Response to OneWeb O

Ex PARTE PRESENTATION NOTIFICATION LETTER submitted by Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP

Response to OneWeb Orbital Debris Ex Parte

2017-12-12

This document pretains to SAT-LOA-20170301-00027 for Application to Launch and Operate on a Satellite Space Stations filing.

IBFS_SATLOA2017030100027_1314109

December 12, 2017


BY ELECTRONIC FILING
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission
445 Twelfth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20554

        Re:      Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS File Nos. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118
                 and SAT-LOA-20170301-00027

Dear Ms. Dortch:

        On December 8, 2017, Patricia Cooper, Mark Krebs (by phone), Mihai Albulet (by phone),
and undersigned counsel on behalf of Space Exploration Holdings, LLC (“SpaceX”) met with Jose
Albuquerque, Karl Kensinger, Stephen Duall (by phone), and Jay Whaley (by phone) of the
Commission’s International Bureau to respond to the nearly identical ex parte letters recently filed
by WorldVu Satellites Limited (“OneWeb”) expressing safety-related concerns about the non-
geostationary orbit (“NGSO”) satellite systems proposed in the above referenced applications.1
        First, SpaceX noted to the Commission that there are least 50 km separating the SpaceX
and OneWeb NGSO systems as filed,2 which ensures safe operations, unless OneWeb
inappropriately plans to occupy an unjustifiably large range of available altitudes. SpaceX
confirmed its confidence that its own constellation would be more than capable of operating safely,
consistent with the filed orbits of both OneWeb and SpaceX. SpaceX also referred to the
Commission’s recent rejection of OneWeb’s recommendation to reserve a large “buffer zone”
around its constellation,3 commenting that no justification was provided for such enormous
separations that would effectively sterilize a large swath of space from further development.



1
    See Letters from Brian D. Weimer to Marlene H. Dortch, IBFS File Nos. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118 and SAT-
    LOA-20170301-00027 (Nov. 17, 2017). Because these letters are nearly identical, they will be referred to herein
    collectively as the “OneWeb Letter.”
2
    OneWeb proposes to operate its NGSO system at an altitude of 1,200 km. SpaceX proposes to operate its NGSO
    system at several altitudes – specifically, 1,110 km, 1,130 km, 1,150 km, 1,275 km, and 1,325 km. Inexplicably,
    OneWeb repeatedly asserts that these orbits are “interwoven” or “interleave[d]” or “overlapping.” See OneWeb
    Letter at 1-4. SpaceX also proposes to operate a portion of its V-band constellation at much lower altitudes
    (335.9-345.6 km).
3
    See Telesat Canada, FCC 17-147, ¶ 12 (rel. Nov. 3, 2017) (“Telesat Order”).


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Marlene H. Dortch
December 12, 2017
Page 2 of 6

       Second, regarding the potential risk of orbital debris, SpaceX noted that it has demonstrated
throughout this proceeding that its NGSO system will meet or surpass all current Commission
requirements and international norms for de-orbit and risk. The company also continues to drive
the expectation of de-orbit risk downward with ongoing innovations in both spacecraft design and
on-orbit operational enhancements, including through its collaboration with both NASA and the
Joint Space Operations Center (“JSpOC”).
        Furthermore, the proposed adoption of some new and unannounced standard would be
antithetical to the Commission’s rulemaking process, and any eventual changes in requirements
clearly should then apply equally to all NGSO applicants. SpaceX is fully committed to
maintaining a safe space environment for future development and exploration, and recognizes the
responsibility held by all those who plan to operate in space. Orbital spacing and de-orbit
procedures are just two of the many aspects of space safety, and the potential interactions among
multiple large NGSO constellations are important to address properly to ensure safe operations in
space. The operational concerns and recommendations for regulatory or best practice standards
should be identified and addressed through a Commission rulemaking, wherein all interested
parties can participate and provide expert advice. That approach will allow the Commission to
adopt rules of general applicability so that the entire satellite industry meets the standards
necessary to safeguard this valuable resource. Indeed, this is the approach that OneWeb itself
supported earlier this year before its own authorization was granted.4
        SpaceX agrees that the operations of its proposed NGSO constellation and any other NGSO
system licensed by the Commission should be subject to any such orbital debris or space safety
rules adopted in the future. Applying new and uncodified rules in the midst of a processing round
to the benefit of one applicant over others, however, would be unprecedented and would
undermine sound regulatory policy. Moreover, as discussed below, the specific issues OneWeb
has raised should be no impediment to granting SpaceX’s application.

