ODAR

0967-EX-ST-2013 Text Documents

Cornell University

2013-10-25ELS_142275

June 4, 2013 Orbital Debris Assessment for KickSat on the CRS SpX-3 / ELaNa-5 Mission per NASA-STD 8719.14A Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)

REFERENCES: A. NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation, NPR 8715.6A, 5 February 2008 B. Process for Limiting Orbital Debris, NASA-STD-8719.14A, 25 May 2012 C. P-POD Status SpX-3 Agreement History (Orbital Information) , ISS_CM_019 Rev 01/2011 D. McKissock, Barbara, Patricia Loyselle, and Elisa Vogel. Guidelines on Lithium- ion Battery Use in Space Applications. Tech. no. RP-08-75. NASA Glenn Research Center Cleveland, Ohio E. UL Standard for Safety for Lithium Batteries, UL 1642. UL Standard. 4th ed. Northbrook, IL, Underwriters Laboratories, 2007 F. Kwas, Robert. Thermal Analysis of ELaNa-4 CubeSat Batteries, ELVL-2012- 0043254; Nov 2012 G. Range Safety User Requirements Manual Volume 3- Launch Vehicles, Payloads, and Ground Support Systems Requirements, AFSCM 91-710 V3. H. UL Standard for Safety for Household and Commercial Batteries, UL 2054. UL Standard. 2nd ed. Northbrook, IL, Underwriters Laboratories, 2005 I. Opiela, John. “RE: DAS 2.0 Orbital Lifetime Inquiry” April 5, 2013. E-mail. The intent of this report is to satisfy the orbital debris requirements listed in ref. (a) for the KickSat CubeSat on the ELaNa-5 auxiliary mission launching in conjunction with the SpX-3 primary payload. It serves as the final submittal in support of the spacecraft Safety and Mission Success Review (SMSR). Sections 1 through 8 of ref. (b) are addressed in this document; sections 9 through 14 fall under the requirements levied on the launch vehicle compliance assessment and are not presented here. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 2

The following table summarizes the compliance status of the KickSat CubeSat as part of the ELaNa-5 auxiliary payload mission flown on SpX-3. This mission is fully compliant with all applicable requirements. Table 1: Orbital Debris Requirement Compliance Matrix Requirement Compliance Assessment Comments 4.3-1a Compliant Lifetime of debris is days 4.3-1b Compliant Lifetime of debris is days 4.3-2 Not applicable No planned debris release 4.4-1 Compliant On board energy source (batteries) incapable of debris-producing failure 4.4-2 Compliant On board energy source (batteries) incapable of debris-producing failure 4.4-3 Not applicable No planned breakups 4.4-4 Not applicable No planned breakups 4.5-1 Compliant 4.5-2 Not applicable 4.6-1(a) Compliant Worst case lifetime 0.2yrs 4.6-1(b) Not applicable 4.6-1(c) Not applicable 4.6-2 Not applicable 4.6-3 Not applicable 4.6-4 Not applicable Passive disposal 4.6-5 Compliant 4.7-1 Compliant Non-credible risk of human casualty 4.8-1 Compliant No planned tether release Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 3

Section 1: Program Management and Mission Overview The ELaNa-5 mission is sponsored by the Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA Headquarters. The Program Executive is Jason Crusan. Responsible program/project manager and senior scientific and management personnel are as follows: KickSat: Mason Peck, Principle Investigator; Zachary Manchester, Project Manager Table 2: Program Milestone Schedule   Program  Milestone  Schedule   Task   Date   CubeSat  Selection   7/1/12   CubeSat  Build,  Test,  and  Integration   July  2012  to  July  2013   MRR   7/23/13   CubeSat  Delivery/integration  at  Cal  Poly   9/16/12   P-­β€POD  Integration  into  LV   10/28/13   Launch   2/11/14   The ELaNa-5 mission will deploy 5 pico-satellites (or CubeSats) as a secondary payload on the mission. The ELaNa-5 mission will be launched as an auxiliary payload on the SpX-3 mission on a Falcon 9 launch vehicle from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. The current launch date is in February 2014. The five CubeSats will be ejected from a P-POD carrier attached to the launch vehicle, placing the CubeSats in an orbit approximately 325 X 325 km at inclination of 51.6 deg (ref. (c)). Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 4

