FCC_Letter__Feb_09_2

SUPPLEMENT submitted by Systems Resource Group Limited

Supplemental Letter - URCA Ruling

2011-02-10

This document pretains to ITC-T/C-20101203-00472 for Transfer of Control on a International Telecommunications filing.

IBFS_ITCTC2010120300472_868049

Holland & Knight
31 West 52nd Street | New York, NY 10019 | T 212.513.3200 | F 212.385.9010
 Holland & Knight LLP | www.hklaw.com




212—513—3268
eric.fishman@hklaw.com




February 9, 2011




Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20554

                    Re:       Application of Systems Resource Group Limited for Transfer of Control,
                              FCC File No. ITC—T/C—20101203—00472

Dear Ms. Dortch:

      On February 4, 2011, the Utilities Regulation & Competition Authority of The Bahamas
("URCA") issued a ruling approving the merger of Systems Resource Group Limited into Cable
Bahamas Limited. A copy of URCA‘s ruling is enclosed herewith.

       Should any questions arise concerning this matter, please feel free to contact the
undersigned counsel directly. A copy of this letter and enclosure is being sent to Executive
Branch agencies.




         3Aw—
Sincerely yours,



  ric Fishman
Counsel to Systems Resource Group Limited and Cable Bahamas Limited

Enclosure




Atlanta | Bethesda | Boston | Chicago | Fort Lauderdale | Jacksonville | Lakeland | Los Angeles | Miami | New York
Northern Virginia | Orlando | Portland | San Francisco | Tallahassee | Tampa | Washington, D.C. | West Palm Beach
#10115681_vl


       NOTICE OF PROPOSED CHANGE IN CONTROL OF BTC
       pursuant to SECTION 75(2)(a) of the COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 2009

      The Utilities Regulation and Competition Authority (URCA) hereby gives notice that on
      February 8, 2011, it received from Bahamas Telecommunications Company Limited
      (BTC) and Cable and Wireless Communications Plc. (CWC) jointly, a Full Notification of a
      transaction between CWC and the Government of The Bahamas (the "Government")
      which will result in the acquisition by CWC from the Government of a majority of the
      issued share capital of BTC (the "Transaction") for approval in accordance with section
      70(3) of the Communications Act, 2009.

DETAILS OF THE TRANSACTION

2.    On February 8, 2011 the Government and CWC entered into a Share Purchase
      Agreement under which, CWC Bahamas Holdings Limited, a company incorporated in
      the Commonwealth of The Bahamas whose ultimate parent company is CWC, will
      acquire fifty—one per cent (51%) of the issued share capital of BTC from the Government,
     thereby becoming the voting controller of a majority of the shares of BTC. As voting
      control of BTC will be transferred to CWC, the Transaction will constitute a "change in
     control" of BTC within the meaning of section 71 of the Communications Act, 2009, and
      requires URCA‘s approval before it can be implemented.

      BTC is currently 100% owned by the Government and operates networks and provides
     carriage services in the markets for fixed voice, fixed data, mobile voice and mobile data
     services in The Bahamas. BTC has been determined to have Significant Market Power in
     the markets for fixed voice, mobile voice and mobile data services.

     CWC is a multinational provider of electronic communications services, headquartered
     in London, with presence in 38 countries worldwide. As of September 2009, CWC
     provided services to 1.8 million fixed, 8.3 million mobile and 600,000 broadband
     customers worldwide. CWC operates as "LIME" in the Caribbean, providing services to


      1,279,000 mobile, 645,000 fixed and 204,000 broadband customers in 13 countries.
      During the year ended 31 March 2010, LIME produced revenues of US$873 million, as
      against total CWC revenues of US$2.346 billion. CWC currently has no operations in the
      electronic communications sector in The Bahamas

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED BY URCA

5.    The questions to be determined by URCA in relation to a change in control are set out in
      section 72 of the Communications Act, 2009.         As neither of the parties to the
     Transaction nor BTC is involved in broadcasting or publishing newspapers, the question
     to be determined by URCA is whether the Transaction would have or is likely to have the
     effect of a substantial lessening of competition in a market in The Bahamas. For a
     further explanation of the approach to be used by URCA, respondents should be guided
      by URCA‘s Competition Guidance: Merger Control — Substantive (ECS COMP.2) which can
      be downloaded from its website (www.urcabahamas.bs).

6.    In assessing the competition effects of the Transaction, URCA‘s assessment will include
     the review of issues such as the definition of the relevant market, what would happen in
     the absence of this transaction (known as the "counterfactual"), the potential
     efficiencies and consumer benefits. In that regard, URCA notes that the Government has
     publicly disclosed a number of considerations that assist with the analysis of consumer
     and economic benefits including price reductions, network investment, efficiencies
     improvements, new product offerings. The Transaction also includes an agreement by
     the Government to extend the period of BTC‘s cellular exclusivity period and
     amendments to the Communications Act, 2009 and the Electronic Communications
     Sector Policy to that effect have been tabled in the House of Representatives. Interested
     parties should take note of these factors in submitting responses to URCA.

7.   Interested parties should note that URCA was not a party to the negotiations nor the
     transaction itself. Decisions made to extend the cellular exclusivity period are the
     responsibility of Government as policy maker for the sector and emanate from
     commercial negotiations between the Government and CWC. The processes for
     engagement between URCA and the Government on the Sector Policy, as envisaged
     under section 6 of the Communications Act 2009, are now addressed in the
     aforementioned amendments to the Sector Policy and legislation tabled.


INVITATION FOR COMMENTS

8.    Under section 75(2) of the Communications Act, 2009, before forming any opinion or
      issuing its adjudication on the proposed change in control, URCA is required to give any
      interested persons a reasonable opportunity to make representations, and shall
      consider any such representations made.

      URCA notes that there has been considerable public interest in various matters relating
      to the proposed change of control of BTC, and in that regard considers it necessary to
      clearly define the scope of URCA‘s jurisdiction in relation to the Transaction. As stated
      above URCA‘s power to consider and approve a change in control of BTC relates solely
      to the question of whether or not the Transaction would or is likely to result in a
      substantial lessening of competition in a market within the electronic communications
      sector in The Bahamas. URCA therefore advises that in its review of the Transaction
      URCA will only consider representations which are relevant to this aspect of the
      Transaction.

