Grant Order ORDER by Federal Communications Commission ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 FCC-17-141 Oct 30 20

Attachment FCC-17-141 Oct 30 20

FCC-17-141 Oct 30 20

ORDER submitted by Federal Communications Commission

Grant Order

2017-10-30

This document pretains to ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 for Transfer of Control on a International Telecommunications filing.

IBFS_ITCTC2017051100095_1298272

Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of )
)
Joint Application of ) WC Docket No. 17-126
Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, )
Securus Technologies, Inc, T-NETIX, Inc., )
T-NETIX Telecommunications Services, Inc. and )
SCRS Acquisition Corporation for Grant of )
Authority Pursuant to Section 214 of the )
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, and )
Sections 63.04 and 63.24 of the Commission’s )
Rules to Transfer Indirect Ownership and Control )
of Licensees )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Adopted: October 27, 2017 Released: October 30, 2017

By the Commission: Chairman Pai issuing a statement; Commissioners Clyburn and Rosenworcel
dissenting and issuing a joint statement.

I. INTRODUCTION
1. By this Order, we approve applications to transfer control of Securus Technologies, Inc.
(STI), T-NETIX, Inc. (TNI), and T-NETIX Telecommunications Services, Inc. (TNTS, and, together with
STI and TNI, Licensees), from Securus Investment Holdings, LLC (Transferor, and, together with
Licensees, Securus), to SCRS Acquisition Corporation (Transferee, and, collectively with Licensees and
Transferor, Applicants).1
2. For the reasons set forth below, we find that these Applications meet the requirements of
section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act), and our rules for transfers of
licenses and, accordingly, the Applications are granted.2 However, as also noted below, the Commission
1
Joint Application of Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, Securus Technologies, Inc., T-NETIX, Inc., T-NETIX
Telecommunications Services, Inc., and SCRS Acquisition Corporation for Grant of Authority to Transfer Indirect
Ownership and Control of Licensees, WC Docket No. 17-126 (filed May 11, 2017) (Lead Application, and, together
with File Numbers ITC-T/C-20170511-00094 and ITC-T/C-20170511-00095, Applications); Domestic Section 214
Application Filed for the Transfer of Control of Securus Technologies, Inc., T-NETIX, Inc., and T-NETIX
Telecommunications Services, Inc. to SCRS Acquisition Corporation, WC Docket No. 17-126, Public Notice, 32
FCC Rcd 4102 (WCB 2017) (WCB Accepted-for-Filing Public Notice); Notice of Removal of Domestic Section
214 Application From Streamlined Treatment, WC Docket No. 17-126, Public Notice, DA 17-594 (WCB 2017);
Streamlined International Applications Accepted For Filing; Section 214 Applications (47 CFR § 63.18), Report No.
TEL-01851S, Public Notice, (IB June 2, 2017) (IB Accepted for Filing Public Notice for File Nos. ITC-T/C-
20170511-00094 and ITC-T/C-20170511-00095); Streamlined International Applications Accepted For Filing
Section 214 Applications (47 CFR § 63.18), Report No. TEL-01855S, Public Notice, (IB June 30, 2017) (IB
Removal from Streamlined Processing Public Notice for File Nos. ITC-T/C-20170511-00094 and ITC-T/C-
20170511-00095). Applicants state that they also filed applications for the transfer of authorizations associated with
wireless services. Any action in this Memorandum Opinion and Order is without prejudice to Commission action
on other related, pending applications.
2
47 U.S.C. § 214; 47 CFR §§ 63.04, 63.18, 63.24.

Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

has entered a consent decree imposing a $1.7 million fine and strict regulatory compliance procedures on
Securus for making inaccurate and incomplete statements to the Chairman of the Commission in
connection with advocacy by Securus of expedited action on the Applications. 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Description of the Applicants and Transaction
3. Transferor is a Delaware holding company that does not itself provide
telecommunications services.4 Connect Acquisition Corp. (Connect)5 is a Delaware corporation and
wholly owned, direct subsidiary of Transferor; Licensees are wholly owned, indirect subsidiaries of
Connect.6 Transferee, a Delaware corporation, is a holding company created for the purposes of the
proposed transaction and is ultimately wholly owned by SCRS Holding Corporation, a Delaware
corporation.7 SCRS Holding Corporation is a holding company in which certain private equity
investment vehicles sponsored by Platinum Equity, LLC will contribute their equity investments in
connection with the proposed transaction.8 Platinum Equity Capital Partners IV, L.P., a wholly controlled
indirect subsidiary of Platinum Equity, LLC and a Delaware limited partnership, will be the majority
owner of SCRS Holding Corporation.9 The membership interests of Platinum Equity, LLC are ultimately
held in trust by the Gores Trust, with Tom Gores and Holly Gores, both U.S. citizens, as trustees.10
Applicants state that no other person, or entity directly or indirectly, owns or controls a 10 percent or
greater interest in Transferee.11 All entities are U.S.-based.12
4. Applicants further state that Transferee does not have any telecommunications carriers in
its current investment portfolio, although it is “affiliated with” MegaPath Holding Corporation, which
provides cloud communications, including Voice over Internet Protocol, and connectivity through an
operating subsidiary.13 Pursuant to the terms of a Stock Purchase Agreement between Transferor,
Connect, and Transferee, Transferee will acquire all of the stock of Connect from Transferor.14 As a
result, Connect will become a wholly owned, direct subsidiary of Transferee, and Licensees will become
wholly owned, indirect subsidiaries of Transferee and its parent companies.15
B. Petition to Deny and Other Filings
5. We received one petition to deny the proposed transaction. On June 16, 2017, the Wright
Petitioners, along with Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants; the Prison Policy Initiative; the

3
Securus Technologies, Inc., et al., File No. EB-IHD-17-000225128, Order, FCC 17-140 (Oct. 30, 2017) (Securus
Order) (adopting a Consent Decree terminating and resolving the investigation) (Securus Consent Decree).
4
Lead Application at 3.
5
The Lead Application also refers to this entity as Connection Acquisition Corp. For ease of reference, we use the
short form, Connect, that the Applicants used in the Lead Application. See id. at 3.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 2
8
Id.
9
Id. at 7-9.
10
Id.
11
Id at 9.
12
Id. at 7-9.
13
Id. at 11, n.4.
14
Id. at 3.
15
Id.