Section 2: Spacecraft Description KickSat is a technology demonstration mission for the Sprite ChipSat developed at Cornell University. The Sprite is a tiny spacecraft with power, sensor, and communication subsystems integrated onto a single printed circuit board measuring 3.5 by 3.5 centimeters with a mass of 5 grams. KickSat is a 3U CubeSat with a 1U avionics bus (a derivative of the PhoneSat bus developed at NASA Ames) mated to a 2U Sprite deployer. The primary mission objective is to demonstrate the Sprite’s CDMA communication architecture, which allows hundreds of Sprites to simultaneously communicate with a single ground station. Table 3: KickSat Properties CubeSat CubeSat CubeSat size CubeSat Names Quantity Masses (kg) 1 3U (10 cm X 10 cm X 30 cm) KickSat 2.6 Figure  1:  KickSat  CAD  Model   Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 5

Figure  2:  KickSat  Individual  Sprite   Upon deployment from the P-POD, KickSat will power up and start a countdown timer. At 30 minutes, the UHF beacon’s antenna will be deployed, then at 45 minutes the beacon itself will be activated. During the first few passes, ground station operators will establish communication and perform checkouts of the spacecraft. Over the next three to four days, the attitude control system in the bus will be used to point KickSat’s minor axis of inertia (long axis) at the sun, and then spin the spacecraft up to 10-15 RPM about this axis, thereby ensuring attitude stability during the deployment sequence. Figure  3:  KickSat  Deployment   Once the stable sun pointing attitude condition has been established, all systems have been checked out, and KickSat is in view of a ground station, a deployment signal from the ground will trigger a nichrome burn wire mechanism. A spring will then push the Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 6

plunger, stacked with 128 Sprites in 4 stacks of 32, down the length of the deployer housing, releasing the Sprites as free-flying spacecraft. The delta-V imparted to the Sprites during deployment is expected to be 5-10 cm/sec. KickSat uses a standard 3U Pumpkin structure made of 5052-H32 aluminum. The majority of its internal components are made of 6061 aluminum, ABS plastic, and FR4 printed circuit boards. There are few steel components (fasteners, deployment spring). There are no pressure vessels, hazardous or exotic materials. The electrical power storage system consists of common lithium-ion batteries with over- charge/current protection circuitry. The lithium batteries, LG ICR18650 C1, carry the UL-listing number MH19896. Figure 4: 3U CubeSat Specification Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 7

Section 3: Assessment of Spacecraft Debris Released during Normal Operations Section 3 provides rationale/necessity for release of each object, time of release of each object relative to launch vehicle separation, release velocity of each object with respect to CubeSat, expected orbital parameters (apogee, perigee, and inclination) of each object after release, calculated orbital lifetime of each object, including time spent in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), and an assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.3-1 and 4.3-2. KickSat will be releasing a maximum of 128 Sprites as part of its primary mission to provide a technology demonstration for the use of CDMA communications across multiple vehicles to one ground station. Upon deployment from the P-POD, KickSat will power up and start a countdown timer. At 30 minutes, the UHF beacon’s antenna will be deployed, then at 45 minutes the beacon itself will be activated. During the first few passes, ground station operators will establish communication and perform checkouts of the spacecraft. Over the next three to four days, the attitude control system in the bus will be used to point KickSat’s minor axis of inertia (long axis) at the sun, and then spin the spacecraft up to 10-15 RPM about this axis, thereby ensuring attitude stability during the deployment sequence. The Sprite deployer contains 128 Sprites stacked 2-by-2 in four columns. Each Sprite is housed in an individual slot and constrained by a carbon fiber rod that runs the length of each column and passes through a hole in the corner of the Sprites (figure 2). The nitinol wire antennas on the Sprites are coiled in such a way that they act as springs, pushing the Sprites out of their slots. When the carbon fiber rod is removed, the Sprites’ antennas will push them from the deployer housing with an estimated ΔV of 5-10 cm/sec. In the event the Sprites are ejected along the deployer’s velocity or anti-velocity vector, the orbital variation in the Sprites will be 325km +/- 0.35 km. This variation is based on their largest separation ΔV of 10 cm/sec. The orbital lifetime was calculated to be 2-4 days depending on deployment date (ref. (i)). The large area to mass ratio, 20–100 times larger than most debris object, will render the Sprites highly susceptible to atmospheric drag and solar perturbations. The publically available version of DAS is not able to calculate orbital lifetimes this small. To satisfy the requirement 4.3-1 the NASA Orbital Debris Planning Office provided orbital lifetimes using the DAS Science and Engineering tool, a version of DAS that outputs the propagation steps into a text data table. The short orbital lifetime of the Sprites satisfies the Requirements 4.3-1 and 4.3-2, whose purpose is to limit the debris in LEO. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 8

