ODAR

0200-EX-PL-2013 Text Documents

Montana State University

2013-03-27ELS_134979

March 20, 2013 Orbital Debris Assessment for FIREBIRD on the NROL-39 / ELaNa-2 Mission per NASA-STD 8719.14A Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)

REFERENCES: A. NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation, NPR 8715.6A, 5 February 2008 B. Process for Limiting Orbital Debris, NASA-STD-8719.14A, 25 May 2012 C. GEMSat to ATLAS V / AFT BULKHEAD CARRIER INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENT, Reference Orbit Requirements Baseline Draft, October 2012. D. McKissock, Barbara, Patricia Loyselle, and Elisa Vogel. Guidelines on Lithium- ion Battery Use in Space Applications. Tech. no. RP-08-75. NASA Glenn Research Center Cleveland, Ohio E. UL Standard for Safety for Lithium Batteries, UL 1642. UL Standard. 4th ed. Northbrook, IL, Underwriters Laboratories, 2007 F. Kwas, Robert. Thermal Analysis of ELaNa-4 CubeSat Batteries, ELVL-2012- 0043254; Nov 2012 G. Range Safety User Requirements Manual Volume 3- Launch Vehicles, Payloads, and Ground Support Systems Requirements, AFSCM 91-710 V3. H. Myers, Gary. NROL-39_GEMSat_Gate#1_Mission_Design_final.ppt, 8.4 (U) Mission Design, Dec 13, 2012 I. UL Standard for Safety for Household and Commercial Batteries, UL 2054. UL Standard. 2nd ed. Northbrook, IL, Underwriters Laboratories, 2005 The intent of this report is to satisfy the orbital debris requirements listed in ref. (a) for the FIREBIRD auxiliary mission launching in conjunction with the NROL-39 primary payload. It serves as the final submittal in support of the spacecraft Safety and Mission Success Review (SMSR). Sections 1 through 8 of ref. (b) are addressed in this document; sections 9 through 14 fall under the requirements levied on the Department of Defense’s Operationally Responsive Space Office and are not presented here. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 2

The following table summarizes the compliance status of the FIREBIRD auxiliary payload mission flown on NROL-39. FIREBIRD as part of the ELaNa-2 mission is fully compliant with all applicable requirements. Table 1: Orbital Debris Requirement Compliance Matrix Requirement Compliance Assessment Comments 4.3-1a Not applicable No planned debris release 4.3-1b Not applicable No planned debris release 4.3-2 Not applicable No planned debris release 4.4-1 Compliant On board energy source (batteries) incapable of debris-producing failure 4.4-2 Compliant On board energy source (batteries) incapable of debris-producing failure 4.4-3 Not applicable No planned breakups 4.4-4 Not applicable No planned breakups 4.5-1 Compliant 4.5-2 Not applicable 4.6-1(a) Compliant Worst case lifetime yrs 4.6-1(b) Not applicable 4.6-1(c) Not applicable 4.6-2 Not applicable 4.6-3 Not applicable 4.6-4 Not applicable Passive disposal 4.6-5 Compliant 4.7-1 Compliant Non-credible risk of human casualty 4.8-1 Compliant No planned tether release under FIREBIRD mission Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 3

Section 1: Program Management and Mission Overview The ELaNa-2 mission is sponsored by the Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA Headquarters. The Program Executive is Jason Crusan. Responsible program/project manager and senior scientific and management personnel are as follows: FIREBIRD: Prof. David M. Klumpar, Principle Investigator <klump@physics.montana.edu>; Ehson Mosleh, Project Manager <ehson@ssel.montana.edu> Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 4