2

Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

Human Rights Defense Center; the Center for Media Justice; Working Narratives; the United Church of
Christ, Office of Communication, Inc.; and Free Press (collectively, Petitioners) filed a Petition to Deny
the transfer, alleging that Securus had violated the Commission’s rules by disguising prohibited
connection fees as first-minute fees and had otherwise acted to demonstrate that it lacked the character
qualifications to hold Commission authorizations.16 On June 26, 2017, Applicants filed an Opposition to
the Petition, stating that Securus had not violated any rules, and that the Petition raised no transaction-
specific issues.17 Following this, Petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, reasserting their allegations
of rule violations and disputing Applicants’ characterizations of Securus’s actions in the Opposition.18
6. On July 6, 2017, representatives of Securus and Transferee met with Commission
representatives, arguing that the proposed transaction is a transfer of control at the parent company level
and has no competitive impact; that the Applicants are qualified for approval of the transaction; that
Securus did not violate Commission rules; and that state regulation and marketplace developments
continue to improve rates for inmates.19 Applicants also informed Commission staff of the expected
closing date of the transaction, and reiterated that delay could result in financial penalties, which could
impact service functionality or rates for Securus’s services.20 In a series of ex parte letters, Petitioners
have expanded on these arguments regarding improper fees charged by Securus, and Applicants have
responded, in turn, with a series of ex parte meetings and filings.21 Petitioners and Securus continued
these disputes in additional ex parte letters and presentations.22

16
Petition to Deny by the Wright Petitioners; Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants; Prison Policy Initiative;
Human Rights Defense Center; The Center for Media Justice; Working Narratives; United Church of Christ, OC
Inc.; and Free Press, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed June 16,
2017) (Petition). Petitioners refer to Transferor and Licensees generally as “Securus.” Petitioners filed their petition
to deny the proposed transaction 10 days after the date that the Wireline Competition Bureau established for filing
comments in this proceeding. WCB Accepted-for-Filing Public Notice at 1. Because all parties have had multiple
opportunities to present their arguments, we accept the late-filed petition as part of the record. We remind
commenters, however, that we reserve discretion to disregard late-filed comments or unauthorized pleadings.
17
Opposition to Petition to Deny by the Wright Petitioners; Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants; Prison
Policy Initiative; Human Rights Defense Center; The Center for Media Justice; Working Narratives; United Church
of Christ, OC Inc.; and Free Press, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095
(filed June 26, 2017) (Opposition).
18
Reply to Opposition by the Wright Petitioners; Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants; Prison Policy
Initiative; Human Rights Defense Center; The Center for Media Justice; Working Narratives; United Church of
Christ, OC Inc.; and Free Press, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095
(filed July 3, 2017) (Reply).
19
See Letter from Paul C. Besozzi, Counsel for Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, et al., to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126 (filed July 10, 2017) (Securus July 10 Ex Parte Letter).
20
Id. at 3. Applicants omitted the expected closing date in their written ex parte submission from this meeting.
21
Letter from Lee G. Petro, Counsel for Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126,
ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed July 14, 2017) (Petitioners July 14 Ex Parte Letter)
(reiterating claims that Securus is violating Commission rules against per-connection and flat fees; disputing
Securus’s characterizations of its past behavior; noting that Securus continues to argue against state law safeguards
cited in Applicants’ ex parte filing as a mitigating factor against abuses; and asserting that the marketplace
improvements cited by Applicants were in fact the result of regulatory compliance with Commission orders).
Among the arguments made by Petitioners in this ex parte filing was that Applicants failed to file their Opposition
and prior ex parte notice in the International Bureau Filing System. Id. at 1-2. Applicants filed their Opposition and
notice of ex parte meeting in the FCC’s Electronic Comment Filing System, where it was accessible to Petitioners
and the public. While Applicants should ensure that their filings are made in all relevant systems and dockets, there
is no reason to believe that their failure to do so here substantially or materially affects Applicants’ character
qualifications. On July 29, 2017, Petitioners submitted an ex parte letter disputing certain rates that it states that
Securus charges for video visitation services for inmates and asserting that Commission determinations regarding
(continued….)
3

Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

7. On July 21, 2017, Securus filed an ex parte letter describing certain prospective and
existing services and programs it intends to provide or continue providing post-closing to benefit the
inmate and law enforcement communities that it serves, including job assistance programs for released
inmates, electronic tablets for inmates, detection services for contraband cellphones in prisons, and
investigative support to identify illegal activities associated with inmate calling.23 Securus states that,
post-closing, it will use Transferee’s invested financial resources to continue these and other inmate and
charitable programs.24 Securus also repeated its request for the Commission to approve the Applications
by August 1, 2017.25
8. In addition to the issues raised above, beginning on July 25, 2017, Petitioners raised two
additional issues: potential privacy violations, and new allegations of misrepresentations made by
Applicants in the course of this proceeding. With respect to alleged privacy violations, Petitioners first
raised these issues on July 25, 2017, in an ex parte letter asserting that certain of the programs that
Securus states that it offers or will offer to the law enforcement community to identify potentially illegal
calling patterns by inmates violate consumer privacy and section 222 of the Act, and that Securus was
aware of but did not explain a privacy issue with these services that is the subject of a state court
proceeding.26 Securus disagreed, contending that its programs did not violate section 22227 and that the

