Signed ODAR

0469-EX-CN-2017 Text Documents

University of North Carolina at Wilmington Center for Marine Science

2017-10-10ELS_199497

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report TN-2124 - Rev A Date: 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of the contents of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the written permission of Clyde Space. Clyde Space ™ is a trademark of Clyde Space. Other company, product or service names may be trademarks or service marks of others.

SOCON—Seahawk ODAR (6) T T paes C\ m. lnir] Orbital Debris Assessment Report Clyde Space approval signatures Name Date Signed Author Baptiste Lombard 13/06/17 Reviewer Douglas McNeil 13/06/17 Approved Martin McGahon 13/06/17 _ Regulatory body approval signatures Name Date Signed NASA HQ program / project management NASA HQ Office of Safety & Mission Assurance Orbital Debris Manager Mission Directorate Associate Administrator NASA Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance Document control Rev Date Section Description of change Reason for change A 13/06/17 All First release Related documents / software No. Document name Document reference [RD—1] Process for Limiting Orbital Debris NASA—STD—8719.14A [RD—2] NASA DAS Software 2.1 and User Guide DAS 2.1.1 & NASA/TP—2016—218600 Revision control Product Part number 01—04578 — Top Level Assembly SeaHawk PFM 01—04578 www.clyde.space Space is Awesome Page 2 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN—2124 — Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Contents Self-assessment of the ODAR using template in [RD-1].............................................................. 4 ODAR section 1: Program Management and Mission Overview ................................................ 5 ODAR section 2: Spacecraft Description ..................................................................................... 6 ODAR section 3: Assessment of Spacecraft Debris Released during Normal Operations......... 10 ODAR section 4: Assessment of Spacecraft Intentional Breakups & Potential for Explosions . 10 ODAR section 5: Assessment of Spacecraft Potential for On-Orbit Collisions .......................... 15 ODAR section 6: Assessment of Spacecraft Post-mission Disposal Plans and Procedures ....... 16 ODAR section 7: Assessment of Spacecraft Reentry Hazards ................................................... 18 ODAR section 8: Assessment for Tether Missions .................................................................... 20 Simulation logs of DAS-2.1 [RD-2] ............................................................................................. 21 Figures Figure 1 - Seahawk spacecraft deployable illustration ............................................................... 7 Figure 2 - Seahawk spacecraft overall envelop in flight configuration ....................................... 8 Figure 3 - Seahawk payload shutter mechanism ........................................................................ 8 Figure 4 - Seahawk orbit natural decay plot using [RD-2] ......................................................... 17 Tables Table 1 – Energy sources and passivation method ................................................................... 14 Table 2 – Spacecraft material list .............................................................................................. 18 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 3 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Self-assessment of the ODAR using template in [RD-1] A self-assessment is provided below in accordance with the assessment format provided in Appendix A.2 of [RD-1]. Note: This launch has multiple spacecraft manifested and the Seahawk spacecraft is not the primary payload. Assessment Report Format This ODAR follows the format recommended in Appendix A.1 of [RD-1] and includes the content indicated at a minimum in each section 2 through 8 below for the Seahawk satellite. Sections 9 through 14 apply to the launch vehicle ODAR and are not covered in this document. DAS Software [RD-2] used in this analysis DAS Software v2.1.1 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 4 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report ODAR section 1: Program Management and Mission Overview Program Management Mission Directorate: UNCW Physics and Physical Oceanography Center for Marine Science University of North Carolina Wilmington Program Executive: John M. Morrison Senior Scientist: Gene Feldman Mission overview The University of North Carolina Wilmington SOCON (aka Seahawk) program consists in two identical 3U spacecraft, “Seahawk-1” and “Seahawk-2”. Those spacecraft carry an Earth Observation payload. The instrument is a multispectral high resolution camera designed for ocean colour imaging. With an estimate 120 meter resolution, the SeaHawk instrument is designed to complement NASA SeaWiFS and Modis Instruments currently in service. These systems were designed to measure global ocean color, but the image resolution made difficult the measurements