Garmin Reply Comment

REPLY submitted by Garmin International, Inc.

Garmin International, Inc. Reply Comments

2018-07-26

This document pretains to SAT-AMD-20180531-00044 for Amended Filing on a Satellite Space Stations filing.

IBFS_SATAMD2018053100044_1474594

                                   Before the
                     FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
                              Washington, DC 20554


In the Matter of                               )
                                               )
LightSquared Request To Modify Its ATC         )      IB Docket No. 12-340
Authorization                                  )
                                               )      IBFS File Nos. SAT-MOD-20120928-
                                               )      00160; SAT-MOD-20120928-00161;
                                               )      SAT-MOD-20101118-00239; SES-MOD-
                                               )      20121001-00872; SAT-AMD-20180531-
                                               )      00044; SAT-AMD-20180531-00045
                                               )
LightSquared Technical Working Group           )      IB Docket No. 11-109
Report                                         )


               REPLY COMMENTS OF GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.

       Garmin International, Inc. (“Garmin”) files these reply comments in response to Ligado

Networks LLC’s (“Ligado’s”) amended applications for modification of its Mobile Satellite

Service (“MSS”) licenses and the comments that Ligado has filed in support of the amended

applications.1 Garmin submits these comments to supplement the record. In processing the

Modification Applications and Amendment, it is important that the FCC take these points into

account. Garmin does not oppose or affirmatively endorse Ligado’s amended application for

modification of its MSS licenses.


1
  See Applications of LightSquared Subsidiary LLC, Narrative, IBFS File Nos. SAT-MOD-
20151231-00090, SAT-MOD-20151231-00091, and SES-MOD-20151231-00981
(“Modification Applications”); Ligado Networks LLC Amendment License Modification
Applications, IBFS File Nos. SAT-AMD-20180531-00044 and SAT-AMD-20180531-00045
(“Amendment”). See also FCC Public Notice, Report No. SAT-01321, released June 8, 2018;
“Reply Comments of Ligado Networks LLC,” IB Docket No. 11-109, SAT-AMD-20180531-
00044, SAT-AMD-20180531-00045, July 19, 2018 (“Ligado’s July 19 Comments”);
“Comments of Ligado Networks LLC,” IB Docket No. 11-109, SAT-AMD-20180531-00044,
SAT-AMD-20180531-00045, July 9, 2018 (“Ligado’s July 9 Comments”). (In these comments,
Garmin uses the term “Ligado” to refer to Ligado’s predecessor as well.)


I.       THE 1 dB STANDARD REMAINS THE UNIVERSAL METRIC FOR
         ASSESSING HARMFUL INTERFERENCE TO GNSS DEVICES

         Ligado’s Reply comments imply that Garmin’s testing of its new GPS receiver designs

against the 1 dB Standard, which measures a 1 dB decrease in a GPS device’s carrier-to-noise-

density ratio (“C/N0”), can also be stretched to suggest non-interference with the entire universe

of GPS devices. 2 Ligado’s comments in this regard are difficult to square with its contention that

the Commission can ignore the 1 dB standard entirely. 3 Only Ligado can explain on which side

it wants to stand. Garmin has difficulty reconciling Ligado’s statements.

         Ligado’s July 9 Comments and Ligado’s July 19 Comments once again overlook the

critical differences between navigation and communication systems and the underlying

engineering concepts that govern their operation. Not all current Garmin consumer devices are

compatible with Ligado’s possible operations, as Garmin’s July 9, 2018 comments make clear

when read in their full context. Consistent with its settlement agreement with Ligado, Garmin is

working diligently to ensure future devices, those that are not subject to Federal Aviation

Administration (“FAA”) performance standards for certified aviation devices, meet the 1 dB

Standard in the presence of Ligado interference. 4 In the same way, Ligado’s statement that the