10.   Pursuant to section 78 of the Communications Act, 2009, URCA is required within thirty
      {(30) calendar days of its receipt of the notification, to either issue its adjudication, or
      open an in—depth investigation of the change in control (in which case extended
      timeframes would apply to URCA‘s consideration of the Transaction}. It is therefore
      necessary that representations from interested persons are received by URCA well
      within the thirty (30) day timeline in order to ensure that such representations can be
      considered, analysed and incorporated into URCA\‘s deliberations. Therefore, URCA will
      only consider representations on the proposed change in control which are received
      by 5:00pm on February 24, 2011 (i.e. midway through the thirty (30) day period).

11.   URCA invites interested parties to submit written representations regarding the
      proposed change in control for consideration, to the Director of Policy and Regulation,
      either:

      a.   by hand, to the office of the Utilities Regulation and Competition Authority (URCA)
           situated at the UBS Annex Building, East Bay Street, Nassau, Bahamas; or
      b. by mail, to URCA at P.O. Box N—4860 Nassau, Bahamas; or
      c.   by fax, to (242) 393—0153; or
      d. by email, to info@urcabahamas.bs.


Adam Goldberg
38 Park Ave
Rutherford, NJ 07070

800—795—6200
Adam@telcoexperts.com

           CURRENTLY CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, TELCO EXPERTS, LLC

   HISTORY                             Gemini Communications                                  1996—Present

   Principal
   * In 1996 Adam with his brother Peter, started up the Telecom consulting firm Gemini Communications.
  This company is still in existence and is one of the largest telecom agents in the country. As agents,
   Peter and Adam learned all aspects of customer service, order processing and selling proper services to
  potential clients. They have worked with multiple carriers including Broadview Networks, Paetec, ACC
   Business, Covad, Verizon and others. Responsibilities included selling, managing the provisioning
  process, as well as, servicing a client base that currently bills out over $1,000,000 per month



                                    Alnet Communications                                      1993 — 1996

Sales Account Manager

   *« Adam started as an entry level sales person at Alnet Communications. Adam performance was
   recognized by earning several sales achievement awards. Adam was promoted to Channel Sales
   Manager.




 EDUCATION

 University of Maryland                    BA Degree Marketing                                1993


Eric Klein
38 Park Ave
Rutherford, NJ 07070
800—787—5050
Eric@Telcoexperts.com

 CURRENTLY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TELCO EXPERTS, LLC


HISTORY       Telco Expert, LLC                                                   2007—Present

              CEO
                 « Eric is considered one of the top telecom sales professionals in the country.
                    He is considered to be in the top one percent. He has the rare ability to be
                    a star sale professional and have the follow up skills and the work ethic to
                    support some of the best customers in New York City. Eric will be guiding
                    Telco Experts with controlled growth and is tasked with assuring our back
                    office systems are prepared for exponential growth.




              ESK Consulting                                                         2002—2007
                 + Sold Telecommunications services as an independent agent for 5 years

              Stock Broker                                                               5 Years




EDUCATION     Baruch College, City University of New York                                   2002
              4.0 GPA In Finance


                                       Peter J. Goldberg
                                        38 Park Ave. Rutherford, NJ 07070
                                      800—795—6200 — Peter@Telcoexperts.com


Professional Summary

Currently, member owner and Vice President of Telco Experts, LLC.


Experience
                                                                                                 1996 — present
Gemini Communications
Principal
Responsibilities

In 1996 with my brother, Adam, we started up the Telecom consulting firm Gemini Communications. This
company is still in existence and is one of the largest telecom agents in the country. As agents, I learned all
aspects of how to service clients.        This included, but was not limited to,    selling,   customer service,
troubleshooting and provisioning. Over the years, I engaged with multiple carriers including Broadview
Networks, Paetec, ACC Business, Covad, Verizon and others in order to negotiate agreements and ensure our
clients were receiving the best possible level of service.

Responsibilities included selling, managing the provisioning process, as well as, servicing a client base that
currently bills out over $1,000,000 per month.

                                                                                                   1995 — 1996
MFS Intelenet
Sr. Account Manager
Responsibilities

While at MFS, I actively pursued revenue objectives generated by selling MFS‘s services to their defined user
base of small to medium size businesses. I was responsible for prospecting new business through cold and
warm lead generation. Responsible for reactivating closed or inactive accounts in addition to securing new
business. Was responsible for maximizing profits by accurately evaluating a customer‘s requirements and
coordinating the matching products and services. Also responsible for reviewing and evaluating Sales
Representative Accounts for accuracy and stability of the life of the account; while ensuring customer
satisfaction.

                                                                                                   1993 — 1995
Metro Media
Account Executive
Responsibilities

As an Account Manager (AM), I was responsible for the overall care, growth and retention of my commercial
customer base or book of business (BOB‘) in a specified geographically assigned territory. My primary
responsibility was to grow Metro Media‘s revenues, increase product saturation in the market and improve
overall profitability. This was achieved by increasing the penetration of Metro Media‘s products through our
existing customer base and referrals.


Education
                                                                                                          1993

        Graduated — University of Florida 1993 — Degree in Marketing


1:26 PM                                       Telco Experts LLC
1050                                              Balance Sheet
Accrual Basis                               As of September 30, 2010

                                                                            Sep 30, 10
                ASSETS
                  Current Assets
                    Checking/Savings
                      1000 : Cash — Chase Checking                               288,855.09
                      1010 : Cash — BOA — Sales Tax Account                       78,092.80
                    Total Checking/Savings                                       366,947.89
                    Accounts Receivable
                      1300 — Accounts Receivable                                 323,810.46
                    Total Accounts Receivable                                    323,810.46

                  Total Current Assets                                           690,758.35
                  Fixed Assets
                    1400 — Equipment                                              36,484.25
                    1490 — Accumulated Depreciation                              —25,771.12
                  Total Fixed Assets                                              10,713.13
                  Other Assets
                    1700 + Security Deposits                                      40,052.00
                  Total Other Assets                                              40,052.00