(Continued from previous page)
inmate calling rates are not final. Letter from Lee G. Petro, Counsel for Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed July 29,
2017) (Petitioners July 29 Ex Parte Letter); Letter from Paul C. Besozzi, Counsel for Securus Investment Holdings,
LLC, et al., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-
20170511-00095 (filed July 20, 2017) (Securus July 20 Ex Parte Letter) (disputing Petitioners’ examples of
continued high rates and reiterating the existence of state rate regulation as a safeguard for reasonable ICS practices
while disputing the characterization and significance of their advocacy before the states).
22
See Letter from Lee G. Petro, Counsel for Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-
126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed July 24, 2017) (Petitioners July 24 Ex Parte
Letter); Letter from Paul C. Besozzi, Counsel for Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, et al., to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed July 24,
2017) (Securus July 24 Ex Parte Letter); Petitioners July 29 Ex Parte Letter; Letter from Paul C. Besozzi, Counsel
for Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, et al., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-
T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed July 31, 2017) (Securus July 31 Ex Parte Letter); Letter
from Lee G. Petro, Counsel for Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-
T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed Aug. 5, 2017) (Petitioners August 5 Ex Parte Letter). Also
on July 24, 2017, Securus filed in this record a copy of a letter it sent to Commissioner Clyburn regarding its
specific calling rates. Letter from Paul C. Besozzi, Counsel for Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, et al., to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-
00095, with Attach. (filed July 24, 2017); Letter from Lee G. Petro, Counsel for Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed Sept. 21,
2017). Prisoners’ Legal Services of Massachusetts filed an ex parte letter asserting that Securus charges high first
minute rates for intrastate calls and that it has violated state rate cap requirements. Letter from Karina Wilkinson
and Bonita Tenneriello, Prisoners’ Legal Services of Massachusetts, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC
Docket No. 17-126 (filed Oct. 16, 2017).
23
Letter from Paul C. Besozzi, Counsel for Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, et al., to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed July 21,
2017) (Securus July 21 Ex Parte Letter).
24
Id. at 3-4.
25
Securus July 31 Ex Parte Letter at 3.
26
Letter from Lee G. Petro, Counsel for Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126,
ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed July 25, 2017) (Petitioners July 25 Ex Parte Letter);
Letter from Lee G. Petro, Counsel for Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126,
(continued….)
4

Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PUBLIC INTEREST FRAMEWORK
10. Pursuant to sections 214(a) and 310(d) of the Act,33 the Commission must determine
whether the proposed transfer of control of certain licenses and authorizations held and controlled by
Securus to Transferee will serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. In making this
determination, the Commission first assesses whether the proposed transaction complies with the specific
provisions of the Act, other applicable statutes, and the Commission’s rules.34
11. If the proposed transaction does not violate a statute or rule, then the Commission
considers whether the transaction could result in public interest harms by substantially frustrating or
impairing the objectives or implementation of the Act or related statutes.35
12. Our competitive analysis, which forms an important part of the public interest evaluation,
is informed by, but not limited to, traditional antitrust principles.36 The DOJ has independent authority to
examine the competitive impacts of proposed mergers and transactions involving transfers of
Commission licenses, but the Commission’s competitive analysis under the public interest standard is
somewhat broader. Notably, the Commission may impose and enforce narrowly tailored, transaction-
specific conditions that address the potential harms of a transaction.37 Specifically, the Commission has
repeatedly held that it will impose conditions “only to remedy harms that arise from the transaction (i.e.,
transaction-specific harms)” and “related to the Commission’s responsibilities under the Communications
Act and related statutes,” and it “will not impose conditions to remedy pre-existing harms or harms that
are unrelated to the transaction.”38

33
47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d). Section 310(d) of the Act requires that we consider applications for transfer of Title
III licenses under the same standard as if the proposed transferee were applying for licenses directly under section
308 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 308. See, e.g., AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of
Control, WC Docket No. 06-74, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 5662, 5672, para. 19 (2007)
(AT&T-BellSouth Order).
34
47 U.S.C. § 310(d); Applications of AT&T, Inc. and DIRECTV for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of
Licenses and Authorizations, MB Docket No. 14-90, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 9131, 9139-40,
para. 18 (2015) (AT&T-DIRECTV Order); Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC
Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No. 10-56,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 4238, 4247, para. 22 (2011) (Comcast-NBCU Order); Application of
EchoStar Communications Corp., General Motors Corp., and Hughes Electronics Corp., Transferors, and EchoStar
Communications Corp., Transferee, CS Docket No. 01-348, Hearing Designation Order, 17 FCC Rcd 20559. 20574,
para. 25 (2002) (EchoStar-DIRECTV HDO).
35
See AT&T-DIRECTV Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 9140, para. 18; Comcast-NBCU Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 4247, para.
22; EchoStar-DIRECTV HDO, 17 FCC Rcd at 20574, para. 25.
36
See Satellite Bus. Sys., 62 FCC 2d 997, 1068-73, 1088 (1977), aff’d sub nom United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); see also Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 947 (1st Cir. 1993) (public
interest standard does not require agencies “to analyze proposed mergers under the same standards that the
Department of Justice . . . must apply”).
37
AT&T-DIRECTV Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 9141, para. 22; Applications filed by Qwest Communications
International Inc. and CenturyTel, Inc. d/b/a CenturyLink for Consent to Transfer Control, WC Docket No. 10-110,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 4194, 4199, para. 10 (2011) (Qwest-CenturyLink Order).
38
See SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, WC Docket
No. 05-65, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290, 18303, para. 19 (2005) (SBC-AT&T Order);
Applications of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. and Cingular Wireless Corporation for Consent to Transfer Control of
Licenses and Authorizations et al., WT Docket Nos. 04-70, 04-254, 04-255, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
FCC Rcd 21522, 21545-46, para. 43 (2004); see also Applications of Nextel Partners, Inc. Transferor, and Nextel
WIP Corp. and Sprint Nextel Corporation, Transferees, for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and
Authorizations, File Nos. 0002444650, 0002444656, 0002456809, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd
7358, 7361, para. 9 (2006); Applications of AT&T Inc. and CellCo Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless for Consent
(continued….)
6

Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

13. If the Commission has determined that a transaction raises no public interest harms or
any such harms have been ameliorated by narrowly tailored conditions, the Commission next considers a
transaction’s public interest benefits. Notably, the Commission has long recognized the clear public
interest benefits in a license or authorization holder being able to assign or transfer control of its license or
authorization freely.39 Indeed, the Commission has adopted streamlining procedures—including the
automatic approval of a transaction—when a “transaction is unlikely to raise public interest concerns.”40
The Commission will also review other claimed public interest benefits of a transaction, with the
applicants bearing the burden of proving those benefits by a preponderance of the evidence.41
14. Finally, if the Commission is able to find that narrowly tailored, transaction-specific
conditions are able to ameliorate any public interest harms and the transaction is in the public interest, it
may approve the transaction as so conditioned.42 In contrast, if the Commission is unable to find that a
proposed transaction even with such conditions serves the public interest or if the record presents a
substantial and material question of fact, then it must designate the application for hearing.43
IV. QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANTS AND COMPLIANCE WITH
COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND FCC RULES AND POLICIES
15. Section 310(d) of the Act requires that we make a determination as to whether Applicants
have the requisite qualifications to hold Commission licenses, including “citizenship, character, financial,