2
    Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 2, 12.
3
 Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 3. Contrary to Ligado’s claim, Garmin’s July 9 comments did
not represent the first time that Garmin had told the Commission that it has tested Ligado’s
proposed operations using the 1 dB Standard. See Letter of M. Anne Swanson to Marlene H.
Dortch, IB Docket Nos. 11-109, et al., May 16, 2018, at 6 n. 16 (“Garmin’s May 16, 2018
Filing”).
4
  See Settlement Agreement and Releases, by and between Garmin International, Inc. and New
LightSquared LLC and LightSquared Subsidiary LLC, at Paragraph 6(a) (dated Dec. 16, 2015)
(“Settlement Agreement”), attached to Letter from Gerard J. Waldron to Marlene H. Dortch, IB
Docket Nos. 12-340 et al. (filed Dec. 17, 2015). Similar to the contentions of Deere & Company
(Comments of Deere & Company, IB Docket No. 11-109, July 9, 2018, at 6-8.) Garmin would
like to repeat for the record that, as a result of its Settlement Agreement and as has been true in
                                                 2


1 dB Standard has never been used for adjacent band services overlooks the many filings from

Garmin and others that offer evidence to the contrary.5

         Ligado’s latest attack on the 1 dB Standard “as neither measured nor reported according to

an established standard”6 ignores that it is a measure of the change in the noise-floor; it is not a

measure of interference per se, but rather a tool to signal when interference occurs. Ligado’s

criticism that a GPS receiver’s C/N0 “fluctuates by multiple dBs in a ‘natural state’ – i.e., even in

the absence of any wireless signals in the proposed Ligado bands”7 completely overlooks the

necessity of planned system margin for variations in the real-world environment such as

atmospheric changes and multipath. Finally, Ligado’s latest claims that the 1 dB Standard itself is

“inherent[ly] unreliab[le],” “inaccurately and inconsistently measured,” “arbitrary,” and

“represents a flawed proxy for harmful interference because it does not translate to any

predictable impact on actual device performance”8 are belied by Ligado’s own data from the

NASCTN testing, which provide both direct and indirect support for the correlation between a

1 dB drop in C/N0 and degradation of the key performance indicators that Ligado directed


its filings throughout this record, Garmin does not speak for all GPS device manufacturers and
speaks only for itself.
5
  Most recently, Garmin discussed and documented at length why the 1 dB Standard is the
appropriate metric for evaluating harmful interference from adjacent band services, explaining
that the metric successfully aggregates increases in the noise floor from out-of-band emissions
alongside degradation from overload interference; it does so in a manner even more generous
than some existing International Telecommunications Union recommendations cited in a recent
analysis by the United States Air Force supporting the 1 dB Standard. Garmin’s May 16, 2018
Ex Parte Filing at 3-4, citing Air Force, SMC/GP (GPS Directorate), Background Paper on Use
of 1-dB decrease in C/N0 as GPS Interference Protection Criterion, at 2, 6-9 (June 2017),
available at http://www.gps.gov/ spectrum/ABC/1dB-background-paper.pdf.
6
    Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 17.
7
    Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 18.
8
    Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 16-17.

                                                  3


NASCTN to measure.9 All of these deficiencies again point to a lack of understanding of the

distinctive engineering considerations that go into the design of navigation systems.

II.    LIGADO’S REPLY COMMENTS DO NOT ADDRESS GARMIN’S CERTIFIED
       AVIATION CONCERNS

       Ligado summarily dismisses Garmin’s concerns about certified aviation devices with

little technical rationale for its statements. In effect, Ligado simply asks the aviation industry,

and passengers who expect and rely on safe air transportation, to trust it when it states, for

instance, that “any real-world deployment of Ligado’s operations would result in more favorable

conditions than those assumed by FAA and DOT modeling.”10 If this statement is true, then

Ligado should have no objection to specific FAA and DOT assumptions (including important

parameters like minimum tower spacing and tower density, antenna height, downtilt, and

polarization) being reflected as conditions upon its licenses.

       The omission in Ligado’s July 9 Comments and Ligado’s July 19 Comments of any

discussion of tower spacing, a key parameter in the DOT/FAA modeling, is particularly




9
  See Garmin’s May 16, 2018 Ex Parte Filing at 4-5. Also, it is well understood in the industry
that measuring changes in C/N0 can be done both accurately and repeatedly; the results are
consistent across a variety of GPS devices. DOT included C/N0 linearity testing in its Adjacent
Band Compatibility study and also repeated key test events in order to ensure the accuracy and
repeatability of C/N0 measurements against the 1 dB standard. See presentation of Hadi Wassaf,
et al., “GPS-ABC Radiated Chamber Testing Overview and Results” (GPS-ABC Workshop VI,
RTCA Washington, DC: March 30, 2017) at pages 2 and 22. See also U.S. Dept’t of
Transportation, Global Positioning System (GPS) Adjacent Band Compatibility Assessment,
(Apr. 2018) (“DOT ABC Report”) at Sections 3.1.5.1 and 3.1.5.2.
10
  Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 9. This claim by Ligado as well as the contentions in the
declaration of James H. Williams, submitted with Ligado’s July 9 Comments, cannot be taken at
face value unless the key assumptions of the FAA and DOT analysis regarding minimum tower
spacing, antenna height, downtilt, and polarization are incorporated in license conditions and
adhered to by the deployed system.