                TOTAL ASSETS                                                     741,523.48
                LIABILITIES & EQUITY
                  Liabilities
                     Current Liabilities
                       Credit Cards
                          2100 — American Express Payable                         71,847.81
                      Total Credit Cards                                          71,847.81
                      Other Current Liabilities
                        2300 — Sales Tax Payable
                          2325 < Sales Tax Payable — New Hampshi                 55.84
                          2301 < Federal Telecommunications Tax             106,871.82
                          2302 < Sales Tax Payable — New York                24,270.14
                          2303 — Sales Tax Payable — New Jersey                ~343.17
                          2304 : Sales Tax Payable — Connecticut               —626.73
                            2305 — Sales Tax Payable — California             2,258.98
                            2306 — Sales Tax Payable — Pennsylvani            1,016.34
                            2311 < Sales Tax Payable — Maryland                   6.00
                            2312 — Sales Tax Payable — Tennessee              1,356.91
                           2313 < Sales Tax Payable — Texas                     424.13
                           2314 < Sales Tax Payable — Minnesota                 124.32
                           2315   < Sales   Tax   Payable   — Arizona           —91.08
                           2316   — Sales   Tax   Payable   — Virginia         —114.61
                           2317   + Sales   Tax   Payable   — Florida            37.08
                           2319   < Sales   Tax   Payable   — Massachuset        40.85
                           2320   < Sales   Tax   Payable   — Arkansas           50.78
                           2324     Sales   Tax   Payable   — Illinois         —113.33
                           2326   — Sales   Tax   Payable   — Delaware          408.92
                         Total 2300 — Sales Tax Payable                          135,633.19

                      Total Other Current Liabilities                            135,633.19

                    Total Current Liabilities                                   207,481.00
                    Long Term Liabilities
                      2500 + Customer Security Deposits                            7,317.66
                   Total Long Term Liabilities                                     7,317.66

                 Total Liabilities                                              214,798.66




                                                                                              Page 1


1:26 PM                                   Telco Experts LLC
105/10                                     Balance Sheet
Accrual Basis                          As of September 30, 2010

                                                                  Sep 30, 10
                  Equity
                    3000 + Capital ESK Consultants LLC                  21,692.74
                    3100 — Capital — Adam Goldberg                      21,692.74
                    3200 — Capital — Peter Goldberg                     21,692.74
                    3500 : Retained Earnings                           157,939.63
                    Net Income                                         303,706.97
                  Total Equity                                         526,724.82

                TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY                             741,523.48




                                                                                    Page 2


1:26 PM                                         Telco Experts LLC
1050                                              Profit & Loss
Accrual Basis                            January through September 2010

                                                                          Jan — Sep 10
                Ordinary Income/Expense
                    Income
                       3999 — Service Income
                         4002 — Service Income      —   Ottawa, ON            2,840.96
                         4001 + Service Income      —   Montreal, QC            952.62
                         4000 + Service Income      —   New York City     2,511,743.88
                         4010 — Service Income      —   New York State      117,290.97
                         4016 — Service Income — Virginia                     8,296.30
                         4019    —   Service Income — Massachusetts           2,334.20
                         4020    —   Service Income — New Jersey            182,609.48
                         4030   —    Service Income — California             39,278.45
                         4040   —    Service Income — Illinois                9,300.63
                         4050   +    Service Income — Florida                 2,710.13
                         4060   ©    Service Income — Maryland                1,752.40
                         4070   <    Service Income — Connecticut            53,351.03
                         4080   —    Service Income — Pennsylvania           29,781.02
                         4090   —    Service Income — Tennessee              92,583.84
                         4091   +    Service Income — Missouri               10,403.75
                         4092   —    Service Income — Texas                  14,980.81
                         4093   —    Service Income — Minnesota               1,516.64
                         4094   —    Service Income — Arkansas                  499.59
                         4095   <    Service Income — Arizona                 9,983.36
                         4096   —    Service Income — Delaware                7,059.76
                         3999   —    Service Income — Other                   7,850.05
                      Total 3999 + Service Income                               3,107,119.87
                      4100 + Installation Income
                        4110 — Installation Income — NYC                     2,035.20
                      Total 4100 : Installation Income                              2,035.20
                      4200 : Consulting Income — NY                                 1,535.00
                      4300 + Finance Charges                                       13,709.39
                      4900 + Sales Tax Vendor Credits                                 659.77
                    Total Income                                                3,125,059.23
                    Cost of Goods Sold
                      5000 — ISP Provider                                       1,162,014.51
                      5100 + Installation Costs                                   23,168.57
                      5200 — Host Monitoring                                     247,549.79
                      5300 +« Number Inventory                                   —19,904.76
                    Total COGS                                                  1,412,828.11

                 Gross Profit                                                   1,712,231.12
                    Expense
                      5400 + Consuliting                                         200,557.05
                      6000 « Commission Expense                                  179,407.10
                      7000 < Guaranteed Pymt — Adam Goldberg
                        7001 + Payments — Adam                             155,000.00
                        7002 — Taxes — Adam                                 10,229.00
                      Total 7000 :« Guaranteed Pymt — Adam Goldberg              165,229.00
                      7003 < Guaranteed Pymt — Peter Goldber
                        7004 + Payments — Peter                            155,000.00
                        7005 Taxes — Peter                                  12,213.00
                      Total 7003 + Guaranteed Pymt — Peter Goldber               167,213.00
                      7007 < Guaranteed Pymt — Eric Klein
                        7008 « Payments — Eric                             203,000.00
                        7006 + Medical Insurance — Eric                      5,627.12
                        7009 — Taxes — Eric                                 12,263.00
                      Total 7007 :« Guaranteed Pymt — Eric Klein                 220,890.12




                                                                                               Page 1


1:26 PM                                            Telco Experts LLC
10/15/10                                             Profit & Loss
Accrual Basis                               January through September 2010

                                                                             Jan — Sep 10

                         7010 + Gross Salaries                                       114,800.94
                         7020 + FICA Expense                                            8,754.73
                         7030 < NJ Unemployment Insurance                              2,767.31
                         7040 + Federal Unemployment Insurance                            183.81
                         7060 — Group Medical Insurance                                4,537.13
                         7080 +« Workers Compensation                                     645.40
                         7090 + Payroli Service                                         1,122.71
                         7100 + Billing Expense                                       61,079.12
                         7120 + Rent                                                  69,358.06
                         7130 — Utilities                                              3,129.15
                         7150 <      Telephone and Internet                           10,122.91
                              +      Answering Service                                 1,273.33
                              *      General Insurance                                 3,153.57
                              *      Office Supplies and Expense                       6,531.79
                                *    Bank Charges                                      2,058.70
                         7230   —    Postage                                           2,308.12
                         7260   +«   Computer and Software Expense                     6,030.57
                         7300   :    Accounting                                       42,364.37
                         7310   +    Legal                                            37,433.51
                         7330 < Dues and Subscriptions                                   785.00
                         7340 + Filing Fees                                            4,086.08
                         7350 — Licenses and Permits                                   1,498.00
                         7370 < Advertising and Marketing                                770.00
                         7381 : Penalties                                                716.85
                         7390   +    Credit Card Discounts                            10,091.56
                         7405   :    Automobile Expense                                3,045.79
                         7410   +    Travel                                           14,254.69
                         7420   <    Meals and Entertainment                           7,962.94
                         7460   +    Charitable Contributions                            665.00
                         7470 © Holiday Expense                                        1,230.80
                      Total Expense                                                1,356,058.21