(Continued from previous page)
to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations and Modify a Spectrum Leasing Arrangement, WT
Docket No. 09-104, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8704, 8747, para. 101 (2010).
39
See, e.g., Amendment of Section 73.3596 of the Commission’s Rules (Applications for Voluntary Assignments or
Transfers of Control), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd 1710 (1988), affirming 59 RR 2d 1081 (1982)
(affirming elimination of requirement that broadcast licenses be held three years before they can be assigned or
transferred, stating “the public interest is usually best served by allowing station sales transactions to be regulated
primarily by marketplace forces,” and holding that the listening public benefits from freely allowing sales to new
owners); id. 55 RR 2d at 1087-88 (holding buyer who is willing to pay market price more likely to deliver service
audiences desire and recognizing public benefit of ready market for broadcast licenses); Amendment of the
Commission’s Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 10760, 10841-44 (2003) (eliminating anti-trafficking policy for satellite licenses expedites
service to the public by facilitating the transfer of licenses to those parties that have the greatest incentive and ability
to construct a satellite system; enables satellite spectrum to move more efficiently to its highest and best use; and
helps licensees mitigate risk thereby encouraging investment).
40
Implementation of Further Streamlining Measures for Domestic Section 214 Authorizations, CC Docket No. 01-
150, Report and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 5517, 5533-35, paras. 29-34 (2002).
41
47 U.S.C. § 309(e); see AT&T-DIRECTV Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 9140, para. 18; Applications for Consent to the
Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses of Adelphia Communications Corporation, et al. to Time Warner
Cable Inc., et al., MB Docket No. 05-192, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 8203, 8217-18, para. 23
(2006) (Adelphia-TWC Order); EchoStar-DIRECTV HDO, 17 FCC Rcd at 20574, para. 25.
42
Although the Commission has suggested in the past that it may employ a “balancing test,” see, e.g., AT&T-
DIRECTV Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 9140, para. 18, or a “sliding scale approach,” see, e.g., AT&T-BellSouth Order, 22
FCC Rcd at 5761, para. 203, in practice the Commission has not allowed potential competitive harms to go
unremedied nor allowed them to be offset by benefits that are not transaction-specific, i.e., benefits that do not
naturally arise from the transaction at issue.
43
47 U.S.C. § 309(e); EchoStar-DIRECTV HDO, 17 FCC Rcd at 20562-63, para. 3. Section 309(e)’s requirement
applies only to those applications to which Title III of the Act applies. We are not required to designate for hearing
applications for the transfer or assignment of Title II authorizations when we are unable to find that the public
interest would be served by granting the applications, see ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 897,
901 (2d Cir. 1979), but may do so if we find that a hearing would be in the public interest.

7

Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

technical, and other qualifications.”44 The Commission generally does not reevaluate the qualifications of
transferors unless issues related to basic qualifications have been sufficiently raised in petitions to warrant
designation for hearing.45 While we do not set for hearing the question of Securus’s basic qualifications
to hold any Commission license or authorization,46 we address the allegations of inaccurate and
incomplete information provided by Securus in the context of this transaction.
16. Candor. The Commission can discharge its responsibilities only when parties are
truthful. Securus’s provision of inaccurate and incomplete information, that could be read as false and
misleading in support of its efforts to expedite action on its application, is unacceptable. Providing false
and misleading information to the Commission in connection with filed applications can be disqualifying
to an applicant and may be grounds for denying an application.
17. At the outset, we find that the claim in the July 26 Letter that Applicants had received “all
necessary State/PSC/PUC approvals” was inaccurate and incomplete, and we reject Applicants’
arguments to the contrary.47 As of July 26, Applicants had not received all required approvals from
Pennsylvania, nor any approvals from California or Alaska. Securus acknowledged the misstatement as
to the status of approvals from Pennsylvania in a subsequent cover letter to staff.48 It did not, however,
address or correct the misstatements as to approvals from California or Alaska.49 Staff was able to
determine the facts with respect to the status of the state approvals only after multiple inquiries and back
and forth with Securus.50 Additionally, subsequent submissions from Securus reflect that Mississippi
granted its approval on August 1, 2017, after the July 26 Letter.51 On August 24, 2017, Securus informed
the Wireline Competition Bureau that the California PUC had that day approved the pending state
application for transfer of control of Securus to the Transferee.52 To date, the Regulatory Commission of
Alaska has not approved the transaction.53

44
47 U.S.C. §§ 308, 310(d); see also, e.g., AT&T-DIRECTV Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 9142, para. 24; Qwest-
CenturyLink Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 4199, para.11.
45
Applications of Sprint Nextel Corp. and SoftBank Corp. and Starburst II, Inc. for Consent to Transfer Control of
Licenses and Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Declaratory Ruling, and Order on Reconsideration,
28 FCC Rcd 9642, 9676, para. 85 (2013) (Softbank-Sprint Order), 28 FCC Rcd at 9653, para. 27.
46
Securus Order at para. 6.
47
July 26 Letter at 1.
48
Securus July 31 Ex Parte Letter at 3, n.6.
49
Id.
50
See Securus August 14 Ex Parte Letter at 2; Securus August 21 Ex Parte Letter 1-2 (responding to requests of
Commission staff). Securus cooperated with the Enforcement Bureau’s investigation. See Securus Order at para. 3.
51
Securus August 11 Ex Parte Letter at Attach. 5.
52
Letter from Paul C. Besozzi, Counsel for Securus Investment Holdings, et al., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126, ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 (filed Aug. 28, 2017) (Securus
August 28 Ex Parte Letter) (attaching Joint Application of SCRS Acquisition Corporation, Securus Investment
Holdings, LLC, and Securus Technologies, Inc. (U6888C) for Approval to Transfer Indirect Control of Securus
Technologies, Inc., Application 17-05-011, Decision Authorizing Transfer of Indirect Control of Securus
Technologies, Inc. to SCRS Acquisition Corporation (CA PUC Aug. 25, 2017) (California PUC Decision)).
53
Petitioners August 3 Ex Parte Letter, Exh. A (Application Filed by SCRS Acquisition Corporation to Acquire a
Controlling Interest in Securus Technologies, Inc. Holder of Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity Nos.
461 and 758 from Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, U-17-040, Order Granting Petition for Confidential Treatment
and Establishing Timeline for Decision (AK Reg. Comm’n Aug. 2, 2017) (stating that “we will issue a final order in
this proceeding no later than December 11, 2017.”)).