Program'Milestone'Schedule' Task% Date% CubeSat%Selection% 5/16/12% CubeSat%Build,%Test,%and%Integration% 1/1/12%through%3/31/13% MRR% 4/27/13% CubeSat%Delivery%to%Cal%Poly% 5/21/13% CubeSat%Integration%into%PFPODs% 5/21/13%through%5/31/13% Launch% 12/1/13% Figure 1: Program Milestone Schedule The ELaNa-2 mission will deploy 5 pico-satellites (or CubeSats) as a secondary payload on the NROL-39 mission. The CubeSat slotted position is identified in Table 2: ELaNa-2 CubeSats. The ELaNa-2 manifest includes: CUNYSAT-1, FIREBIRD (2 cubes), IPEX, MCubed-2. Each CubeSat ranges in sizes from a 10 cm cube to 10 cm x 10cm x 15 cm, with masses from about 1 kg to 2 kg total. The CubeSats have been designed and built by universities and government agencies and each have their own mission goals. The ELaNa-2 mission will be launched as an auxiliary payload on the NROL-39 mission on an Atlas V 501 launch vehicle from Vandenberg Air Force Base. The current launch date is in 2013. The four CubeSats will be ejected from P-POD carriers attached to the launch vehicle, placing the CubeSats in an orbit approximately 464 X 898 km at inclination of 120 deg (ref. (h)). Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 5

Section 2: Spacecraft Description There are four CubeSats flying on the ELaNa-2 Mission. They will be deployed out of two P-PODs, as shown in Table 2: ELaNa-2 CubeSats below. Table 2: ELaNa-2 CubeSats PPOD CubeSat CubeSat CubeSat CubeSat size Slot Quantity Names Masses (kg) 1U (10 cm X 10 cm X 10 cm) CUNYSAT-1 1.21 PPOD 1 3 1U (10 cm X 10 cm X 10 cm) IPEX 1.28 1U (10 cm X 10 cm X 10 cm) MCubed-2 1.1 1.5U (10 cm X 10 cm X 15 cm) FIREBIRD-1 1.9 PPOD 2 2 1.5U (10 cm X 10 cm X 15 cm) FIREBIRD-2 1.9 The following subsections contain description of FIREBIRD. ! ! Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 6

FIREBIRD Montana State University – 1.5U CubeSat (Qty 2) Figure'2:'FIREBIRD'Expanded'View% FIREBIRD, which stands for Focused Investigations of Relativistic Electron Burst, Intensity, Range, and Dynamics, is funded by the National Science Foundation. The mission is a targeted, goal-directed, space weather Cubesat mission to resolve the spatial scale size and energy dependence of electron microbursts in the Van Allen radiation belts. FIREBIRD’s unique two-point, focused observations at low altitudes fully exploit the capabilities of the Cubesat platform. The CubeSats will deploy out of the P-POD and when the system turns on thereafter a 1 hour timer begins to tick. When that 1 hour is complete, the flight computer will engage the antenna deployment sequence and the system will begin to start UHF beacon transmissions at a 20 seconds cadence. This mission is set to last 3 months nominally with an extended period of 6 months pending vehicle performance and operations funding. The CubeSat structure is made of Aluminum 5052H32 and Aluminum 6061-T6. It contains all standard commercial off the shelf (COTS) materials, electrical components, PCBs and solar cells. The GPS patch antenna radio uses a ceramic patch antenna and the UHF/VHF antennas are made of spring steel 410. There are no pressure vessels, hazardous or exotic materials. The electrical power storage system consists of common lithium-ion batteries with overcharge/undercurrent circuitry protection. There are no modifications to the cell cases as tested by UL and they are considered safe for travel. See Table 3 for UL Listing information. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 7

Figure 3: 1U CubeSat Specification Figure 4: 3U CubeSat Specification Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 8

Section 3: Assessment of Spacecraft Debris Released during Normal Operations The assessment of spacecraft debris requires the identification of any object (>1 mm) expected to be released from the spacecraft any time after launch, including object dimensions, mass, and material. The section 3 requires rationale/necessity for release of each object, time of release of each object, relative to launch time, release velocity of each object with respect to spacecraft, expected orbital parameters (apogee, perigee, and inclination) of each object after release, calculated orbital lifetime of each object, including time spent in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), and an assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.3-1 and 4.3-2. No releases are planned on the FIREBIRD CubeSat mission therefore this section is not applicable. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 9