       In granting OneWeb authority to access the U.S. market, the Commission noted that
OneWeb’s NGSO system would operate “at an approximate altitude of 1200 kilometers.”5
However, OneWeb now asserts that its system will operate at altitudes that vary by 75 km above
and below its stated orbit at 1,200 km.6 This is a far larger orbital variance than any other NGSO

4
    See Letter from Douglas A. Svor to Marlene H. Dortch, IBFS File No. SAT-LOI-20160428-00041 (June 16,
    2017) (OneWeb “expressed its view that the NGSO FSS rulemaking process is the proper forum for resolution of
    all items related to the ongoing NGSO FSS proceeding” and that “no decisions on such items should be made in
    connection with OneWeb’s pending Petition for Declaratory Ruling”). Indeed, it appears that OneWeb raised
    many of these same concerns about space safety in the context of the recent NGSO FSS rulemaking. See Letter
    from Samuel L. Feder to Marlene H. Dortch, IB Docket No. 16-408, Attachment at 15-25 (Nov. 3, 2017).
5
    See WorldVu Satellites Limited, 32 FCC Rcd. 5366, ¶ 2 (2017) (“OneWeb Authorization Order”).
6
    See OneWeb Letter at 10 n.20.


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Marlene H. Dortch
December 12, 2017
Page 3 of 6

applicant expects to maintain.7 OneWeb provides no justification for its claim to such a large
operational range for its system. It is this variance from its stated orbital altitude that creates the
“overlap” that OneWeb now cites as problematic.
        In granting market access, the Commission did not discuss (much less endorse) OneWeb’s
proposed ± 75 km area of operations. The Commission did, however, impose a condition requiring
OneWeb to “coordinate physical operations of spacecraft with any operator using similar orbits,
for the purpose of eliminating collision risk and minimizing operational impacts,” and put OneWeb
on notice that “[t]he orbital parameters specified in this grant are subject to change based on such
coordination.”8 Such coordination should not be difficult. For example, if OneWeb and SpaceX
agreed to maintain their orbits within a 25 km altitude tolerance – a reasonable and achievable
level of variance – they could eliminate any potential for “overlap” of their NGSO systems.
        Contrary to this condition of its authorization, OneWeb means to benefit from its own
“loose” approach to station-keeping to somehow lay claim to vast areas of space and thereby
preempt entry by competitors. To this end, OneWeb continues to argue that the Commission
should impose a buffer zone of 125 km between NGSO systems, and require SpaceX to change
the parameters of its NGSO system.9 In support of this assertion, OneWeb cites no rule nor any
other requirement imposed by the Commission or the ITU – because none exist.10 Indeed, the ITU
rules do not give any priority to the orbital parameters of earlier-filed NGSO systems, and the
Commission’s processing round regime is specifically designed to grant all applicants equal


7
     See, e.g., Letter from Bruce A. Olcott to Jose P. Albuquerque, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20170301-00028, at 11
     (July 25, 2017) (altitude maintained within 11 km tolerance); Letter from William M. Wiltshire to Jose P.
     Albuquerque, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118, at 1 (Apr. 20, 2017) (altitude maintained within 30
     km tolerance).
8
     OneWeb Authorization Order, ¶ 25.d.
9
     See OneWeb Letter at 10. Establishing such an extensive buffer zone would allow OneWeb to reserve 250 km
     of orbital altitude for use by its system alone, effectively warehousing valuable orbital real estate. Such an
     approach would unnecessarily chill the development of space by limiting the number of NGSO operators that
     could be accommodated. This would be especially harmful to systems from emerging nations that may not yet
     be ready to deploy. OneWeb fails to recognize the anticompetitive effect of its proposal, much less justify it.
10
     OneWeb attempts to shore up its position by citing a recent statement released by the Iner-Agency Space Debris
     Coordination Committee (“IADC”) recommending that NGSO systems maintain “sufficient altitude separation”
     in order to minimize the potential collision risk. See OneWeb Letter at 12. However, IADC did not endorse any
     specific separation distance, much less anything as large as 125 km. Moreover, the IADC statement makes clear
     that its recommendations “do not mean additional or expansion of IADC guidelines, but technical guidance on
     how to best comply with them.” Inter-agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, IADC Statement on Large
     Constellations of Satellites in Low Earth Orbit, IADC-15-03, § 4.1 (Sep. 2017), available at http://www.iadc-
     online.org/index.cgi?item=docs pub. This IADC recommendation does not support the overlarge buffer zone
     OneWeb proposes as a new regulatory requirement.


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Marlene H. Dortch
December 12, 2017
Page 4 of 6

status.11 Reflecting these facts, the full Commission recently rejected OneWeb’s request to impose
such a buffer zone on another NGSO system applicant, Telesat Canada (“Telesat”), which
proposed to operate some of its satellites at an altitude of 1,248 km (i.e., 48 km above OneWeb’s
constellation).12 The Commission concluded that “these concerns are best addressed in the first
instance through inter-operator coordination,” and thus declined to impose the requested 125 km
buffer zone.13 In addition, the Commission imposed a standard condition requiring that Telesat
coordinate its physical operations with space stations of NGSO systems operating at similar orbital
altitudes – just as it had required of OneWeb.14 Thus, the Commission has already established
how it will handle NGSO systems operating at proximate orbital altitudes under its existing rules,
and should take the same approach here as well.
        With respect to assessing orbital debris risk, SpaceX responded to the Commission’s
request for information on the potential for collisions involving failed satellites and the existing
catalog of space objects. OneWeb incorrectly asserts that SpaceX failed to respond fully because
it did not address the risk of its NGSO satellites colliding with each other or with other NGSO
constellations.15 This critique is unfounded, as the Commission specifically clarified that in
response to its inquiry, it would expect applicants to “address collision risk involving failed
[NGSO] satellites and the background debris population, which may be the single largest category
of risk.”16 In response, SpaceX discussed a simulation performed using data from JSpOC and
NASA’s Orbital Debris Engineering Model. These simulations concluded that a satellite failure
rate of 1 percent at mission altitude would yield approximately a 1 percent chance per decade that