8

Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

18. We reject Applicants’ claims that the July 26 Letter should be understood to be
“focus[ed] just on the approvals which, per [Schedule 7.1(b) of] the Stock Purchase Agreement, must be
obtained prior to closing.”54 Any reasonable person would understand “necessary” to refer to approvals
necessary under law, and not solely to approvals necessary under the private law created by the contract.
It is irrelevant that the signatories were “bankers and businessmen,”55 as there is no reason to assume such
individuals care more about some legal obligations than others, and presumably such sophisticated
individuals are able to consult with counsel when referencing complex legal matters such as state utility
approval processes. The letter states, without qualification, that “we have received … all necessary
State/PSC/PUC approvals.” It makes no reference to the Stock Purchase Agreement nor to any other
contractual conditions or schedule. Applicants did not submit the Stock Purchase Agreement or the
schedule to which the Applicants claim the July 26 Letter refers until August 11, 201756 To be truthful,
by the clear language of the letter, any state, PSC, or PUC whose approval was required would need to
have already granted its approval on or before the letter was filed on July 26. Alaska, California, and
Mississippi plainly had not.
19. We reject Securus’s claim that a letter to the Chairman of the Commission should
somehow be taken less seriously than other communications with the Commission. Securus argues that
the July 26 Letter “was not intended to be a detailed, granular, legal description” but was rather “a
personal and informal note from Deutsche Bank, ABRY Partners senior executives and Securus’s CEO
and Chairman with a plea to provide the required FCC approval.”57 It is precisely because these filers
attempted to persuade the head of the agency to act more quickly on applications by relying on
information known to be incorrect that the filers’ actions are so egregious. The responsibility for the
inaccurate and incomplete information falls squarely on Securus and its current management. As
Petitioners point out, Applicants have affirmed that the current management of Securus will remain in
place post-transaction.58 The rule violations at issue here and the transparency problems associated with
them relate to Securus, not to Transferee and Platinum Equity, LLC, the acquirer.
20. We also reject Securus’s claim that the inaccurate statement concerning California should
be discounted because in California, Securus had “ceased selling” even “a de minimis level of intrastate
services” subject to state regulation in the interval since filing its California application for transfer of
control.59 It is not the role of the Commission to determine if Applicants are required to file an
application in any state, but Securus had a duty to provide accurate and complete information on the
matter once it raised the issue in this record. The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) decision
approving the transfer of control of STI to Securus Acquisition Corporation states that STI holds a current
certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) requiring it to obtain pre-approval prior to any
merger, acquisition, or transfer of control.60 It states that STI will continue to provide service under

54
Securus August 11 Ex Parte Letter at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
55
Id.
56
Id. at Attach. 1 (Schedules to Stock Purchase Agreement).
57
Id. at 3. In response to staff requests, Securus has provided a copy of its Stock Purchase Agreement, certain
schedules, and documents supporting its assertion that it had received 48 state money license transfer approvals,
documents indicating that the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice had not taken action under the
Clayton Act, and records of its filings with and actions taken by state commissions. Securus August 11 Ex Parte
Letter; Securus August 14 Ex Parte Letter; Securus August 21 Ex Parte Letter; Securus August 28 Ex Parte Letter.
We note that the Commission reviews transfers of control independently of state review.
58
Petitioners August 4 Ex Parte Letter at 3. See Lead Application at 12.
59
Securus August 11 Ex Parte Letter at 3.
60
California PUC Decision at 1-3.

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Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

existing rates, terms, and conditions to customers.61 It requires STI to “maintain its performance bond of
at least $25,000” in accordance with a prior PUC decision and affirms that the California PUC must be
listed as a current obligee on the bond.62 We would expect that Securus would have withdrawn its
pending transfer application or sought to cancel its CPCN and the associated bond obligations if it had
ceased all operations in the state since it filed the application on May 16, 2017, several days after filing its
section 214 applications on May 11, 2017.63
21. The record in the California PUC proceeding is also clear that Securus participated in a
July 20, 2017 prehearing conference with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) about the pending
application, at which the ALJ “informed the Joint Applicants that the August 1, 2017 target completion
date for the transfer of control was not possible, because the next Commission meeting is August 10,
2017.”64 The California Scoping Memo also states that the ALJ questioned Securus about why it had
waited to file its state application with the PUC if it sought an August 1, 2017 closing date and explains
that the judge cautioned the Applicants that state law permitted imposition of penalties and nullifying the
transfer “if they do not wait for Commission approval before completing the transaction.”65 There is no
indication that Securus was no longer subject to state regulation or that it was not necessary for the PUC
to expend resources to complete its review of the proceeding.
22. The July 26 Letter is therefore inaccurate and incomplete.66 This issue has direct bearing
on the transaction. We find Securus’s cavalier and willful attitude towards the Commission and its
transaction review process unacceptable. We agree with Petitioners that Securus provided inaccurate
information to attempt to secure faster approval of the proposed transaction.67
23. Because candor is paramount in Commission dealings and wholly relevant to the pending
Applications, the Wireline Competition Bureau referred the July 26 Letter to the Enforcement Bureau,
and we did not act on the Applications while the Enforcement Bureau determined appropriate action. The
Enforcement Bureau has engaged in a detailed examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding
that matter. The result of that action is that Securus has now agreed to enter into a consent decree to
resolve the Enforcement Bureau’s investigation, which recognizes that the July 26 Letter was not accurate
on its face.68 To settle the matter, Securus has agreed to pay a $1,700,000 civil penalty and to implement
a three-year compliance plan to ensure that it adheres to Commission rules. Among other things, the
compliance plan requires Securus to appoint a compliance officer, implement internal procedures and
training to ensure compliance, report noncompliance, and submit periodic reports.69 The plan agreed to
61
Id. at 2-3.
62
Id. at 4.
63
STI made various filings in the state proceeding record between May 16, 2017 and August 8, 2017 addressing
state law requirements. Joint Application of SCRS Acquisition Corporation, Securus Investment Holdings, LLC,
and Securus Technologies, Inc. (U6888C) for Approval to Transfer Indirect Control of Securus Technologies, Inc.,
Application 17-05-011 (CA PUC).
64
Joint Application of SCRS Acquisition Corporation, Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, and Securus
Technologies, Inc. (U6888C) for Approval to Transfer Indirect Control of Securus Technologies, Inc., Application
17-05-011, Scoping Memo and Ruling of Assigned Commissioner, at 3 (CA PUC July 31, 2017) (California
Scoping Memo); Petitioners August 3 Ex Parte Letter at 1-2.
65
Id.
66
See 47 CFR § 1.17.
67
Petitioners August 3 Ex Parte Letter at 2; Petitioners August 4 Ex Parte Letter at 3 (citing Leflore Broadcasting
Co. Inc. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 454, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946)).
68
Securus Order at para. 4; Securus Consent Decree at paras. 13-17 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 154, 308; 47 CFR §§ 1.17,
1.65).
69
Securus Consent Decree at paras. 12-15.