Section 4: Assessment of Spacecraft Intentional Breakups and Potential for Explosions. Malfunction of lithium ion or lithium polymer batteries and/or associated control circuitry has been identified as a potential cause for spacecraft breakup during deployment and mission operations. While no passivation of batteries will be attempted, natural degradation of the solar cell and battery properties will occur over the post mission period, which may be as long as 0.2 years. These conditions pose a possible increased chance of undesired battery energy release. The battery capacity for storage will degrade over time, possibly leading to changes in the acceptable charge rate for the cells. Individual cells may also change properties at different rates due to time degradation and temperature changes. The control circuit may also malfunction as a result of exposure to the space environment over long periods of time. The cell pressure relief vents could be blocked by small contaminants. Any of these individual or combined effects may theoretically cause an electro-chemical reaction that result in rapid energy release in the form of combustion. There are NO plans for designed spacecraft breakups, explosions, or intentional collisions on the KickSat mission. Section 4 asks for a list of components, which shall be passivated at End of Mission (EOM), as well as the method of passivation and description of the components, which cannot be passivated. No passivation of components is planned at the End of Mission for any of the ELaNa-5 CubeSats. Since the batteries used do not present a debris generation hazard even in the event of rapid energy release (see assessment directly below), passivation of the batteries is not necessary in order to meet the requirement 4.4-2 (56450) for passivation of energy sources “to a level which cannot cause an explosion or deflagration large enough to release orbital debris or break up the spacecraft.” Because passivation is not necessary, and in the interest of not increasing the complexity of the CubeSats, there was no need to add this capability to their electrical power generation and storage systems. Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.4-1 through 4.4-2 shows that the ELaNa-5 CubeSats are compliant. Requirements 4.4-3 and 4.4-4, addressing intentional break-ups are not applicable. The following addresses requirement 4.4-2. The CubeSats that have been selected to fly on the SpX-3 mission have not been designed to disconnect their onboard storage energy devices (lithium ion and lithium polymer batteries). However, the CubeSats batteries still meet Req. 56450 by virtue of the fact that they cannot “cause an explosion or deflagration large enough to release orbital debris or break up the spacecraft”. Table 4: ELaNa-5 CubeSat Cells UL Listing CubeSat Technology Manufactor Model Number KickSat Lithium Ion LG LG ICR18650 C1 MH19896 Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 9

The batteries are all consumer-oriented devices. All battery cells have been recognized as Underwriters Laboratories (UL) tested and approved. Furthermore, safety devices incorporated in these batteries include pressure release valves, over current charge protection and over current discharge protection. The fact that these batteries are UL recognized indicates that they have passed the UL standard testing procedures that characterize their explosive potential. Of particular concern to NASA Req. 56450 is UL Standard 1642, which specifically deals with the testing of lithium batteries. Section 20 Projectile Test of UL 1642 (ref. (e)) subjects the test battery to heat by flame while within an aluminum and steel wire mesh octagonal box, “[where the test battery] shall remain on the screen until it explodes or the cell or battery has ignited and burned out” (UL 1642 20.5). To pass the test, “no part of an exploding cell or battery shall penetrate the wire screen such that some or all of the cell or battery protrudes through the screen” (UL 1642 20.1). Steel Screen Top (20 openings/in) Steel Screen Bottom (20 openings/in) Test Subject Aluminum Screen (16-18 wires/in) Flame Figure 5: Underwriters Laboratory Explosion Test Apparatus The batteries being launched via CubeSat will experience conditions on orbit that are generally much less severe that those seen during the UL test. While the source of failure would not be external heat on orbit, analysis of the expected mission thermal environment performed by NASA LSP Flight Analysis Division shows that given the very low (<=41.44 W-hr, maximum for PhoneSat) power dissipation for CubeSats, the batteries will be exposed to a maximum temperature that is well below their 212oF safe operation limit (ref. (f)). It is unlikely but possible that the continual charging with 2 to 6 W of average power from the solar panels over an orbital life span greater than 2 years may expose the two to four batteries (per CubeSat) to overcharging which could cause similar heat to be generated internally. Through the UL testing, it has been shown that these batteries do not cause an explosion that would cause a fragmentation of the spacecraft. A NASA Glenn Research Center guideline entitled Guidelines on Lithium-ion Battery Use in Space Applications (ref. (d)) explains that the hazards of Li-Ion cells in an overcharge situation result in the breakdown of the electrolyte found in Li-ion cells causing an increase in internal pressure, formation of flammable organic solvents, and the Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 10