                  Net Ordinary Income                                               356,172.91
                  Other Income/Expense
                    Other Income
                      8000 : Interest Income                                            339.76
                    Total Other Income                                                  339.76
                    Other Expense
                      9000 : New Jersey LLC Tax                                      17,032.00
                      9010 : California LLC Tax                                         800.00
                      9020 : Connecticut LLC Tax                                        250.00
                      9040 — New York TAF                                             1,667.70
                      9050 : DC LLC Tax                                                 625.00
                      9060 : lllinois LLC Tax                                            29.00
                             + NYC UBT Tax                                           32,402.00
                             * Voided Checks                                              0.00
                    Total Other Expense                                              52,805.70

                  Net Other Income                                                   —52,465.94

                Net Income                                                          303,706.97


February 4, 2011




Ms. Judith Smith
Legal Counsel
Cable Bahamas Ltd.
Robinson & Marathon Roads
Nassau, Bahamas

Dear Ms. Smith,

Re: Merger Control Adjudication

The Utilities Regulation and Competition Authority {(URCA) has completed its full analysis of the
Full Merger Notification Form and the accompanying documents submitted to URCA regarding
the proposed merger of Systems Resource Group Limited and Cable Bahamas Ltd. URCA has
also completed its in—depth investigation into the proposed merger.

URCA hereby gives its consent to the merger and approves the change in control consequential
thereto.

Kindly find the adjudication attached which provides URCA‘s reasons and reasoning for its
decision.

Yours faithfully,


Kathleen Smith
Director of Policy and Regulation




                UTILITIES     REGULATION        &   COMPETITION AUTHORITY

UBS Annex Bidg., East Bay Street | ®.CQ. Box N—4860 Nassau, Bahamas |T 242.399.0234 | F 242.3921.01563
                                      www.urcabahamas.bs


MERGER CONTROL ADJUDICATION:


SYSTEMS RESOURCE GROUP LIMITED

   AND

CABLE BAKHAMAS LTD.




February 4, 2011



                  UTILITIES REGULATIGN & COMPETITION AUTHORITY

 UBS Annex Building, East Bay t   |—   P.O0. Box N~4860 Nassau, Bahamas   |   T 242.393.0334   |   F242.393.0153

                                          www .urcabahamas.bs


 Adjudication made pursuant to Section 75 of the Communications Act, 2009 in the matter of:
 a request for approval by the Utilities Regulation and Competition Authority (URCA) of the
 merger of Systems Resource Group Limited and Cable Bahamas Ltd.


Please note that the square brackets indicate figures or text which have been deleted for
reasons of commercial confidentiality.


1.     The Parties


Systems Resource Group Limited

1.1    Systems Resource Group Limited (the "Licensee") is a privately owned fimited company
       duly incorporated in The Bahamas. It is primarily active in the provision   of fixed voice
       telephony services under the registered business name IndiGO Networks.      In November,
       2009, the Licensee was issued an Individual Operating Licence and           an Individual
       Spectrum Licence by URCA in accordance with the Communications Act,         2009 (Comms
       Act), which established the new licensing regime.

1.2    The Licensee wholly owns four (4) subsidiaries: Digital Systems (Bahamas) Limited,
       Tribune Satellite Limited, Internet (Bahamas) Limited and XT Wireless Limited, none of
       which are currently trading.

1.3    The Licensee does not hold an interest in any other Comms Act licensee.

Cable Bahamas Ltd.


1.4    Cable Bahamas Ltd. (the "Acquirer") is a publicly traded limited company duly
       incorporated in The Bahamas. It is primarily active in the provision of cable television
       services and broadband internet services. In October, 2009 the Acquirer was also issued
       an Individual Operating Licence and an Individual Spectrum Licence by URCA in
       accordance with the Comms Act.

1.5    The Licensee wholly owns three (3) subsidiaries: Cable Freeport Ltd., Caribbean
       Crossings Ltd. and Maxil Communications Ltd.

1.6    The Acquirer does not hold an interest in any other Comms Act licensee.

       Background


2.1    In October 2002, the Licensee was licensed under the Telecommunications Act, 1999
       {Tel Act). In September 2009, the Comms Act came into force which substantially
       repealed the Tel Act and required licensees under the legacy licensing regime to

                                                                                      Page 2 of 14


         transition to the new licensing regime.         The Licensee transitioned to a Comms Act
         licence in November 2009 and thereby became a licensee under the Comms Act, subject
         to the merger control provisions in Part XI of the Comms Act.

2.2      in October 1994, the Acquirer was issued an exclusive Cable TV licence and franchise by
         the Government of The Bahamas under the Broadcasting Act, Chapter 278 to establish,
         maintain and operate a cable television system throughout The Bahamas (exclusive of
         Freeport, Grand Bahama) for a period of fifteen (15) years with effect from October 13,
         1994. The exclusivity period expired October 13, 2009. The Acquirer transitioned its
         exclusive licence to a Comms Act licence in October 2009, thereby becoming a licensee
         under the Comms Act, also subject to the merger control provisions in Part XI of the
         Comms Act.

2.3     On September 7, 2010 the Licensee and the Acquirer executed a Share Purchase
        Agreement (SPA) which, subject to regulatory approval by URCA, will result in, inter alia,
        the change of control of the Licensee to the Acquirer.

2.4     Part Xi of the Comms Act sets out the competition provisions that will apply to the
        electronic communications sector. Under Section 70 of the Comms Act, no change in
        control of a licensee can be implemented without obtaining the prior written approval
        of URCA.

2.5     On September 17, 2010 the Parties jointly submitted a Full Merger Notification Form
        (with accompanying documents which will be referred to where appropriate) to URCA in
        compliance with the Comms Act for regulatory approval of the proposed acquisition of a
        controlling shareholding in the Licensee.

2.6     URCA published a Notice of its receipt of the merger Notification on its website on
        September 20, 2010 inviting representations from interested parties to the proposed
        merger. URCA has received comments from interested parties and the public in respect
        of the proposed merger, which comments have been reviewed and considered.