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by Securus requires, among other things, that all employees who perform or directly supervise the
performance of duties relating to responsibilities of the Securus entities under the Act and other laws,
rules, and decisions of the Commission must ensure that all filings with the Commission will be preceded
by review and documented written approval by legal counsel. Importantly, the provisions of the consent
decree or any other enforcement action between the Enforcement Bureau and Securus or between the
Commission and Securus are binding on Securus and SCRS Acquisition Corporation as the transferee.
We further clarify that grant of the Applications will not alter Securus’s or SCRS Acquisition
Corporation’s responsibility to comply with the consent decree or other Commission enforcement action.
24. We have carefully examined the facts and circumstances surround this matter, and the
commitments Securus has made in the consent decree. While as noted above we do not condone efforts
to expedite Commission action based upon an inaccurate and incomplete characterization of the status of
these other regulatory proceedings, we have also taken due account of the specific commitments that
Securus has made in its compliance program, designed to ensure that it will be truthful to the Commission
and comply with its rules in the future. Accordingly, in light of these commitments, we do not believe
that the inaccurate and incomplete statements made here, in an attempt to secure faster approval of the
transaction, raise substantial and material questions of fact concerning the basic qualifications of Securus
so as to bar approval of this proposed transfer of control of its authorizations.
25. Other Issues. Petitioners raise several instances of Securus’s past behavior that they
claim demonstrate that we must deny the proposed transaction.70 These instances include allegedly
misleading customers as to the effects of the Commission’s earlier orders; misrepresentations about the
vulnerability of its businesses in the face of Commission action; and repeated violations of the
Commission’s procedural rules.71 However, Petitioners fail to demonstrate that these allegations raise
substantial and material issues regarding Securus’s basic qualifications, as required by well-established
Commission policy.72 Each of these instances is associated with the Inmate Calling rulemaking
proceeding; in each case, the Commission addressed the matter at the time it arose and did not find a
substantial rule violation.73 Moreover, to the extent these matters are unadjudicated allegations with
respect to non-FCC misconduct, they are not cognizable under our Character Policy Statement. Nor do
we believe that the remaining allegations raised by Petitioners regarding Securus’s conduct in the Inmate
Calling proceeding have demonstrated a substantial and material question of fact as to Securus’s character

70
See Petition at 11-13.
71
Id.; Petitioners July 14 Ex Parte Letter at 3-4.
72
See Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing Amendment of Rules of Broadcast
Practice and Procedure Relating to Written Responses to Commission Inquiries and the Making of
Misrepresentations to the Commission by Permittees and Licensees, Report, Order, and Policy Statement, 102
F.C.C.2d 1179, 1208-10, paras. 54-57 (1986) (Character Policy Statement); MCI Telecommunications Corp,
Petition for Revocation of Operating Authority, Order and Notice of Apparent Liability, FCC 88-24, 3 FCC Rcd
509, 515 n.14 (1988) (stating that character qualification standards adopted in broadcast context can provide
guidance in common carrier context); Applications Filed for the Transfer of Certain Spectrum Licenses and Section
214 Authorizations in the States of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont from Verizon Communications Inc. and its
Subsidiaries to Fairpoint Communications, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd 514 (2008) (“The
Commission does not, as a general rule, reevaluate the qualifications of the transferors unless issues related to basic
qualifications have been designated for hearing by the Commission or have been sufficiently raised in petitions to
warrant the designation of a hearing.”).
73
Opposition at 13-20 (citing various Commission actions addressing issues that arose during the rulemaking
proceeding regarding interstate site commissions, mandatory fees associated with inmate calling, the procedural
propriety of a filing made by Securus, and representations by Securus to the Commission about the impact of rate
caps to its business). Petitioners also claim that Securus’s information about rates for video calling services was
false and that the rates are higher than Securus has stated. Petitioners August 23 Ex Parte Letter at 2.

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Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

qualifications.74 We caution however that future violations of Commission rules and policies by Securus
could be grounds for revocation of its section 214 operating authority. The record in this transfer of
control proceeding does not raise any issues with regard to the character, financial, technical, or other
qualifications of Transferee and Platinum Equity, LLC. Accordingly, we find that Applicants hold the
basic qualifications to be a Commission licensee under the Act and our rules and policies.
26. The proposed transaction must comply with the Act, other applicable statutes, and the
Commission’s rules before we can find that it is in the public interest, unless a waiver is granted.75 We
find that the proposed transaction will not violate any statutory provision or Commission rule.
V. POTENTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST HARMS AND BENEFITS
A. Potential Harms
27. Having addressed the foregoing candor issue and the significant burdens it caused the
Commission and interested parties by having to garner the facts and work to develop an accurate and
transparent record in this proceeding, we now consider the other allegations Petitioners raise regarding
Securus’s rates and practices for inmate calling service. We find that these allegations are not directly
related to the proposed acquisition of Securus by Transferee and are appropriately addressed in other
proceedings. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to
adopt certain rules addressing intrastate calling services that Petitioners assert Securus has violated.76
Given these circumstances, consistent with Commission practice, we believe that these questions, which
we take seriously, are best resolved via a complaint to the Enforcement Bureau or other enforcement
proceeding addressing alleged rule violations within the Commission’s jurisdiction.77 Because we do not
find a potential harm as result of this transaction, we reject Petitioners’ request that we impose certain
conditions requiring Securus to charge specific rates or to freeze rates.78
28. Petitioners’ claims that the “substantial restructuring” of Securus’s rates between 2013
and the present violates a commitment it made in a previous transaction involving the company, and that
Securus and its management are therefore unqualified to hold Commission authorizations,79 also are