Section 4: Assessment of Spacecraft Intentional Breakups and Potential for Explosions. Malfunction of lithium ion or lithium polymer batteries and/or associated control circuitry has been identified as a potential cause for spacecraft breakup during deployment and mission operations. While no passivation of batteries will be attempted, natural degradation of the solar cell and battery properties will occur over the post mission period, which may be as long as 13.2 years. These conditions pose a possible increased chance of undesired battery energy release. The battery capacity for storage will degrade over time, possibly leading to changes in the acceptable charge rate for the cells. Individual cells may also change properties at different rates due to time degradation and temperature changes. The control circuit may also malfunction as a result of exposure to the space environment over long periods of time. The cell pressure relief vents could be blocked by small contaminants. Any of these individual or combined effects may theoretically cause an electro-chemical reaction that result in rapid energy release in the form of combustion. There are NO plans for designed spacecraft breakups, explosions, or intentional collisions on the FIREBIRD mission. Section 4 asks for a list of components, which shall be passivated at End of Mission (EOM), as well as the method of passivation and description of the components, which cannot be passivated. No passivation of components is planned at the End of Mission for the FIREBIRD CubeSat. Since the batteries used do not present a debris generation hazard even in the event of rapid energy release (see assessment directly below), passivation of the batteries is not necessary in order to meet the requirement 4.4-2 (56450) for passivation of energy sources “to a level which cannot cause an explosion or deflagration large enough to release orbital debris or break up the spacecraft.” Because passivation is not necessary, and in the interest of not increasing the complexity of the CubeSat, there was no need to add this capability to the electrical power generation and storage systems. Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.4-1 through 4.4-4 shows that the FIREBIRD CubeSat is compliant. Requirements 4.4-3 and 4.4-4 are not applicable. The following addresses requirement 4.4-2. FIREBIRD has not been designed to disconnect onboard storage energy devices (lithium ion and lithium polymer batteries). However, the CubeSat batteries still meet Req. 56450 by virtue of the fact that they cannot “cause an explosion or deflagration large enough to release orbital debris or break up the spacecraft”. The cells utilize lithium ion technology and are compliant with Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Standard 1642. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 10

Table 3: ELaNa-2 CubeSat Cells CubeSat' Technology' Manufactor' Model' UL'Listing'Number' FIREBIRD* Lithium-Ion LG ICR18650B2 MH19896 The batteries are consumer-oriented devices. All battery cells have been recognized as Underwriters Laboratories (UL) tested and approved. Furthermore, safety devices incorporated in these batteries include pressure release valves, over current charge protection and over current discharge protection. The fact that these batteries are UL recognized indicates that they have passed the UL standard testing procedures that characterize their explosive potential. Of particular concern to NASA Req. 56450 is UL Standard 1642, which specifically deals with the testing of lithium batteries. Section 20 Projectile Test of UL 1642 (ref. (e)) subjects the test battery to heat by flame while within an aluminum and steel wire mesh octagonal box, “[where the test battery] shall remain on the screen until it explodes or the cell or battery has ignited and burned out”(UL 1642 20.5). To pass the test, “no part of an exploding cell or battery shall penetrate the wire screen such that some or all of the cell or battery protrudes through the screen” (UL 1642 20.1). Steel Screen Top (20 openings/in) Steel Screen Bottom (20 openings/in) Test Subject Aluminum Screen (16-18 wires/in) Flame Figure 5: Underwriters Laboratory Explosion Test Apparatus The batteries being launched via CubeSat will experience conditions on orbit that are generally much less severe that those seen during the UL test. While the source of failure would not be external heat on orbit, analysis of the expected mission thermal environment performed by NASA LSP Flight Analysis Division shows that given the very low power dissipation for CubeSats, the batteries will be exposed to a maximum temperature that is well below their 212oF safe operation limit (ref. (f)). It is unlikely but possible that the continual charging with 2 to 6 W of average power from the solar panels over an orbital life span greater than 2 years may expose the two batteries (per CubeSat) to overcharging which could cause similar heat to be generated internally. Through the Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 11