2.7     As a result of a preliminary assessment of the representations received, URCA
        determined that the proposed merger raised certain competition concerns that merited
        an in—depth investigation as set out in the URCA Competition Guidetines‘. This was
        communicated to the Parties on November 5, 2010 and a Notice to this effect was
        published on the URCA website.

2.8     During the investigation, URCA collected additional information from the Parties
        necessary to assess the competitive effects of the proposed merger. The information
        submitted by the Parties during the in—depth investigation has been considered by
        URCA.


‘ Competition Guidance: Merger Control — Procedure ECS Comp. 1 par. 64

                                                                                       Page 3 of 14


          The Transaction


 3.1      The Licensee and the Acquirer executed the SPA on September 10, 2010 conditional
          upon regulatory consent being obtained for the change of control consequential to the
          purchase of the Licensee‘s shares.

3.2       Under the SPA, the Acquirer will purchase the entire issued share capital of the
          Licensee. The consideration for the shares is [ ]. The SPA also provides for an
          adjustment to the share purchase price to reflect any material change to the Licensee‘s
          closing balance sheet in comparison to the previous year‘s balance sheet.

3.3       Consequential to the Transaction, the Acquirer will own 100% of the shares of the
         Licensee. It is envisaged that post—transaction, the Licensee "will be a wholly—owned
         subsidiary or a division of the Acquirer" .

         Third Party Representations


4.1      URCA received comments and representations on the proposed merger from interested
         parties and the public, including competitors and customers of the Parties.

4.2      There were a total of eleven (11) representations submitted to URCA. Seven (7)
         interested parties opposed the merger while there were four (4) that supported the
         merger. The representations were largely anecdotal with no concrete theories of harm
         or evidence to support the competition concerns asserted. Some of the concerns were
         not merger specific.

4.3      Of particular note, a stakeholder as an interested party and competitor to the Parties,
         expressed serious concern that should the merger be approved it would allow the
         Acquirer (a designated significant market power (SMP) operator under the Comms Act
         subject to SMP obligations imposed by URCA) to immediately enter new markets,
         particularly the voice market, through its affiliate, the Licensee. The interested party
         submitted that this would be contrary to the statutory constraints imposed under the
         Comms Act*.

4.4      It was further submitted by the stakeholder that URCA should also give consideration to
         the issue of the Licensee having "virtually all of the 2.5MHz spectrum in New Providence,
         Abaco and Grand Bahama" and the ability of the merged entity to be able to leverage
         its dominant position in the Wi—Max spectrum. The interested party submitted that
         URCA should impose certain conditions on the merging parties regarding the SMP
         obligations and to correct the anomaly in the 2.5MHz spectrum band.

* Particularly Section 116(5)

                                                                                       Page 4 of 14


4.5   The stakehoider was further of the view that the proposed merger would result in much
      harm to the "evolution of an emerging liberalised sector that is in the throes of early
      competition and serve to discourage new entrants, thereby limiting the choice and
      variety available to customers in The Bahamas". It was submitted that the merger
      would raise significant competition concerns because of both the elimination of actual
      and potential competition as between the Parties and the increased ability and
      incentive of the newly merged entity to eliminate actual and potential competition from
      third parties.

4.6   it was argued by the stakeholder that the proposed merger would substantially lessen
      competition in contravention of the stated objectives of the Government‘s Electronic
      Communications Sector Policy by reducing competition in fixed voice services.          The
      merged parties could potentially enter each other‘s product markets.

4.7   Finally, the stakeholder expressed the concern that the proposed merger has the
      characteristics of a vertical merger, which can give rise to further competition concerns,
      including input and customer foreclosure.

      Requirement for URCA‘s notification and approval — "Change in control"


5.1   Under Section 70 of the Comms Act, no change in control of a Licensee may be
      implemented without URCA‘s prior written approval.
5.2   Under Section 71 of the Comms Act, a "change in control" occurs when a person, either
      alone or with any affiliated company:
      (a)    acquires control (including by the acquisition of voting shares), by virtue of any
             powers conferred by the memorandum or articles of association or other
             instrument regulating the licensee or any other corporation or otherwise, to
             ensure that strategic decisions of the licensee are conducted in accordance with
             the wishes of that person;
      (b)    becomes the beneficial owner or voting controller of more than thirty percent of
             the voting shares in the licensee; or
      {c)    becomes the beneficial owner or voting controller of more than fifteen percent of
             the voting shares but not more than thirty percent of the voting shares in the
             licensee concerned unless that person either alone or with any affiliated
             company—
                       {i)     is not, or does not concurrently become, the beneficial owner or
                       voting controller of more than five percent of the voting shares in any
                       other licensee; and
                       (ii)   does not have the power (including by the holding of voting
                       shares), or does not concurrently acquire control (including by the

                                                                                     Page 5 of 14


                           acquisition of voting shares), by virtue of any powers conferred by the
                           memorandum or articles of association or other instrument regulating
                           any other licensee or any other corporation or otherwise, to ensure that
                           the affairs of such other licensee are conducted in accordance with the
                           wishes of that person."
 5.3      The Full Merger Notification Form submitted to URCA provides at paragraphs 19 and 20
          respectively that "the transaction comprises the acquisition by CBL of 100% of the shares
          in SRG" and "post—transaction, SRG will be a wholly—owned subsidiary or division of
          CBL...." This is buttressed by Article II 2.1(c) of the SPA that provides: "Cable Bahamas
         will, upon completion of the acquisition of the SRG Interest as contemplated herein,
         legally and beneficially own all of the SRG Interest free and clear of any claim, charge or
         encumbrance whatsoever".

5.4      The cumulative effect of the foregoing is that the "share threshold test" to determine
         whether there is change in control between the Acquirer and the Licensee is satisfied
         under Section 71(b) of the Comms Act, as cited above.

         Non—merger specific issues


6.1      An interested party has raised concerns of whether the Acquirer should be permitted to
         enter new markets if it has not complied with its SMP obligations and the allocation of
         the 2.5MHz spectrum to the merged entity. URCA is of the opinion that these non—
         merger specific issues are of sufficient importance to require treatment independent of
         the proposed concentration.

6.2      Under the Comms Act, the Acquirer was presumed to have SMP® and thereby subject to
         obligations imposed by URCA designed to maintain the objective of encouraging,
         promoting and enforcing sustainable competition". Accordingly, no SMP licensee would
         be permitted to engage in the provision of any networks or carriage services, which it
         was not already licensed to provide when the Comms Act came into force, until URCA
         has confirmed compliance with any imposed obligations".