74
See AT&T-DIRECTV Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 9143-49, paras. 27-40 (finding that AT&T did not lack the character
qualifications to be a Commission licensee based on conduct that the Commission had previously investigated and
that further inquiry in the merger proceeding was not warranted).
75
See, e.g., AT&T-DIRECTV Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 9154, para. 52.
76
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing En Banc in the case. See Global Tel*Link v.
FCC, 859 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2017), amended and superseded by 866 F.3d 397, reh’g en banc denied, No. 15-1461
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 2017).
77
See, e.g., WorldCom, Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Consent to Transfer and/or Assign Section 214
Authorizations, Section 310 Licenses, and Submarine Cable Landing Licenses, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18
FCC Rcd 26484, para. 25 (2003); Applications of EchoStar Communications Corp. and Hughes Corp. for Consent
to Transfer Control of Licenses, CS Docket No. 01-348, Hearing Designation Order, 17 FCC Rcd 20559, 20578-79,
para. 33 (2002).
78
Letter from Lee G. Petro, Counsel for Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 17-126,
ITC-T/C-20170511-00094, ITC-T/C-20170511-00095, at 2-3 (filed Oct. 2, 2017) (Petitioners October 2 Ex Parte
Letter). We also deny Petitioners’ request to condition the transaction on requiring Securus to provide video relay
service in each facility that it serves “to offset potential public interest harms caused by the Transaction.” Id. at 3.
79
Petition at 11-14. Applicants assert that Securus did not commit in 2013 to freeze rates in perpetuity, that the
transaction was not conditioned on a specific rate commitment by Securus, and that Petitioners’ argument focuses on
intrastate rates that are outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction. Opposition at 11-15. In 2013, the Wireline
Competition Bureau referred to Securus’s statement that there would be no changes in its rates “as a result of the
transaction” in its finding that the transaction would likely result in some public interest benefits. The Wireline
Competition Bureau granted the applications subject to one enforceable and binding condition associated with
Securus’s commitment to cease blocking inmate-initiated calls to certain phone numbers. Applications Granted for
(continued….)
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Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

directly related to the extent to which Securus’s rate practices are lawful. Accordingly, this claim also is
best addressed in an enforcement or rulemaking proceeding.80 The Commission likewise takes seriously
allegations regarding possible violations of section 222 of the Act, and of its rules regarding the
proprietary information of the customers of telecommunications services. However, like allegations
regarding Securus’s rates and practices, any allegations regarding violations of these rules are better
handled in the context of an enforcement proceeding and not in that of a transaction.81
B. Potential Benefits
29. Having addressed any potential public interest harms of the transaction, we next review
the public interest benefits of the particular transaction, beyond fostering the free transferability of
licenses and authorizations. The Commission has recognized that efficiencies generated through a
transaction can mitigate competitive harms only “if such efficiencies enhance the merged firm’s ability
and incentive to compete and therefore result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service or new
products.”82 Specifically, the Commission finds a claimed benefit to be cognizable only if it is
transaction-specific—meaning it naturally arises as a result of the transaction83—and verifiable, and is
“more likely to find marginal cost reductions to be cognizable than reductions in fixed cost.”84
30. Based on our evaluation of the record, we find that the transaction is likely to result in
some net public interest benefits beyond fostering the free transferability of licenses and authorizations.
These benefits include increased capital resources available to Securus to implement or continue offering
certain services and programs it has stated it will provide post-closing.85 We also note that there are no
issues in the record regarding the ability of Transferee to provide service, and Applicants expressly
commit in the Lead Application that, post-closing, Securus will provide “services to the same extent and
at the same rates and on the same terms and conditions as are currently in effect.”86 With regard to its
services, we also take notice of the fact that during the pendency of this transaction proceeding, a
representative of Securus filed a signed certification with the Commission stating that Securus is “in

(Continued from previous page)
the Transfer of Control of the Operating Subsidiaries of Securus Technologies Holdings, Inc. to Securus Investment
Holdings, LLC, Public Notice, 28 FCC Rcd 5720, 5723 (WCB 2013).
80
See Application of GTE Corp., Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corp., Transferee, 15 FCC Rcd 14032, 14229, para.
432 (2000) (finding alleged violations of the Act and merger conditions are best addressed in the broader
proceedings of general applicability and in enforcement proceedings). Petitioners have acknowledged that an
investigation would be an appropriate vehicle to determine whether their allegations regarding Securus’s rates are
valid. Petition at 14.
81
See, e.g., Softbank-Sprint Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 9676, para. 85; Verizon Communications, Inc.
and America Móvil, S.A. de C.V., Application for Authority to Transfer Control of Telecommunicaciones de Puerto
Rico, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd 6195, 6206, para. 25 (2007) (rejecting
assertions that a transfer of control should be denied or conditioned based on prior conduct that can be raised in the
enforcement context, and stating that applicants were subject to existing Commission requirements).
82
AT&T-BellSouth Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5760, para. 201.
83
Or as the Commission has previously put it, “more likely to be accomplished as a result of the merger but unlikely
to be realized by other means that entail fewer anticompetitive effects.” Id. at 5761, para. 202.
84
Id.
85
Securus July 21 Ex Parte Letter at 1-4 (describing anticipated post-closing investments in inmate services,
education and recidivism-reduction programs, and correctional facility assistance that the proposed transaction
would support).
86
Lead Application at 12. Applicants state that “STI’s nationwide average per-minute rate across all of the over
2000 correctional facilities it currently services is $0.18 per minute (i.e.., $2.16 for the average 12 minute call).”
Opposition at 14. This grant does not approve the current rates, terms, or conditions, and as noted above, those
issues are part of the Inmate Calling FNPRM proceeding.