of lakes, rivers, estuaries, and coastal zones. Mission development schedule FRR (Seahawk-1): November 2017 Launch (Seahawk-1): No earlier than February 2018 FRR (Seahawk-2): March 2018 (TBC) Launch (Seahawk-2): No earlier than January 2019 Mission duration Intended operational lifetime: 18 month Post-operation orbit lifetime: 3.4 years until re-entry via atmospheric orbital decay Cumulated orbit lifetime: 4.9 years, as calculated with [RD-2] www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 5 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Launch and deployment summary Launch vehicle and site: SpaceX Falcon 9 – Vandenberg Air Force Base; This launch is a multi-payload launch provided by Spaceflight, with mini/micro and nano satellites. Proposed launch date: No earlier than February 2018 Target injection orbit: SSO (LTDN 10:30) @ 575 x 575 km (used as worst case) Deployment: ISIS DuoPack 3U deployer. The actual deployment sequence and direction is managed by the launch provider. Orbit transfer: no orbit change (no propulsion onboard) ODAR summary • No debris released in normal operations • No credible scenario for explosion • Collision probability is compliant with NASA standards • No disposal plan that could be compromised • Estimated orbital lifetime until uncontrolled re-entry (with no residual material) is under 25 years Important note: All values and simulations are given for Seahawk-1. Seahawk-2 is planned for launch in Q1-Q2 2019 on the same launch vehicle but on a lower orbit: SSO (LTDN 10:30) @ 500 x 525 km. For this reason, Seahawk-2 compliancy could be inherited from the present ODAR, as Seahawk-1 constitutes the worst-case scenario. ODAR section 2: Spacecraft Description Physical description Seahawk spacecraft is a 3U CubeSat, compliant with the standard 3U envelope of 340.5mm x 113mm x 113mm (L x W x H) in launch configuration. www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 6 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Spacecraft components: Seahawk spacecraft structure hosts a 1U / 1kg payload (described in the previous section), a GPS receiver with its body-mounted antenna, a X-band radio with its body- mounted patch antenna, a UHF/VHU radio with its dipole antennas and standard avionics (OBC, EPS, BAT, ADCS sensors and actuators…). Spacecraft mass: 4.7kg as designed (there are neither propellants nor fluids) Spacecraft average cross-sectional area: 0.132m2, as per [RD-1] guidelines. Note: nadir-pointing cross-sectional area is 0.103m2. Calculated Area-to-mass ratio: 0.028m2/kg Deployable appendages include the following (refer to Figure 1 for illustration): • 4 solar panels, all deployed from the Z+ face • 4 monopole whip antennas, deployed from the edges of the Z- face. Main component locations are also illustrated in the Figure 1. Note that the payload apertures (on the X- face) are covered by a deployable solar panel during the launch. Flight direction (Z+) Payload location EPS/BAT location ADCS location +X +Z Nadir (X-) +Y Figure 1 - Seahawk spacecraft deployable illustration Overall dimensions in flight configuration: Appendages in deployed configuration are shown in Figure 2. The 83mm wide solar panels are deployed in the Z+ face plane. The antennas are deployed in the Z- face plan. The overall envelop is then: 970mm (X) x 760mm (Y) x 340mm (Z). www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 7 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report 562mm 760mm +X +Z +Y 470mm 970mm Figure 2 - Seahawk spacecraft overall envelop in flight configuration Mechanisms The payload consists of a multispectral push-broom camera, with an electro- mechanical shutter (refer to Figure 3). The shutter has 2 redundant solenoids that are always OFF except when actuated for a short period of time (dark frame imaging for calibration purpose). Traction springs counteract the solenoids and are always in lower energy position (about 35 grams force combined), except when the shutter is ON. Figure 3 - Seahawk payload shutter mechanism Deployable solar panels make use of hold-on mechanisms consisting in a piece of nylon wire tied against a burn resistor. Similar mechanisms are used to hold down each of www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 8 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report the antennas. The deployment is achieved by small torque springs (mechanical energy is negligible after deployment, and not strong enough to cause panels to break in any folded configuration). Attitude control system Primarily based on fine sun-sensors attitude determination, the ADCS achieve a 1degree pointing accuracy using the following actuators: • 5x magnetorquers, integrated in body panels • 3x Reaction Wheels, stacked in the core avionics Nominal mission attitude is nadir pointing, as described in the Figure 1 above. A detumble mode is available in case the rotation rate is too high (in particular after initial deployment). In that mode, only the magneto-torquers are used. Power generation and storage system There are 3 body solar