6.3      URCA issued its Final Decision on April 22, 2010 describing the types of obligations to
         impose on the presumed SMP operators and the process and parameters for
         compliance with each of the ex ante obligations imposed on certain markets in which
         each operator has been presumed to have SMP®.




* See Section 116(1) and Schedule 4
* See Section 116(2)
* Supra note 2
© See "Obligations imposed on Operators with Significant Market Power (SMP)" ECS — 11/2010 published April
22, 2010

                                                                                                 Page 6 of 14


 6.4     URCA has concluded the necessary review of the documentation submitted by the
         Acquirer in its application for confirmation on compliance with each of the ex ante
         obligations imposed on it by URCA. URCA has confirmed compliance with all of the
         obligations imposed on the Acquirer and has certified the Acquirer compliant to engage
         in the provision of any networks or carriage services, which it was not already licensed
         to provide when the Comms Act came into force on September 1, 2009.

6.5      URCA therefore concludes that the statutory restriction prohibiting the Acquirer from
         entering new markets unless it has complied with its SMP obligations is no longer
         germane to the instant merger notification.

6.6      URCA has also considered the 2.5MHz spectrum assigned to the Licensee. While URCA
         has the statutory power to impose conditions on the Parties, sections 36 and 37 of the
         Comms Act established the procedure for the vacation of spectrum. URCA has engaged
         the Parties on this issue within the scope of the in—depth investigation. The vacation of
         the spectrum prior to a determination by URCA would have to be on a voluntary basis
         by the Parties. As such, URCA may act ultra vires to impose a condition to vacate
         spectrum on the Parties under the merger,. URCA expands on this issue at paragraphs
         7.19 and 7.20 below.

         Analysis of the proposed Transaction

7.1      Under Section 72 of the Comms Act, on receiving a notification, URCA is required to
         form an opinion on whether "a proposed change of control of a licensee would have, or
         be likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market in The
         Bahamas." This will involve: (i) defining what is the relevant market; (ii}) assessing
         market concentration; (iii) assessing the theories of harm; assessing the counterfactual;
         (iv) determining whether there are barriers to entry or expansion; and (v) assessing any
         pro—competitive effects or efficiencies which may be consequential to the proposed
         merger‘.

Substantial lessening of competition in a market in The Bahamas


7.2      In determining whether the merger between the Licensee and the Acquirer would be
         likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market in The
         Bahamas, URCA must firstly define the relevant market®. As set out in the Competition
         Guidelines, a relevant market will normally have two dimensions: a relevant product
         market and a relevant geographic market.

7.3     A relevant product market comprises those products that are regarded as
        interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer by reason of the products‘


" See URCA‘s Competition Guidance: Merger Control — Substantive ECS COMP. 2
® Ibid see particularly section 4.1; see also Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215

                                                                                            Page 7 of 14


         characteristics, their prices and their intended use. There is a demand—side substitution
         and a supply—side substitution to defining the relevant market,               Demand—side
         substitution exists where, in response to a small yet significant and non—transitory price
         increase in a good or service supplied by the merged parties, a significant number of
         customers would switch to other products (This is also known as the SSNIP test)g.
         Supply—side substitution exists where, in response to a small yet significant and non—
         transitory price increase in a good or service supplied by the merging parties, other
         suppliers could easily start providing the good or service in the short term, using largely
         unchanged production facilities and with little or no additional investment.

 7.4     The products provided by the Licensee are: (i) fixed wireless access (FWA); (ii) prepaid
         phone cards; and (iii} voice over internet. While the Licensee has been issued spectrum
         in the 2.5GHz spectrum band which allows it to provide high speed broadband services,
         URCA is unaware of any plans for new services or expansion of current services to be
         launched by the Licensee within the next 12—24 months. As such, broadband products
         are not considered within the substitution analysis. The product markets for the
         Acquirer are"": (i) pay TV, and (ii) high speed data services and connectivity. URCA
         concludes that the relevant product market of the Parties does not overlap and are
         distinct.

7.5      The relevant geographic market is the area in which the firms under examination are
         involved in the supply and demand matrix of the relevant product and services. Under
         the Comms Act licensing regime, the Parties have been issued national licences
         restricted only by spectrum limitations where stipulated in the Annex to the individual
         Spectrum Licence. As such, the geographic market for the Parties is The Bahamas.
         Notwithstanding this, as the Parties are in distinct product markets, there will not be a
         substantial lessening of competition. The determination of the relevant geographic
         market therefore can be left open as the Parties are in distinct product markets and
         there will not be a substantial lessening of competition.

         Market Concentration and theories of harm


7.6      The structure of a market will be a key factor in assessing whether a proposed change of
         control of a licensee will give rise to a substantial lessening of competition. The more
         concentrated the market, the more likely it is that the competitive constraints on the
         merging firms are weaker‘‘. Market concentration can be measured through the
         Herfindahl—Hirschman Index (HHI)}. The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share
         of each operator competing in a market then summing the resulting numbers. As the
         Parties do not compete in the same markets the market concentration will remain

° tbid
!° See the "Obligations imposed on Operators with Significant Market Power (SMP)" Final Decision document ECS
11/2010
URCA‘s Final Decision
" See URCA‘s Competition Guidance: Merger Control — Substantive ECS COMP. 2 section 4.2

                                                                                                   Page 8 of 14


          unchanged. URCA therefore concludes that a decision on market concentration can be
          left open.

 7.7      In assessing the proposed merger, URCA has considered the merging parties‘ offerings
          to their customers and the potential harm to those offerings. URCA has concluded that
          the Parties are in different relevant markets, URCA has therefore considered whether
          the proposed merger would result in foreclosure through tying and bundling and
          foreclosure through portfolio effects.

 7.8      Foreclosure through tying and bundling occurs where the merged firm uses its market
          power in one market to foreclose competitors in another by employing selling practices
          that link the products it sells in the separate markets together. Foreclosure through
          portfolio effects occurs where the merger gives the merged firm a product range
          advantage because customers value variety and therefore wish to purchase both of the
          merged firm‘s products.

7.9      As described in paragraphs 7.31 through 7.33 below, the Parties will provide tied and
         bundled services. Tying and bundling need not be anti—competitive and can be
         beneficial to customers. The Parties have provided evidence to support efficiency gains
         consequential to tying and bundling. URCA therefore concludes, after its investigation
         and analysis, that the potential efficiencies resulting directly from the proposed merger
         are sufficiently substantial to counteract potential anti—competitive effects that would
         lessen competition.