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compliance with the Federal Communications Commission’s rules governing inmate calling services
(ICS). I acknowledge that failure to comply with the rules governing ICS may result in civil or criminal
prosecution.”87 We expect this statement of compliance, coupled with the compliance plan in the consent
decree, to firmly guide Securus’s future dealings with the Commission and to prevent any type of
misrepresentation in any proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
31. Securus has pursued approval of the transaction in an unacceptable fashion. With this
serious lapse addressed in a consent decree imposing significant monetary and compliance-related
penalties, and other, non-transaction-specific issues best handled in enforcement or rulemaking
proceedings, upon review of the record, we find that this transaction, which involves a transfer of control
to a holding company entity with no competing operations, imposes no public interest harms.
32. After thoroughly reviewing the proposed transaction and the record in this proceeding,
we conclude that the transfer of control of the licenses and authorizations in Appendix A is in the public
interest and hereby grant the Applications.
VII. ORDERING CLAUSES
33. Accordingly, having reviewed the record in this matter, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to
sections 4(i) and (j), 5(c), 214(a), and 214(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 154(i), 154(j), 155(c), 214(a), 214(c), and sections 63.03-04, 63.18, and 63.24 of the Commission’s
rules, 47 CFR §§ 63.03-04, 63.18, and 63.24, that the Applications to transfer control of the licenses and
authorizations listed in Appendix A ARE GRANTED.
34. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition to Deny of The Wright Petitioners;
Citizen United for Rehabilitation of Errants; Prison Policy Initiative; Human Rights Defense Center; The
Center for Media Justice; Working Narratives; United Church of Christ, OC Inc.; and Free Press IS
DENIED.
35. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Memorandum Opinion and Order SHALL BE
EFFECTIVE upon release, in accordance with section 1.103 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR
§ 1.103. Petitions for reconsideration under section 1.106 of the Commission’s Rules, 47 CFR § 1.106,
may be filed within thirty days of the release date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary

87
Securus Technologies, Inc., Inmate Calling Services Annual Certification Form, WC Docket No. 12-375 (Aug.
23, 2017).

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Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

APPENDIX A

SECTION 214 AUTHORIZATIONS

A. International
We grant the applications for consent to the transfer of control of the international section 214
authorizations from Securus to SCRS Acquisition Corporation.

File Number Authorization Holder Authorization Number

ITC-T/C-20170511-00094 Securus Technologies, Inc. ITC-214-19991115-00713
ITC-T/C-20170511-00095 T-NETIX, Inc ITC-214-19980312-00185

B. Domestic

We grant the application to transfer control of domestic section 214 authority in connection with
the proposed transaction.

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Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141

STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN AJIT PAI

Re: Joint Application of Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, Securus Technologies, Inc., T-NETIX,
Inc., T-NETIX Telecommunications Services, Inc. and SCRS Acquisition Corporation for Grant of
Authority Pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, and Sections
63.04 and 63.24 of the Commission’s Rules to Transfer Indirect Ownership and Control of
Licensees, WC Docket No. 17-126; Securus Technologies, Inc., et al., File No.: EB-IHD-17-
000225128
This action could have occurred months ago. Yet one of the Applicants chose to misrepresent
facts to the Commission. A lack of candor with the Commission is a very serious matter, and there must
be a strong deterrent to such misconduct.
So as we approve this transaction from which we find no competitive harms, we also have a
consent decree with Securus that both punishes its untruthfulness and serves as a strong deterrent to others
who would mislead the agency.
I believe the purpose of this misrepresentation was to speed the approval of this transaction. But
it ended up having the opposite effect. Those doing business in front of the agency should take note of
that fact. They should also note that while Applicants urged quick approval to avoid incurring fees, in the
companion decree Securus will pay a civil penalty of $1.7 million because of their lack of candor, a
particularly large amount for this type of violation.
Lastly, it’s important to understand that none of the conditions that it’s been suggested we impose
here are transaction-specific — that is, they have nothing to do with remedying a transaction-specific
harm. And as the standard of review in this document makes clear, a transaction is not an opportunity to
apply extraneous conditions upon a licensee.

16

$Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-141 JOINT DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS MIGNON L. CLYBURN AND JESSICA ROSENWORCEL Re: Joint Application of Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, Securus Technologies, Inc, T-NETIX, Inc., T-NETIX Telecommunications Services, Inc. and SCRS Acquisition Corporation for Grant of Authority Pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, and Sections 63.04 and 63.24 of the Commission’s Rules to Transfer Indirect Ownership and Control of Licensees, WC Docket No. 17-126; Securus Technologies, Inc., et al., File No.: EB-IHD-17- 000225128 Today, the FCC’s majority gives its blessing to an approximately $1.6 billion deal involving Securus, one of the nation’s largest providers of inmate calling services. This is the same company that attempted to mislead the Chairman into prematurely granting its transaction. For violating our rules, and our trust, the Commission also adopts a consent decree that is worth:  0.1% of the value of the transaction;  0.39% of the company’s 2015 revenues; and  0.12% of the kickbacks Securus paid to correctional facilities from 2004-2014. To give an idea of how relatively small this penalty is, consider that we routinely fine companies up to several percent of their gross annual revenues for egregious infractions of our rules. But to anyone familiar with how this company operates, this is unsurprising. It is a company that has shown it is willing to operate on the bleeding edge of legality when it comes to this agency’s rules. For example, when the FCC banned connection fees, this company simply renamed them “first minute rates” and continued to charge them. This is unacceptable and wrong. Is this transfer of control and consent decree just a slap on the wrist? More like a pat on the back. And it is precedent-setting. Until now, the FCC has never granted a transfer of control when a company has made misrepresentations during the review process. We could have adopted conditions on the transaction to mitigate public interest harms. Indeed, we suggested several, but the Chairman respectfully declined to act on any of them, including a condition to ensure that the company could not decline to serve incarcerated people with disabilities. When it comes to the plight of prisoners and their families paying usurious rates for phone service, the current leadership of the Commission has not made a single move to help. Instead, we’ve seen a string of half-hearted words that add up to a refusal by the Commission to do its job under the law. This Commission is failing in its duty to protect prisoners and their families from usurious phone rates. *** Unfortunately, disregard for inmates and their families is not the only thing wrong with this item. The Communications Act instructs the Commission to consider the public interest when it reviews a transaction. A deeply-rooted preference to protect and promote competition in relevant markets, accelerate deployment of advanced services, ensure a diversity of license holdings, and manage spectrum in the public interest, have traditionally been a part of this consideration. However, today’s item sets an ominous precedent by narrowing the Commission’s standard of review to effectively take the public interest out of the equation. By doing so, we shirk our responsibility under the Act. For all of the above reasons, we dissent. 17$

Document Created: 2017-10-31 14:10:25
Document Modified: 2017-10-31 14:10:25