panels and 4 deployable solar panels (with cells on both faces) on the spacecraft. Generated power is managed by a set of battery charge regulators, which architecture is designed to handle the extremum power configurations. A 40Whr Li-Ion Polymer battery is used, featured with a cell protection circuit to manage charging / discharging and a heater to keep the cells in operating temp. range. Note that the electrical system architecture is designed such as it is not possible to cut power lines between the solar panels and the battery - this is to improve the overall reliability of the platform. Consequently, batteries will continue to charge whenever the panels are sunlit and cannot be passivated. This is addressed as a risk in the section 4 of this ODAR. Propulsion and fluid systems None. Note that batteries are unpressurized. Other sources of stored energy None. Neither radioactive materials nor pyrotechnic devices are used. www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 9 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report ODAR section 3: Assessment of Spacecraft Debris Released during Normal Operations There are no intentional releases whatever the flight phase. Note that X+ deployable solar panel also serves as payload aperture cover for the first days of flight. Assessment of spacecraft compliance Requirement ID Compliancy status Requirement 4.3-1a Compliant (debris released in LEO) Requirement 4.3-1b Compliant (all debris released in LEO) Requirement 4.3-2 Compliant (debris released in GEO) ODAR section 4: Assessment of Spacecraft Intentional Breakups & Potential for Explosions Potential causes of spacecraft breakup during deployment and mission operations: There is no credible scenario that would result in spacecraft breakup during normal deployment and operations. All bolts are suitably torqued and head locked and all risk components are staked. Summary of failure modes and effects analyses of all credible failure modes which may lead to an accidental explosion: In-mission failure of a battery cell protection circuit could lead to a short circuit resulting in overheating and a very remote possibility of battery cell explosion. The battery safety systems discussed in the FMEA below describe the combined faults that must occur for any of nine, independent, mutually exclusive failure modes that could lead to a battery explosion. www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 10 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Supporting rationales Battery explosion impact: All failure modes below might result in battery explosion with the possibility of orbital debris generation. However, in the unlikely event that a battery cell does explosively rupture, the small size, mass, and potential energy, of these small batteries is such that while the spacecraft could be expected to vent gases, most debris from the battery rupture should be contained within the vessel due to the lack of penetration energy. The batteries consist of lithium polymer pouch cells with a flexible casing; as has a much lower burst pressure than equivalent lithium ion can cells with metal casings there is no credible opportunity for a high pressure explosion to occur. If a failure mode occurs that results in the accumulation of gas within a cell, the pouch cells will rupture however no shrapnel will be generated due to the polymer casing. Probability: Very Low. Though it is not easily quantifiable, it is believed to be less than 0.1% given that multiple independent (not common mode) faults must occur for each failure mode to cause the ultimate effect (explosion). Supporting FMEA details Failure mode 1: Battery internal short circuit. Mitigation 1: Complete qualification tests of the cell design and battery design through NASA EP-WI-032 testing. Combined faults required for realized failure: Environmental testing (inclusive of Thermal cycling and thermal vacuum testing) AND functional charge/discharge tests AND ESA qualified inspection at board level must all be ineffective in discovery of the failure mode. Failure Mode 2: Internal thermal rise due to high load discharge rate. Mitigation 2: The power system consists of overcurrent protection at power bus level, overcurrent protection at a cell level, and overcurrent protection at a string level consisting of a positive temperature coefficient (PTC) variable resistance device to inhibit charge or discharge rates beyond acceptable levels. Combined faults required for realized failure: The PTC must fail AND spacecraft thermal design must be incorrect AND external over current detection and protection must fail for this failure mode to occur. Failure Mode 3: Overcharging and excessive charge rate. Mitigation 3: The satellite bus battery charging circuit design eliminates the possibility of the batteries being overcharged if circuits function nominally. This circuit has been proto-qualification tested for survival in vibration and thermal-vacuum environments and has extensive heritage on other spacecraft. The charge circuit disconnects the