11
     See, e.g., Amendment of the Commission’s Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies, 18 FCC Rcd. 10760, ¶
     61 (2003) (under the modified processing round regime, “operating rights in all the available spectrum in the
     frequency band will be assigned equally to all qualified applicants in the first processing round”), OneWeb
     Authorization Order, ¶ 3 (“Each of these applicants and petitioners [in the processing round] proposes an
     NGSO FSS system that, if approved, would have the same status as OneWeb’s NGSO FSS system approved
     here”).
12
     See Telesat Order, supra.
13
     Id. ¶ 12.
14
     Id.
15
     See OneWeb Letter at 5.
16
     See E-mail from Karl Kensinger to Carlos Nalda, et al. (Apr. 5, 2017). This e-mail is available in IBFS File No.
     SAT-LOA-20161115-00121, but was copied to counsel for all applicants that received a similar request for
     information. The Commission went on to say that, “[w]hile we would welcome any analysis that assumes
     deployment of multiple constellations, and assesses risk with respect to uncontrolled satellites resulting from
     those constellation deployments, we recognize that this may require complex modelling, and would consider your
     answer complete if it simply recognized but did not further address such scenarios.” Id.


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Marlene H. Dortch
December 12, 2017
Page 5 of 6

any failed SpaceX satellite would collide with a piece of tracked debris.17 Thus, SpaceX’s
response fully satisfied the Commission’s expectations.
         As SpaceX has demonstrated, its system far surpasses the U.S. and international standards
for de-orbit operations.18 Nonetheless, SpaceX has stated its intention to continue to explore
opportunities to reduce total risk still further.19 The Commission should encourage such efforts.
For transparent reasons, OneWeb persists in arguing that the Commission should defer action on
SpaceX’s application until some undefined future date when these further refinements above and
beyond current requirements have been achieved.20 Here again, OneWeb inequitably asserts that
the Commission should impose a new and higher standard upon SpaceX that is applied to no other
satellite operator at any orbit – including OneWeb and other applicants in the ongoing NGSO
processing rounds. If a new rule is to be imposed, it should be considered in a rulemaking
proceeding and, if adopted, then made applicable to all NGSO system authorizations. It would be
inappropriate to apply a novel and unannounced standard to SpaceX uniquely.
       SpaceX has demonstrated that its proposed NGSO system will meet or surpass all current
requirements with respect to safety of space. It understands that its system will be subject to the
standard condition requiring coordination of physical operations with space stations of NGSO
systems operating at similar orbital altitudes, and anticipates no difficulty in complying. While
SpaceX would support a rulemaking to explore additional strategies for safeguarding this critical
resource and will comply with any rules adopted in the future, it would be inappropriate to impose
new and heightened requirements upon SpaceX’s application alone, as OneWeb requests.
Accordingly, the Commission should reject OneWeb’s self-serving and anti-competitive
arguments and grant SpaceX’s application expeditiously so that it can proceed with development
and deployment of its NGSO system.

                                                   Respectfully submitted,




                                                   William M. Wiltshire
                                                   Counsel to SpaceX



17
     See Letter from William M. Wiltshire to Jose P. Albuquerque, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118, at 6
     (Apr. 20, 2017).
18
     See Consolidated Opposition to Petitions and Response to Comments of Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS
     File No. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118, at 13-14 (July 7, 2017).
19
     See, e.g., id. at 14-15.
20
     See OneWeb Letter at 14.


HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

Marlene H. Dortch
December 12, 2017
Page 6 of 6



cc:    Jose Albuquerque
       Karl Kensinger
       Stephen Duall
       Jay Whaley


                             ENGINEERING CERTIFICATION


The undersigned hereby certifies to the Federal Communications Commission as follows:

 (i) I am the technically qualified person responsible for the engineering information contained
     in the foregoing filing,

 (ii) I am familiar with Part 25 of the Commission's Rules, and

 (iii) I have either prepared or reviewed the engineering information contained in the foregoing
       filing, and it is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


                                             Signed:


                                             /s/ Mark Krebs
                                             Mark Krebs
                                             Principal Satellite Systems Engineer
                                             SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORP.


                                             December 12, 2017
                                             Date



Document Created: 2019-04-10 14:21:29
Document Modified: 2019-04-10 14:21:29

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