                                                  4


egregious. Surely Ligado is aware of the vital importance of tower spacing in any aggregate

power analysis – the omission can hardly be interpreted as accidental. 11

       Ligado is also unwavering in its efforts to selectively harvest points from the U.S.

Department of Transportation Adjacent Band Capability Assessment and uses them wholly out

of context. For example, the fact that Ligado claims that “DOT and FAA signed off on the 250-

foot standoff cylinder” indicates that it may be working off of a different version of the report

than the one publicly available, which lists numerous caveats and items for further study.12

Similarly, it is ironic that Ligado reminds the Commission that helicopter pilots are required to

plan their routes with 300-feet of vertical clearance – an impossible task without any publicly

available database of Ligado antenna and tower information to which Garmin and other aviation

parties have repeatedly asked Ligado to commit.13

       Ligado’s latest statement that it “remains willing to put this commercially sensitive

information in a database that could be accessed by all stakeholders and to pay for the building


11
   On the issue of antenna specifications, Ligado now argues that “any application of the
FAA/DOT assessment model using the actual tower height and downtilt in a network would
result in a higher permissible power level for Ligado’s operations than is indicated by the models
developed by the FAA.” (Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 10 (underlining supplied).) Garmin is
at a loss to evaluate this conclusion without more information – and hopefully a commitment –
regarding tower spacing or tower density. The references to “cross-polarization” in Ligado’s
accompanying Table 1 can only be taken as examples. Garmin cannot confirm Ligado’s broad
statement about “higher permissible power” since the record includes no commitment on antenna
polarization, and a license condition should be required on this important parameter, as well as
others.
12
   Contrast Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 7 with, e.g., DOT ABC Report, at VI, summarizing a
litany of concerns regarding standoff cylinders.
13
  Ligado continues to cite 14 C.F.R § 135.165 and its requirement that pilots of helicopter air
ambulance services ensure 300-foot and 500-foot clearances during day and night operations,
respectively. (Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 7.) That subpart of the FAA rules also requires
that such operators be equipped with HTAWS, implying that the preflight route planning rules of
14 C.F.R § 135.615 are insufficient by themselves to ensure safety. See 14 C.F.R § 135.605.

                                                 5


and maintenance of this database …” is a positive first step; the database, however, does need to

include all information concerning its deployment that is relevant to ensuring aviation safety and

needs to do so in a way that all aviation parties, including pilots, UAS operators, certified

aviation device manufacturers, and helicopter air ambulance operators, can access the data easily

and seamlessly. 14

         With respect to concerns Garmin and others have raised about helicopter safety, and

specifically the ability of the Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (“HTAWS”) to

function in the presence of Ligado interference, Ligado countered that “HTAWS is not intended

to be used as an aid for navigation.”15 Garmin agrees with that flat statement per se. HTAWS is

intended to save lives by providing terrain and obstacle alerts,16 and has been doing so ever since

it became available.17 The Commission must recognize that pilots do not rely solely on GPS



14
   See Comments of Garmin International, Inc., IB Docket Nos. 11-109, et al, July 9, 2018, at 7-8
n. 20. Garmin’s concerns are not allayed by Ligado’s citations of FCC and FAA rules related to
notices concerning towers. (See Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 11.) These rules in some cases
would require aviation parties, post-tower construction, to visit sites and track down antenna
structure registration numbers and then look up information for each tower in the FCC’s database
before aviation concerns could be assessed. In other cases, the rules would only require notice if
towers are over 200-feet in height (not complete reassurance) and may not require adequate
notice around private (as opposed to public) airports.
15
     Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 7.
16
  See RTCA, Inc., Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Helicopter
Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS) Airborne Equipment, RTCA/DO-309,
prepared by SC-212, Mar. 13, 2008, at § 1.4. Ligado’s citation of the same document
conveniently ignores the obstacle alerting functions when paraphrasing the intended functions of
HTAWS.
17
   In adopting the rule requiring helicopter air ambulances to utilize HTAWS, the FAA noted
statistics on the lives that use of HTAWS could save. See FAA, “Press Release-FAA Issues
Final Rule To Rule to Improve Helicopter Safety,” Feb. 20, 2014, available at
https://www.faa.gov/ne-ws/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=15795; see also FAA, Final
Rule, “Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Operations,“ Docket No.
FAA-2010-0982, 79 Fed.Reg. 9932 (Feb. 21, 2014).
                                                  6