www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 11 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report incoming current when battery voltage indicates normal full charge at 8.27 V. If this circuit fails to operate, continuing charge can cause gas generation. Combined faults required for realized failure: a) For overcharging: The charge control circuit must fail to function. b) For excessive charge rate: The peak power generation from the solar arrays at any given time is 22W, which corresponds to approximately 2.8A potential charge current to the battery. The maximum charge rate the battery can accept is 4A. The battery is a proto-qualified Clyde Space 40Whr via NASA EP- WI-032 and has 8 LPP503759DL cells. The battery itself has two parallel strings of 2 cells connected in series and 4 strings in parallel, and thus having 8 cells. Due to solar panel current limits and their direction-facing arrangement on the satellite, there is no physical means of exceeding charging rate limits, even if only a single string from the battery was accepting charge. For this failure mode to become active one string must fail to accept a charge AND the charge control circuit on the remaining string fails. Failure Mode 4: Excessive discharge rate or short circuit due to external device failure or terminal contact with conductors not at battery voltage levels (due to abrasion or inadequate proximity separation). Mitigation 4: This failure mode is negated by a) proto-qualification tested short circuit protection on each external circuit previously discussed for Failure Mode 2, b) design of battery packs and insulators such that no contact with nearby board traces is possible without being caused by some other mechanical failure c) obviation of such other mechanical failures by proto-qualification and acceptance environmental tests (vibration, thermal cycling, and thermal- vacuum tests). Combined faults required for realized failure: The PTC must fail AND an external load must fail/short-circuit AND external over-current detection and disconnect function must fail to enable this failure mode. Failure Mode 5: Inoperable vents. Mitigation 5: The lithium polymer pouch cells used within this design do not feature safety vent; they are hermetically sealed units. The casing is not rigid enough to allow sufficient pressure to build before the cell vents and therefore cause a hazard that might be induced by vent failure. www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 12 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Failure Mode 6: Crushing. Mitigation 6: This mode is negated by spacecraft design. There are no moving parts in the proximity of the batteries. Combined faults required for realized failure: A catastrophic failure must occur in an external system AND the failure must cause a collision sufficient to crush the batteries leading to an internal short circuit AND the satellite must be in a naturally sustained orbit at the time the crushing occurs. Failure Mode 7: Low level current leakage or short-circuit through battery pack case or due to moisture-based degradation of insulators. Mitigation 7: These modes are negated by a) battery holder/case design made of nonconductive plastic, and b) operation in vacuum such that no moisture can affect insulators. Combined faults required for realized failure: Abrasion or piercing failure of circuit board coating or wire insulators AND dislocation of battery packs AND failure of battery terminal insulators AND failure to detect such failures in environmental tests must occur to result in this failure mode. Failure Mode 8: Excess temperatures due to orbital environment and high discharge combined. Mitigation 8: Numerous CubeSat past experiences tend to demonstrate that given the compacity of the satellite, there is not significant overall thermal rise due to the space environment in LEO and batteries do not exceed normal allowable operating temperatures which are well below temperatures of concern for explosions. The satellite thermal design is passive, with only a battery heater switched on at low temperatures. Standard satellite thermal design includes temperature monitoring and protection: should a critical temperature be monitored in a subsystem (radio, payload, battery…) then the platform automatically transitioned into safe mode, powering off its switchable power busses. Combined faults required for realized failure: Thermal analysis AND thermal design AND mission simulations AND the PTC device must fail AND over-current monitoring and control must all fail for this failure mode to occur. Failure Mode 9: Polarity reversal due to over-discharge caused by continuous load during periods of negative power generation vs. consumption. Mitigation 9: The spacecraft EPS design negates this mode because the processor will stop when voltage drops too low. This disables ALL connected loads, creating a guaranteed power-positive charging scenario. The spacecraft will not restart or connect any loads until battery voltage is above a specific acceptable