         The Counterfactual


7.10     To determine whether there is likely to be a substantial lessening of competition, URCA
         has also considered what would happen if the Parties did not mergeu. This is known as
         the counterfactual or "failing firm" defence. URCA begins with the presumption that
         the counterfactual scenario is the status quo prior to the proposed merger. In analysing
         the counterfactual, URCA particularly considers whether the firm being acquired would
         exit the market in the near future were it not for the merger; that the firm is unable to
         reorganise its operations; and there is no less anti—competitive alternative purchase to
         the merger.

7.11     The Parties have provided cogent evidence to rebut this presumption by urging URCA to
         have regard to the Licensee‘s financial position and, in particular, whether this position
         is likely to allow the Licensee to emerge as an effective competitor capable of exercising
         competitive constraints on dominant operators in the sector.                    Under the SPA, the
         Licensee has an indebtedness for borrowed money in the amount of [ ] as at June 30,


‘f Ibid see particularly section 4.4             .
" in addition to section 4.4 of the Competition Guidance, see EC Joined Cases C—68/94 and C—30/95, Kali and Salz
par. 110 — 116.

                                                                                                     Page 9 of 14


          2010. Additionally, the Licensee‘s Audited Financial Statements indicate that as at
          December 31, 2009 its liability totalled a higher amount of [ ].

 7.12      The Parties submitted that absent the merger the Licensee is at a greater risk in its
          ability to compete going forward, particularly, should there be a merger between the
          local incumbent and Cable & Wireless Communications Limited (a strong global
          competitor).

 7.13     The Parties confirmed that after an assessment of the Licensee‘s options, it has not
         been able to identify alternative sources of funding to enable the Licensee to pursue its
         own growth strategy. It was further submitted that even if alternative sources of
         funding could be identified, the Licensee‘s current financial position, removes any
          realistic possibility of securing funding necessary for growth.

7.14       The Parties argue that the Licensee "will find it challenging to sustain its business
          without a strategic partner."

7.15       URCA is satisfied by its investigation that the foregoing submissions allow the Parties to
         rely on the "failing firm" defence. However, URCA is of the opinion that even where the
         defence does not apply, it is conceivable that the acquisition of the Licensee by the
         Acquirer might be permitted where it yields relevant customer benefits"*. The benefits
         would however need to outweigh the customer detriments which arise through the loss
         of competition. The potential benefits to customers which might accrue under the
         proposed concentration are lower prices, greater choices and higher quality service*".

7.16     URCA believes that the continued provision of fixed voice services under the merger is
         vital to sustainable competition in The Bahamas. This is one of the key policy objectives
         of the Comms Act and the Electronic Communications Sector Policy‘".                                  URCA‘s
         conclusion regarding the counterfactual is that there is a potential loss of the only other
         operator currently providing fixed voice services in The Bahamas should the merger not
         be approved. Any such loss should therefore be avoided.

         Barriers to entry and expansion

7.17     URCA has considered the extent to which there may be barriers that adversely affect the
         likelihood, timeliness and sufficiency of other players‘ ability to enter or expand in the
         market®. These barriers to entry may include, but are not limited to: (i) legal barriers



"‘ A position taken by the Competition Commission (UK) and reflected in the OFT Guidance, par. 4.38;
" The Privileged and Confidential report prepared by LECG Consulting Ltd. (UK) dated 14 October, 2010
submitted by the Parties describes in detail direct benefits to be passed on to customers within a reasonable time
post—merger approval.
* Published in the Official Gazette, 7"" October, 2009
‘" See URCA‘s Competition Guidance: Merger Control — Substantive ECS COMP. 2 section 4.5

                                                                                                         Page 10 of 14


         such as the requirement for a licence, (ii) technical barriers such as the availability of
         spectrum and (ii}) access to essential facilities.

 7.18    The licensing regime under the Comms Act effectively removes legal barriers to entry.
         The licensing regime, when taken as a whole, encourages, promotes and enforces
         sustainable competition in the sector. Additionally, the promotion of investment and
         innovation in electronic communications networks and services is a core policy objective
         under the Comms Act, URCA has published its Licensing Guidelines*® which, inter alia,
         describe the licensing framework and the criteria for obtaining a Comms Act licence. Of
         particular note, the Licensing Guidelines expressly provide that URCA may not limit the
         number of licences it issues save for where there is a limited scarce resource such as
         spectrum. URCA has issued Comms Act licences which allow other operators to provide
         like services in the market as the Parties.

7.19     The potential technical barriers to entry consequential to availability of spectrum are
         addressed by the exercise of URCA‘s powers under Part V of the Comms Act. URCA has
         a statutory duty to ensure that radio spectrum is managed and used in a manner that:
         "is open, objective, transparent and non—discriminatory; is economically efficient and
        facilitates the evolution of new technologies and electronic communications services
         whilst taking into account in particular investment in existing equipment configured for
         specific radio spectrum and the cost of migration to other radio spectrum." URCA may
         by determination, without compensation, declare vacant any radio spectrum that has
         been assigned to a person and may assign such spectrum to a different person on
         certain grounds, particularly: "the relevant spectrum is not in significant use and there is
         demonstrable demand from other persons for making efficient use of all or part of such
         radio spectrum."

7.20     URCA may also by determination, with compensation, require a person to vacate radio
        spectrum that has been assigned to a person and may assign such spectrum to a
        different person on certain grounds, particularly where it is necessary or expedient to
        further the electronic communications policy objectives. An objective of the Electronic
        Communications Sector Policy is to further the interests of consumers by promoting
        competition and, in particular, to promote the optimal use of state assets including
        radio spectrum. Therefore, URCA‘s power of vacation of spectrum either with or
        without compensation lowers the barrier to entry even where there is a merger
        concentration.

7.21    While access to essential facilities can act as a barrier to entry, URCA has issued its Final
        Decision on obligations for SMP operators*" which are specifically designed to maintain
        the objective of encouraging, promoting and enforcing sustainable competition

® See URCA‘s published document Guidance On The Licensing Regime Under the Communications Act, 2009
Guidelines ECS 1572009
* See section 4 of the "Obligations imposed on Operators with Significant Market Power (SMP]" Final Decision
document ECS 11/2010

                                                                                                    Page 11 of 14


         particularly in the markets of the SMP operators and thus remove the potential that
         access to essential facilities can pose as a barrier to entry. The Acquirer, as an SMP
         operator, has the obligation of providing its broadband services to other licensed
         operators on a resale basis. It also has the obligation of untying its broadband packages
         from pay TV packages. This also lowers the costs of entry.