release of oxygen from the metal oxide structure. From a structural point of view a battery in an overcharge situation can expect breakage of cases, seals, mounting provisions, and internal components. The end result could be “unconstrained movement of the battery” (ref. (d), pg 13). This document clearly indicates that only battery deformation and the escape of combustible gasses will be seen in an overcharging situation, providing further support to the conclusion that CubeSat fragmentation due to explosion is not a credible scenario for this application. It is important to note that the NASA guide to Li-ion batteries makes no mention of these batteries causing explosions of any magnitude whatsoever. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 11

Section 5: Assessment of Spacecraft Potential for On-Orbit Collisions Calculation of spacecraft probability of collision with space objects larger than 10 cm in diameter during the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft takes into account both the mean cross sectional area and orbital lifetime. KickSat was evaluated for this ODAR in a stowed in a convex configuration, indicating there are no elements of the CubeSats obscuring another element of the same CubeSats from view. Thus, mean CSA for all stowed CubeSats was calculated using Equation 1. This configuration renders the longest orbital life times for KickSat and the Sprites. Once a CubeSat has been ejected from the P-POD and deployables have been extended Equation 2 is utilized to determine the mean CSA. Amax is identified as the view that yields the maximum cross-sectional area. A1 and A2 are the two cross-sectional areas orthogonal to Amax. Refer to Appendix A for dimensions used in these calculations. 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒆  π‘¨π’“𝒆𝒂 𝟐∗ π’˜∗𝒍 +πŸ’∗ π’˜∗𝒉 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏  π‘ͺ𝑺𝑨 =   = πŸ’ πŸ’ Equation  1:  Mean  Cross  Sectional  Area  for  Convex  Objects   π‘¨π’Žπ’‚π’™ + π‘¨πŸ + π‘¨πŸ 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏  π‘ͺ𝑺𝑨 =   𝟐 Equation  2:  Mean  Cross  Sectional  Area  for  Complex  Objects The KickSat’s orbit at deployment is 325 km apogee altitude by 325 km perigee altitude, with an inclination of 51.6 degrees. With an area to mass ratio of 0.027  m2/kg, DAS yields 0.2 years for orbit lifetime for its stowed state, which in turn is used to obtain the collision probability. KickSat in the deployed configuration has a probability of collision of 10-9.1, and a 10-9.1 probability of collision in the stowed configuration. Table 5 below provides complete results. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 12

Table 5: CubeSat Orbital Lifetime & Collision Probability             CubeSat     KickSat     Mass  (kg)   2.6         Mean  C/S  Area  (m^2)     0.0270   Area-­β€to  Mass  (m^2/kg)   0.0077   Stowed   Orbital  Lifetime  (yrs)   0.2   Probability  of  collision  (10^X)   -­β€9.1       Mean  C/S  Area  (m^2)     0.0582   Area-­β€to  Mass  (m^2/kg)   0.0166   Deployed   Orbital  Lifetime  (yrs)   0.1   Probability  of  collision  (10^X)   -­β€9.1  