threshold. When the satellite restarts, it boots into safe mode where only core avionics are connected. By definition, this safe mode is very low power consumption and allow the system to charge again. www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 13 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Detailed plan for any designed spacecraft breakup, including explosions and intentional collisions: There are no planned breakups. List of components which shall be passivated at End of Mission (EOM) including method of passivation and amount which cannot be passivated: In summary, no particular operation is required to dispose of the spacecraft. As per the spacecraft description in ODAR section 2, the stored energy sources and the passivation methods are detailed in the table below. Table 1 – Energy sources and passivation method Required Energy sources Assessment details Passivation method operation at EOM Appendage hinge residual Spring-based mechanisms, forces are insignificant. used for deployment of appendages and payload Payload shutter spring residual None None operation (shutter return force is negligible (35gr) and in position of rest) springs are well encapsulated in the payload casing. Transition out of the Reaction wheels, spinning RWS are powered-off by Mission mode is performed None in standby & mission design when platform by: on-board schedule, modes only transitions into Safe mode. command, or in case of system reset / failure Battery could be discharged The design is not None, but risk Battery energy storage but platform is designed to compatible with a battery addressed in recover from discharged state passivation ODAR section 4 Battery is always linked to the The design is not None, but risk Solar panel energy EPS and solar panels, no compatible with a solar addressed in generation chain possible cut-off. panel passivation ODAR section 4 In case of forced EOM, transition out of Mission mode will be commanded. Otherwise the spacecraft will do so at the end of its on-board schedule (less than 1 week after last ground contact), and anytime it experiences a reset of a system failure. Power system architecture is designed for high reliability link, excluding any EOM passivation operation. The inherent risk is addressed in the following paragraphs. www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 14 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report For information only (not part of this ODAR), TMTC radio is beaconing status every few minutes but could be permanently silenced by telecommand. X-band radio is always off outside Mission mode. Rationale for all items which are required to be passivated, but cannot be due to their design: Even if battery and power generation chain couldn’t be passivated by design, the Failure mode analysis detailed above demonstrates that there is no credible scenario that could lead to debris creation. Assessment of spacecraft compliance Requirement ID Compliancy status Requirement 4.4-1 Compliant (risk of accidental explosion) Requirement 4.4-2 Compliant (design for passivation) Requirement 4.4-3 (long-term risk involved by Compliant intentional break-ups) Requirement 4.4-4 (short-term risk involved by Compliant intentional break-ups) ODAR section 5: Assessment of Spacecraft Potential for On-Orbit Collisions Inputs for DAS-2.1: • Orbit as described in Section 1 (575km circular SSO) • Mission lifetime as described in ODAR Section 1 (1.5year) • Satellite characteristics as described in ODAR Section 2 (4.7kg; 0.028m2/kg) • No critical parts for disposal operations as per ODAR Section 6 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 15 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report For information only, a simulation of OBC board damage by small debris was performed. Since it is protected by a number of other boards stacked on both sides, overall damage probability is extremely low (0.000002), which is reassuring for the nominal mission operations. Platform collision probability with large objects during orbital lifetime: DAS-2.1 simulation outputs: 0.00000 Critical parts collision probability with small objects during mission operations: DAS-2.1 simulation outputs: 0.00000 Assessment of spacecraft compliance Requirement ID Compliancy status Requirement 4.5-1 (risk of large object collision Compliant inferior to 0.001) Requirement 4.5-2 (risk of small object collision Compliant inferior to 0.01) ODAR section 6: Assessment of Spacecraft Post-mission Disposal Plans and Procedures Description of spacecraft disposal option selected: Seahawk spacecraft will be disposed by natural atmospheric re-entry (option A). As soon as injected in orbit, the spacecraft altitude will start to decay due to the residual atmospheric drag. A simulation using [RD-2] and the data below gives an orbital lifetime of 4.9years, compliant with the 25’ year requirement. www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 16 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Figure 4 - Seahawk orbit natural decay plot using [RD-2] Identification of all systems or components required to accomplish any post mission disposal operation, including passivation and manoeuvring: As per the energy sources listed in Table 1 (ODAR section 4) and the operations identified to be performed at EOM, no particular operation is required to dispose the spacecraft (no active passivation nor manoeuvring are required). Consequently, there are no critical parts for disposal operations. Plan for any spacecraft manoeuvres required to accomplish post mission disposal: There is no propulsion system and no plan to perform any orbital manoeuvre. There is no controlled re-entry either so no need for attitude control. Calculation of area-to-mass ratio after post mission disposal, if the controlled re- entry option is not selected Spacecraft Mass: 4.7 kg Cross-sectional Area: 0.132 m2 as per [RD-1] guidelines. Area to mass ratio: 0.132/4.7 = 0.028 m2/kg www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 17 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Assessment of spacecraft compliance Requirement ID Compliancy status Requirement 4.6-1 Compliant (disposal in LEO) Requirement 4.6-2 Compliant (disposal in GEO) Requirement 4.6-3 Compliant (disposal between GEO & LEO) Requirement 4.6-4 Compliant (disposal operation reliability) ODAR section 7: Assessment of Spacecraft Reentry Hazards Detailed description of spacecraft components by size, mass, material, shape and original location on the space vehicle Table 2 – Spacecraft material list Row Name Parent Qty Main Material type Shape Mass Diameter/ Length Height # for [RD-2] (kg) Width (m) (m) (m) 1 Cubesat root element 0 1 Aluminum 6082 T6 Box 4.7 0.1 0.34 0.1 2 Body Solar Panels 1 1 Copper Alloy Box 0.78 0.1 0.34 0.1 (Copper, Fibreglass…) 3 CubeSat Structure (incl. 2 1 Aluminum 6082 T6 Box 0.35 0.1 0.34 0.1 all aluminum items) 4 Platform electronic 3 11 Fiberglass FlatPlate 0.07 0.095 0.095 boards (FR4, copper, silicon, ceramic) 5 Radio housing 3 2 Aluminum (generic) Box 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.01 6 Fasteners (max M3x5) 3 70 Stainless Steel Cylinder 0.001 0.006 0.005 7 Stack rods 3 4 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Cylinder 0.006 0.003 0.21 8 Thermal heat shunt 3 4 Copper Alloy Box 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.005 9 Reaction Wheels &motors 3 3 Stainless Steel Cylinder 0.06 0.03 0.015 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 18 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report 10 Harnesses 3 25 Copper Alloy Cylinder 0.018 0.005 0.15 11 Payload housing 3 1 Aluminum 6061 T6 Box 0.45 0.097 0.102 0.097 12 Payload boards (FR4, 11 5 Fiberglass FlatPlate 0.045 0.085 0.095 copper, silicon, ceramic) 13 Payload solenoids 11 2 Stainless Steel Cylinder 0.023 0.013 0.043 14 Payload mechanical parts 11 9 Stainless Steel Cylinder 0.012 0.013 0.017 15 Deployable Solar Panels 1 4 Copper Alloy FlatPlate 0.15 0.083 0.33 (Copper, Fibreglass…) 16 Patch Antenna 1 2 Fiberglass Box 0.015 0.03 0.03 0.01 (composite housing) 17 Patch Antenna (copper) 17 2 Copper Alloy FlatPlate 0.065 0.08 0.08 18 VHF/UHF Antenna 1 4 Nitinol (NiTi) FlatPlate 0.008 0.005 0.5 The table above details the main materials used for the spacecraft, in a format compatible with [RD-2]. Note that electronics components, glues and other low melting temperature material were not detailed (e.g. optical glass, silicon). Summary of objects expected to survive an uncontrolled re-entry, using [RD-2] No components are expected to survive the re-entry, as per DAS-2.1 simulation. The largest stainless steel pieces will demise at a 65km altitude. Calculation of probability of human casualty for the expected uncontrolled re-entry As per [RD-2] simulation, and using the inputs above, DAS-2.1 calculates the following probability: 1:100000000 Hazardous material summary Because the battery cells are not considered as hazardous articles by regulations, there is no detailed information on the chemical content except that they don’t contain heavy metals. By products of the battery could be released during re-entry as the aluminium container will break, however no hazardous material is expected to survive the re-entry, due to the very light container type and the type and quantity of chemical involved. No other hazardous materials are present on the spacecraft. www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 19 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Assessment of spacecraft compliance Requirement ID Compliancy status Requirement 4.7-1 (risk of human casualty inferior to 0.0001, evaluated for an Compliant uncontrolled re-entry as mentioned in ODAR section 6) ODAR section 8: Assessment for Tether Missions Not applicable as there are no tethers in the Seahawk mission. Assessment of spacecraft compliance Requirement ID Compliancy status Requirement 4.8-1 Compliant (risk involved by tether) www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 20 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Simulation logs of DAS-2.1 [RD-2] 06 13 2017; 08:58:09AM