 7.22    URCA may also consider the effect of a merger on the likelihood of new entry which
         might itself contribute to a substantial lessening of competition where the merger will
         reduce or eliminate the competitive constraint represented by new entry. This is
         especially the case where the acquired firm is one of the most likely entrants into the
         market of the acquiring firm.

7.23     The merger of the Parties will result in a reduction of the number of competitors in the
         market as the Acquirer would have been able to enter the market of the Licensee and
        the Licensee would have been able to enter the market of Acquirer. However, any new
        entry should be of sufficient scope to constrain attempts to exploit market power.
        URCA is of the opinion that small—scale entry, perhaps into a niche market, may be
        insufficient to substantially lessen competition. The Parties have submitted that
        without the merger the Licensee will be "reduced to a mere niche player at best."

7.24    URCA has considered whether the creation of a portfolio or bundle of services by the
        merged entity will be a strategic barrier to entry and whether another provider could
        replicate such bundled services. URCA‘s investigation in this regard and having regard
        to URCA‘s comments at paragraph 7.21 above, the bundled services proposed by the
        Parties can be provided by other rival operators. This can act as an important constraint
        on the merging parties‘ behaviour in the market.

7.25    URCA‘s conclusion on the barriers to entry is that although the merger may reduce
        competitive rivalry in the short term, entry by new players and/or expansion by existing
        players consequential to low barriers to entry may be sufficient to deter or defeat
        attempts by the merged firm to exploit that reduction in competitive rivalry. As such,
        the merger would not substantially lessen competition.

        Efficiencies


 7.26   The Parties have claimed that the efficiency gains consequential to the merger will have
        a positive effect on rivalry. In its assessment of the claimed efficiency gains, URCA
        would expect the following criteria to be met: (i} the efficiencies are very likely to arise
        and to do so within a period of time corresponding to the onset of any adverse effects
        on customers, {ii) the efficiencies must be a direct consequence of the merger; and (iii)
        the benefits of the efficiencies must be passed on (wholly or partially) to customers of
        the merged firm.""

*° See URCA‘s Competition Guidance: Merger Control — Substantive ECS COMP. 2 section 4.7

                                                                                           Page 12 of 14


 7.27     While there is no exhaustive list of efficiency gains that can result from a merger, the
          possible efficiencies to be considered by URCA under the instant merger include cost
          savings, more intensive use of existing capacity, economies of scale or scope, and
          demand—side efficiencies such as increased network size and product quality.

 7.28     The information asymmetry between URCA and the Parties in respect of the efficiency
          claims requires that the evidence provided must be compelling**. The Parties have
          submitted both quantitative and qualitative data in support of the claimed efficiencies
          prepared by the UK based firm, LECG Consulting Ltd., which describes the efficiencies
          which will result from the instant mergerzz.

 7.29     The report provides that the merged entity will aim to offer voice services to [ %] of the
          Bahamian population at lower prices, with a quality at least as high as PSTN. In this
          regard, the merged entity will offer residential and commercial customers voice tariffs
          significantly lower [  % and      % respectively]} than the rival incumbent, using the
          Acquirer‘s cable network. The merged entities have established a plan to migrate the
          existing customers of the Licensee to the merged entity‘s corresponding tariff plan.

7.30      The report outlines higher quality of service and reliability than the VoIP service
          currently provided by the incumbent and the Licensee {as a stand—alone provider) as a
          claimed efficiency. The report admits that the quality of service and greater reliability
          are difficult to quantify but asserts that consumer research indicates that these
          variables are the most important factors Bahamian consumers consider when choosing
          a fixed voice provider. Further, the merged entity will be able to provide reliable voice
          service and high call quality managed by the merged entity‘s geographical redundant
          next generation switching equipment and delivered by the merged entity‘s advanced
          fibre—optic network. The latter has direct benefit for corporate customers ({particularly
          large and medium).

7.31     Arising from the report, the merged entity proposes to provide double, triple and
          possibly quadruple play bundles at bundled discounts. Relying on a Cournot model*",
         the Parties proposes to treat broadband internet, pay TV and voice as complementary
         products and offer one of the products in the bundle at a discount. Consequently,
         demand for all the products in the bundle should increase. Reduced prices under the
         Cournot model has been claimed as a pricing efficiency by the Parties that will benefit
         consumers.



*‘ An international standard as adopted by OFT
* Supra note 12
* The Cournot model is an economic model that attempts to predict the behavior of two businesses that make up a
given market. In the Cournot Model, the variable that exists between two companies of a specific market is their output
level. These companies will adjust their levels of output until they reach a point where they can lower prices while still
maximizing profits. Bundled products and discounts is one method of achieving this goal.

                                                                                                             Page 13 of 14


7.32   The report has also described potential network efficiency consequential to the merger
       by combining the Acquirer‘s cable network with Licensee‘s fixed wireless network. It
       illustrates that the Acquirer‘s network passes [ %] of the population on the four
       Bahamian islands where it operates. It has been submitted that the merged entity
       intends to extend its network footprint to reach an additional [ %] of the population of
       those islands. The concentration will allow the merged entity to use the fixed line
       network to provide voice services to customers approximately nine (9) months earlier
       than without the merger.

7.33   The report outlines lower termination rates for international calls as an efficiency that
       the merged entity could not provide consumers on their own. Under the report, the
       Parties proffer that as lower termination rates will reduce the marginal costs of a call to
       the merged entity, this benefit will be shared with Bahamian consumers.

7.34   The report indicates that should the merged entity be given regulatory approval, the
       consumer benefits under the merger will be realised in 2011.

7.35   URCA concludes that, after its investigation and analysis, the potential efficiencies
       resulting directly from the proposed merger are sufficiently substantial to counteract
       any potential anti—competitive effects. URCA is satisfied that the efficiencies will be
       passed on to consumers within a reasonable time of the merger.


       URCA‘s decision

       Having provided the foregoing reasons and reasoning, URCA hereby issues its opinion
       and decision in accordance with Section 75(1){a) of the Comms Act, that the proposed
       change in control between the Acquirer and the Licensee would not be likely to have the
       adverse effects as set out in Section 72 of the Comms Act and therefore URCA gives its
       consent to the proposed merger.




                                                                                      Page 14 of 14



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Document Modified: 2019-04-17 08:09:05

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