UL testing, it has been shown that these batteries do not cause an explosion that would cause a fragmentation of the spacecraft. A NASA Glenn Research Center guideline entitled Guidelines on Lithium-ion Battery Use in Space Applications (ref. (d)) explains that the hazards of Li-Ion cells in an overcharge situation result in the breakdown of the electrolyte found in Li-ion cells causing an increase in internal pressure, formation of flammable organic solvents, and the release of oxygen from the metal oxide structure. From a structural point of view a battery in an overcharge situation can expect breakage of cases, seals, mounting provisions, and internal components. The end result could be “unconstrained movement of the battery” (ref. (d), pg 13). This document clearly indicates that only battery deformation and the escape of combustible gasses will be seen in an overcharging situation, providing further support to the conclusion that CubeSat fragmentation due to explosion is not a credible scenario for this application. It is important to note that the NASA guide to Li-ion batteries makes no mention of these batteries causing explosions of any magnitude whatsoever. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 12

Section 5: Assessment of Spacecraft Potential for On-Orbit Collisions Calculation of spacecraft probability of collision with space objects larger than 10 cm in diameter during the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft takes into account both the mean cross sectional area and orbital lifetime. !"#$%&'!!"#$ !∗ !∗! +!∗ !∗! !"#$!!"# = ! = ! ! Equation'1:'Mean'Cross'Sectional'Area'for'Convex'Objects' !!"# + !! + !! !"#$!!"# = ! ! Equation'2:'Mean'Cross'Sectional'Area'for'Complex'Objects FIREBIRD evaluated for this ODAR is stowed in a convex configuration, indicating there are no elements of the CubeSats obscuring another element of the same CubeSat from view. Thus, mean CSA was calculated using Equation 1. This configuration renders the longest orbital life times for FIREBIRD. Once a CubeSat has been ejected from the P-POD and deployables have been extended Equation 2 is utilized to determine the mean CSA. Amax is identified as the view that yields the maximum cross-sectional area. A1 and A2 are the two cross-sectional areas orthogonal to Amax. Refer to Appendix A for dimensions used in these calculations The FIREBIRD orbit at deployment is 898 km apogee altitude by 464 km perigee altitude, with an inclination of 120 degrees. With an area to mass ratio of 0.0117 m2/kg, DAS yields 13.2 years for orbit lifetime for its stowed state, which in turn is used to obtain the collision probability. Table 4 below provides complete results. Table 4: CubeSat Orbital Lifetime & Collision Probability CubeSat' FIREBIRD' % Mass'(kg)' 1.9% % % % % Mean'C/S'Area'(m^2)' 0.0223% Stowed' AreaSto'Mass'(m^2/kg)' 0.0117% Orbital'Lifetime'(yrs)' 13.2% Probability'of'collision'(10^X)' F6.5% % ' % Mean'C/S'Area'(m^2)' 0.0288% Deployed' AreaSto'Mass'(m^2/kg)' 0.0152% Orbital'Lifetime'(yrs)' 12.5% Probability'of'collision'(10^X)' F6.4% Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 13

Orbital Environment FIREBIRD Figure 6: Highest Risk of Orbit Collision vs. Altitude (FIREBIRD Deployed) There will be no post-mission disposal operation. As such the identification of all systems and components required to accomplish post-mission disposal operation, including passivation and maneuvering, is not applicable. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 14