Activity Log Started 06 13 2017; 08:59:01AM Processing Requirement 4.3-1: Return Status : Not Run ===================== No Project Data Available ===================== =============== End of Requirement 4.3-1 =============== 06 13 2017; 08:59:03AM Processing Requirement 4.3-2: Return Status : Passed ===================== No Project Data Available ===================== =============== End of Requirement 4.3-2 =============== 06 13 2017; 08:59:05AM Requirement 4.4-3: Compliant =============== End of Requirement 4.4-3 =============== 06 13 2017; 09:10:30AM Processing Requirement 4.5-1: Return Status : Passed ============== Run Data ============== **INPUT** Space Structure Name = Seahawk Space Structure Type = Payload Perigee Altitude = 575.000000 (km) Apogee Altitude = 575.000000 (km) Inclination = 97.700000 (deg) RAAN = 0.000000 (deg) Argument of Perigee = 0.000000 (deg) Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg) Final Area-To-Mass Ratio = 0.028000 (m^2/kg) Start Year = 2018.250000 (yr) Initial Mass = 4.700000 (kg) Final Mass = 4.700000 (kg) Duration = 1.500000 (yr) Station-Kept = False Abandoned = True PMD Perigee Altitude = -1.000000 (km) PMD Apogee Altitude = -1.000000 (km) PMD Inclination = 0.000000 (deg) PMD RAAN = 0.000000 (deg) PMD Argument of Perigee = 0.000000 (deg) PMD Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg) **OUTPUT** Collision Probability = 0.000002 Returned Error Message: Normal Processing Date Range Error Message: Normal Date Range www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 21 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Status = Pass ============== =============== End of Requirement 4.5-1 =============== 06 13 2017; 09:19:59AM Requirement 4.5-2: Compliant ================================================== Spacecraft = Seahawk Critical Surface = OBC board ================================================== **INPUT** Apogee Altitude = 575.000000 (km) Perigee Altitude = 575.000000 (km) Orbital Inclination = 97.700000 (deg) RAAN = 0.000000 (deg) Argument of Perigee = 0.000000 (deg) Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg) Final Area-To-Mass = 0.028000 (m^2/kg) Initial Mass = 4.700000 (kg) Final Mass = 4.700000 (kg) Station Kept = No Start Year = 2018.250000 (yr) Duration = 1.500000 (yr) Orientation = Fixed Oriented CS Areal Density = 0.760000 (g/cm^2) CS Surface Area = 0.008800 (m^2) Vector = (0.000000 (u), 1.000000 (v), 0.000000 (w)) CS Pressurized = No Outer Wall 1 Density: 0.570000 (g/cm^2) Separation: 5.000000 (cm) Outer Wall 2 Density: 5.000000 (g/cm^2) Separation: 1.000000 (cm) **OUTPUT** Probabilty of Penetration = 0.000002 (0.000002) Returned Error Message: Normal Processing Date Range Error Message: Normal Date Range 06 13 2017; 09:24:20AM Processing Requirement 4.6 Return Status : Passed ============== Project Data ============== **INPUT** Space Structure Name = Seahawk Space Structure Type = Payload Perigee Altitude = 575.000000 (km) Apogee Altitude = 575.000000 (km) Inclination = 97.700000 (deg) RAAN = 0.000000 (deg) Argument of Perigee = 0.000000 (deg) Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg) www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 22 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Area-To-Mass Ratio = 0.028000 (m^2/kg) Start Year = 2018.250000 (yr) Initial Mass = 4.700000 (kg) Final Mass = 4.700000 (kg) Duration = 1.500000 (yr) Station Kept = False Abandoned = True PMD Perigee Altitude = 571.502813 (km) PMD Apogee Altitude = 574.729298 (km) PMD Inclination = 97.673435 (deg) PMD RAAN = 178.153898 (deg) PMD Argument of Perigee = 355.332978 (deg) PMD Mean Anomaly = 0.000000 (deg) **OUTPUT** Suggested Perigee Altitude = 571.502813 (km) Suggested Apogee Altitude = 574.729298 (km) Returned Error Message = Passes LEO reentry orbit criteria. Released Year = 2023 (yr) Requirement = 61 Compliance Status = Pass ============== =============== End of Requirement 4.6 =============== 06 13 2017; 09:25:22AM *********Processing Requirement 4.7-1 Return Status : Passed ***********INPUT**** Item Number = 1 name = Seahawk quantity = 1 parent = 0 materialID = -1 type = Box Aero Mass = 4.700000 Thermal Mass = 4.700000 Diameter/Width = 0.100000 Length = 0.340000 Height = 0.100000 name = Body panels quantity = 1 parent = 1 materialID = 19 type = Box Aero Mass = 3.793000 Thermal Mass = 0.780000 Diameter/Width = 0.100000 Length = 0.340000 Height = 0.100000 name = Structure quantity = 1 parent = 2 materialID = -1 type = Box Aero Mass = 3.013000 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 23 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Thermal Mass = 0.350000 Diameter/Width = 0.100000 Length = 0.340000 Height = 0.100000 name = Platform boards quantity = 11 parent = 3 materialID = 23 type = Flat Plate Aero Mass = 0.070000 Thermal Mass = 0.070000 Diameter/Width = 0.095000 Length = 0.095000 name = Radio housing quantity = 2 parent = 3 materialID = 5 type = Box Aero Mass = 0.150000 Thermal Mass = 0.150000 Diameter/Width = 0.090000 Length = 0.090000 Height = 0.010000 name = Fasteners (max size M3x5) quantity = 70 parent = 3 materialID = 54 type = Cylinder Aero Mass = 0.001000 Thermal Mass = 0.001000 Diameter/Width = 0.006000 Length = 0.005000 name = Stack rods quantity = 4 parent = 3 materialID = 65 type = Cylinder Aero Mass = 0.006000 Thermal Mass = 0.006000 Diameter/Width = 0.003000 Length = 0.210000 name = Thermal heat shunt quantity = 4 parent = 3 materialID = 19 type = Box Aero Mass = 0.010000 Thermal Mass = 0.010000 Diameter/Width = 0.020000 Length = 0.020000 Height = 0.005000 name = Reaction wheels gimbal+motor quantity = 3 parent = 3 materialID = 54 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 24 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report type = Cylinder Aero Mass = 0.060000 Thermal Mass = 0.060000 Diameter/Width = 0.030000 Length = 0.015000 name = Harnesses quantity = 25 parent = 3 materialID = 19 type = Cylinder Aero Mass = 0.018000 Thermal Mass = 0.018000 Diameter/Width = 0.005000 Length = 0.150000 name = Payload housing quantity = 1 parent = 3 materialID = 8 type = Box Aero Mass = 0.829000 Thermal Mass = 0.450000 Diameter/Width = 0.097000 Length = 0.102000 Height = 0.097000 name = Payload boards quantity = 5 parent = 11 materialID = 23 type = Flat Plate Aero Mass = 0.045000 Thermal Mass = 0.045000 Diameter/Width = 0.085000 Length = 0.095000 name = Payload solenoids quantity = 2 parent = 11 materialID = 54 type = Cylinder Aero Mass = 0.023000 Thermal Mass = 0.023000 Diameter/Width = 0.013000 Length = 0.043000 name = Payload mechanical parts quantity = 9 parent = 11 materialID = 54 type = Cylinder Aero Mass = 0.012000 Thermal Mass = 0.012000 Diameter/Width = 0.013000 Length = 0.017000 name = Deployable Panels quantity = 4 parent = 1 materialID = 19 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 25 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report type = Flat Plate Aero Mass = 0.150000 Thermal Mass = 0.150000 Diameter/Width = 0.083000 Length = 0.330000 name = Patch antenna (composite housing) quantity = 2 parent = 1 materialID = 23 type = Box Aero Mass = 0.080000 Thermal Mass = 0.015000 Diameter/Width = 0.030000 Length = 0.030000 Height = 0.010000 name = Patch antenna radiative element quantity = 2 parent = 16 materialID = 19 type = Flat Plate Aero Mass = 0.065000 Thermal Mass = 0.065000 Diameter/Width = 0.080000 Length = 0.080000 name = Deployable VHF/UHF antenna quantity = 4 parent = 1 materialID = -2 type = Flat Plate Aero Mass = 0.008000 Thermal Mass = 0.008000 Diameter/Width = 0.005000 Length = 0.500000 **************OUTPUT**** Item Number = 1 name = Seahawk Demise Altitude = 77.994385 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Body panels Demise Altitude = 76.114410 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Structure Demise Altitude = 75.163429 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Platform boards Demise Altitude = 74.164711 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 26 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Radio housing Demise Altitude = 71.871292 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Fasteners (max size M3x5) Demise Altitude = 73.777084 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Stack rods Demise Altitude = 74.302017 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Thermal heat shunt Demise Altitude = 73.847328 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Reaction wheels gimbal+motor Demise Altitude = 67.508415 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Harnesses Demise Altitude = 74.394104 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Payload housing Demise Altitude = 71.812996 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Payload boards Demise Altitude = 71.049004 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Payload solenoids Demise Altitude = 67.826508 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Payload mechanical parts Demise Altitude = 67.813400 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 27 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential

SOCON-Seahawk ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report ************************************* name = Deployable Panels Demise Altitude = 76.873795 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Patch antenna (composite housing) Demise Altitude = 77.033310 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Patch antenna radiative element Demise Altitude = 75.641121 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* name = Deployable VHF/UHF antenna Demise Altitude = 77.878220 Debris Casualty Area = 0.000000 Impact Kinetic Energy = 0.000000 ************************************* =============== End of Requirement 4.7-1 =============== 06 13 2017; 09:26:52AM Project Data Saved To File END of ODAR for Seahawk www.clyde.space SPACE IS AWESOME Page 28 of 28 Copyright © 2016 Clyde Space Ltd. All rights reserved. TN-2124 - Rev A 13 Jun 2017 Clyde Space Confidential


Document Created: 2017-10-10 13:09:51
Document Modified: 2017-10-10 13:09:51
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