navigation guidance near obstacles, but also rely upon additional technologies, such as HTAWS,

which are intended to save the lives of pilots, passengers, and bystanders by providing timely

alerts that help prevent controlled flight into terrain and other obstacles, such as communications

towers. Certified aviation devices rely on GPS to provide position and velocity information to

HTAWS, which in turn provides alerts to help pilots avoid obstacles. Degrading or interrupting

GPS signals, even temporarily, can cause false HTAWS alerts or deny HTAWS’ ability to

provide any alerts.

           Moreover, it does not make sense, when discussing whether and when HTAWS will be

degraded, to assume that an aircraft is always going to be operated safely. HTAWS provides

warnings when an aircraft is at an unsafe distance from terrain or obstacles. Contrary to

Ligado’s suggestion, 18 GPS also does not need to be “entirely unavailable” to negatively impact

HTAWS. The horizontal and vertical position and velocity information obtained from the GPS

signals must be sufficiently accurate to allow HTAWS to function. Thus, even temporary or

partial degradation of GPS function due to interference from Ligado towers could render

HTAWS, and its attendant safety benefits, inoperable.

           Contending that interference to GPS “is likely to be temporary as [a] helicopter moves

through the cylinder” overlooks the entire purpose of a safety-of-life system and unnecessarily

puts lives in danger.19 This “temporary” interference that is caused by proximity to a Ligado


   Some have advanced the notion that helicopter pilots must rely on visual awareness when
navigating near obstacles (See Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 6). However, this simplistic
outlook fails to heed the painful lessons of aviation history and the FAA’s analysis of the lives
that could have been saved by the enhanced situational awareness based on the alerting that
technologies like HTAWS provide.
18
     Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 8.
19
     Id.

                                                   7


tower (that is, an obstacle that may endanger safe flight) would be an entirely unacceptable threat

to public safety. Ligado’s assertions that concerns about degraded HTAWS performance are

unfounded because the aircraft would already be operating below the alerting altitude when

inside the 250 foot cylinder are moot if the location of the cylinder is not known.20 Without the

inclusion of Ligado towers in a publicly available obstacle database, Garmin has concerns, as it

does with certified avionics overall, about the ability of HTAWS to consistently provide alerts

that allow pilots to avoid Ligado towers and their associated standoff cylinders in order to

maintain GPS performance.

         *      *      *      *        *      *         *       *     *     *        *         *

         Garmin respectfully requests that these comments be taken into account as the FCC

reviews the Modification Applications and Amendment.

                                              Respectfully submitted,

                                              GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.



                                              By /s/ M. Anne Swanson
                                                 M. Anne Swanson

                                                         of

                                                      Wilkinson Barker Knauer, LLP
                                                      1800 M Street, NW Suite 800N
                                                      Washington, DC 20036
                                                      202.383.3342

                                                      Its Attorneys

Dated: July 26, 2018




20
     Ligado’s July 19 Comments at 7.

                                                  8


                                      DECLARATION

       In accordance with 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.16 and 25.154, 1 declare under penalty that the facts

included in the forgoing "Reply Comments of Garmin International, Inc." are true and correct.




July 26, 2018


                                CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I, Alexandra Carr, hereby certify that on this July 26, 2018 a copy of the foregoing Reply
Comments of Garmin International, Inc. was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, upon the
following:

Gerard J. Waldron
Covington & Burling LLP
One CityCenter
850 Tenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001



                                            By:     /s/ Alexandra Carr
                                                    Alexandra Carr



Document Created: 2018-07-26 16:49:40
Document Modified: 2018-07-26 16:49:40

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