The probability of any ELaNa-2 spacecraft collision with debris and meteoroids greater than 10 cm in diameter and capable of preventing post-mission disposal is less than 10-6.4, for any configuration. This satisfies the 0.001 maximum probability requirement 4.5-1. Since the CubeSats have no capability or plan for end-of-mission disposal, requirement 4.5-2 is not applicable. Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.5-1 shows FIREBIRD to be compliant. Requirement 4.5-2 is not applicable to this mission. Section 6: Assessment of Spacecraft Postmission Disposal Plans and Procedures FIREBIRD will naturally decay from orbit within 25 years after end of the mission, satisfying requirement 4.6-1a detailing the spacecraft disposal option. Planning for spacecraft maneuvers to accomplish postmission disposal is not applicable. Disposal is achieved via passive atmospheric reentry. The worst case (smallest Area-to-Mass) post-mission disposal is FIREBIRD in stowed configuration.The area-to-mass is calculated as follows: !"#$! ! ! !"#$!(!! ) !! = !"#$ − !" − !"##!( ) !"##!(!") !" Equation 3: Area to Mass . 0223!!! !! = !0.0117 1.9!!" !" The assessment of the spacecraft illustrates it is compliant with Requirements 4.6-1 through 4.6-5. DAS 2.0.2 Orbital Lifetime Calculations: DAS inputs are: 464 km maximum perigee X 898 km maximum apogee altitudes with an inclination of 120 degrees at deployment in the year 2013. An area to mass ratio of 0.0117%m2/kg for the FIREBIRD CubeSat was input. DAS 2.0.2 yields a 13.2 year orbit lifetime for FIREBIRD in its stowed state. % This meets requirement 4.6-1. Assessment results show compliance. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 15

Section 7: Assessment of Spacecraft Reentry Hazards A detailed assessment of the components to be flown on ELaNa-2 was performed. The assessment used DAS 2.0, a conservative tool used by the NASA Orbital Debris Office to verify Requirement 4.7-1. The analysis is intended to provide a bounding analysis for characterizing the survivability of a CubeSat’s component during re-entry. For example, when DAS shows a component surviving reentry it is not taking into account the material ablating away or charring due to oxidative heating. Both physical effects are experienced upon reentry and will decrease the mass and size of the real-life components as the reenter the atmosphere, reducing the risk they pose still further. The following steps are used to identify and evaluate a components potential reentry risk relative to the 4.7-1 requirement of having less than 15 J of kinetic energy and a 1:10,000 probability of a human casualty in the event the survive reentry. 1. Low melting temperature (less than 1000 °C) components are identified as materials that would never survive reentry and pose no risk to human casualty. This is confirmed through DAS analysis that showed materials with melting temperatures equal to or below that of copper (1080!°C) will always demise upon reentry for any size component up to the dimensions of a 1U CubeSat. 2. The remaining high temperature materials are shown to pose negligible risk to human casualty through a bounding DAS analysis of the highest temperature components, stainless steel (1500°C). If a component is of similar dimensions and has a melting temperature between 1000 °C and 1500°C, it can be expected to posses the same negligible risk as stainless steel components. See Table 5. Table 5: ELaNa-2 Stainless Steel DAS Analysis' ELaNaS4'Stainless' Length'/' Demise'Alt' CubeSat' Mass'(g)' Width'(cm)' Height'(cm)' KE'(J)' Steel'Components' Diameter'(cm)' (km)' FIREBIRD% %% %% %% %% %% %% %% %% %% VHF%Antenna% 15% 1% 50% <0.1% %% 0% 1% %% UHF%Antenna% 8% 1% 10% <0.1% %% 77% 0% %% Sep%Switch% 1% 0.2% 0.5% 0% %% 77.3% 0% *HuMy80 is a magnet and not a steel alloy, however the melting temperature is 1450°C which is similar to that of stainless steel. Representing the component as steel provides a conservative analysis of the material’s demise characteristics. The majority of stainless steel components demise upon reentry. The components that DAS conservatively identifies as reaching the ground have 1 or less joules of kinetic energy, far below the requirement of 15 joules. No stainless steel component will pose a risk to human casualty as defined by the Range Commander’s Council. In fact, any injury incurred or inflicted by an object with such low energy would be negligible and wouldn’t require the individual to seek medical attention. Through the method described above, Table 5: ELaNa-2 Stainless Steel DAS Analysis, and the full component list in the Appendix, the FIREBIRD CubeSat launching under the ELaNa-2 mission is conservatively shown to be in compliance with Requirement 4.7-1 of Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 16

