 20036
202-730-1300 tel SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
202-730-1301 fax 1155 F Street, NW
Suite 475
Counsel to SpaceX Washington, DC 20004
202-649-2700 tel
202-649-2701 fax

February 11, 2019

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on this 11th day of February, 2019, a copy of the foregoing pleading

was served via First Class mail upon:

Craig Scheffler
President, Commercial Smallsat
Spectrum Management Association
555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004

Jan King
Chief Technology Officer
Astro Digital U.S., Inc.
3171 Jay Street
Santa Clara, CA 95054

Nick G. Spina
Director, Launch & Regulatory Affairs
Kepler Communications Inc.
675 King Street West, #204
Toronto, ON Canada
M5V 1M9

Tony Lin
Daniel Landesberg
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004

Rich Leshner
Vice President, Government and Regulatory Affairs
Planet Labs Inc.
645 Harrison Street, Floor 4
San Francisco, CA 94107

George John
Lead Legal & Regulatory Counsel
Spire Global, Inc.
575 Florida Street, Suite 150
San Francisco, CA 94110

/s/ Samuel D. Sperling
Samuel D. Sperling

Document Created: 2019-04-26 13:17:18
Document Modified: 2019-04-26 13:17:18

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