NASA-STD-8719.14A. See the Appendix for a complete accounting of the survivability of all components. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 17

Section 8: Assessment for Tether Missions FIREBIRD will not be deploying any tethers. FIREBIRD satisfies Section 8’s requirement 4.8-1. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 18

Section 9-14 ODAR sections 9 through 14 for the launch vehicle are addressed in ref. (g), and are not covered here. If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned at 321-867-2958. /original signed by/ Justin Treptow Flight Design Analyst NASA/KSC/VA-H1 cc: VA-H/Mr. Carney VA-H1/Mr. Beaver VA-H1/Mr. Haddox VA-G2/Mr. Atkinson VA-G2/Mr. Fineberg SA-D2/Mr. Frattin SA-D2/Mr. Hale SA-D2/Mr. Henry Analex-3/Mr. Davis Analex-22/Ms. Ramos Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 19

Appendix Index: Appendix A. FIREBIRD Component List Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 20

Appendix A. FIREBIRD Component List External/Internal Diameter/ Width Melting Temp (Major/Minor Row Number Components) Length (mm) Height (mm) Low Melting Body Type Comment Material CubeSat Mass (g) Name (mm) Qty FIREBIRD 1 FIREBIRD 2 CubeSat Box 2000 100 100 150 Demises CubeSat FIREBIRD 2 External - Major 1 5052H32 aluminum Box 308 Y Demises Structure Negligible Risk, bounded by larger FIREBIRD 3 VHF Antenna External - Major 1 Spring Steel 410 Rectangle 15 10 500 <1 N 1500 SS components. See Table 5. Demises FIREBIRD 4 UHF Antenna External - Major 1 Spring Steel 410 Rectangle 8 10 100 <1 N 1500 See Table 5. FIREBIRD 5 Solar Panels External - Major 4 FR4 PCB Fiberglass Rectangle 52.5 85 130 Y Demises Demises FIREBIRD 6 Sep Switches External - Minor 1 Steel and Delrin Rectangle 1 2 5 N 175 / 1500 See Table 5. FR4 PCB Fiberglass FIREBIRD 7 GPS Antenna External - Minor 1 Square 30 20 20 Y Demises and Copper FIREBIRD 8 Batteries Internal - Major 2 Lithium Ion Cylinder 48 18.29 N/A 65.05 Y Demises Nickel-plated FIREBIRD 9 ADCS Magnets Internal - Major 1 Cylinder 5.09 9.52 N/A 9.52 N 1000 Demises Neodymium Grade N52 FIREBIRD 10 Payload Board Internal - Major 3 FR4 PCB Fiberglass Square 120 95 95 Y Demises FIREBIRD 11 Comm Board Internal - Major 1 FR4 PCB Fiberglass Square 78 95 95 Y Demises FIREBIRD 12 Battery Board Internal - Major 1 FR4 PCB Fiberglass Square 158 95 95 Y Demises FIREBIRD 13 C&DH Board Internal - Major 1 FR4 PCB Fiberglass Square 92 95 95 Y Demises 5 Negligible Risk, bounded by larger FIREBIRD 14 Fasteners Internal - Minor Stainless Steel Rectangle 1 N 1500 7 SS components. See Table 5. Cabling - Board FIREBIRD 15 Internal - Minor 1 Copper Alloy N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Y Demises Traces Cabling - Solar FIREBIRD 16 Internal - Minor 4 Teflon Wire 5 3 40 N/A Y 327 Demises Array Harness


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Document Modified: 2013-03-27 08:36:54
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