Figure 6: Highest Risk of Orbit Collision vs. Altitude There will be no post-mission disposal operation. As such the identification of all systems and components required to accomplish post-mission disposal operation, including passivation and maneuvering, is not applicable. The probability of the KickSat spacecraft collision with debris and meteoroids greater than 10 cm in diameter and capable of preventing post-mission disposal is less than 10-9.1, for any configuration. This satisfies the 0.001 (10-6) maximum probability requirement 4.5-1. Since KickSat and the Sprites have no capability or plan for end-of-mission disposal, requirement 4.5-2 is not applicable. Assessment of spacecraft compliance with Requirements 4.5-1 shows the KickSat mission to be compliant. Requirement 4.5-2 is not applicable to this mission. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)

Section 6: Assessment of Spacecraft Postmission Disposal Plans and Procedures KickSat and the Sprites will naturally decay from orbit within 25 years after end of the mission, satisfying requirement 4.6-1a detailing the spacecraft disposal option. Planning for spacecraft maneuvers to accomplish postmission disposal is not applicable. Disposal is achieved via passive atmospheric reentry. Calculating the area-to-mass ratio for the worst-case (smallest Area-to-Mass) post- mission disposal is calculated for is as follows: 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏   π‘ͺ 𝑺 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂  (π’ŽπŸ ) π’ŽπŸ = 𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂 − 𝒕𝒐 − 𝑴𝒂𝒔𝒔  ( ) 𝑴𝒂𝒔𝒔  (π’Œπ’ˆ) π’Œπ’ˆ Equation 3: Area to Mass 0.0214π‘š! π‘š! =  0.0076 2.8  π‘˜π‘” π‘˜π‘” DAS 2.0.2 Orbital Lifetime Calculations: DAS inputs are: 325 km maximum perigee X 325 km maximum apogee altitudes with an inclination of 51.6 degrees at deployment in the year 2013. An area to mass ratio of 0.0076  m2/kg.   Assessment results show compliance of KickSat and the Sprites. This meets requirement 4.6-1. For the KickSat orbital lifetime, reference Table 5. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 15

Section 7: Assessment of Spacecraft Reentry Hazards A detailed assessment of the components to be flown on KickSat was performed. The assessment used DAS 2.0, a conservative tool used by the NASA Orbital Debris Office to verify Requirement 4.7-1. The analysis is intended to provide a bounding analysis for characterizing the survivability of a CubeSat’s component during re-entry. For example, when DAS shows a component surviving reentry it is not taking into account the material ablating away or charring due to oxidative heating. Both physical effects are experienced upon reentry and will decrease the mass and size of the real-life components as the reenter the atmosphere, reducing the risk they pose still further. The following steps are used to identify and evaluate a components potential reentry risk relative to the 4.7-1 requirement of having less than 15 J of kinetic energy and a 1:10,000 probability of a human casualty in the event the survive reentry. 1. Low melting temperature (less than 1000 °C) components are identified as materials that would never survive reentry and pose no risk to human casualty. This is confirmed through DAS analysis that showed materials with melting temperatures equal to or below that of copper (1080  °C) will always demise upon reentry for any size component up to the dimensions of a 1U CubeSat. 2. The remaining high temperature materials are shown to meet the human casualty requirement through a bounding DAS analysis of the highest temperature components, generally stainless steel (1500°C). A component of similar dimensions and possessing a melting temperature between 1000 °C and 1500°C, can be expected to posses as negligible risk similar to stainless steel components. Probability of human casualty was calculated if a component exceeded 15J of energy upon reentry. See Table 6. The KickSat mission complies with Requirement 4.7-1, to have less than 1:10,000 risk of human casualty. The majority of high temperature components demise upon reentry. The components that DAS conservatively identifies as reaching the ground have less than 15 joules of kinetic energy. No high temperature component will pose a risk to human casualty as defined by the Range Commander’s Council (ref. (g)). As documented in, Table 6: KickSat Survivability DAS Analysis, and Appendix A, the KickSat mission is conservatively shown to be in compliance with Requirement 4.7-1 of NASA-STD-8719.14A. See Appendix for a complete accounting of the survivability of all CubeSat components. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 16

Table 6: KickSat Survivability DAS Analysis   ELaNa-­β€5  Stainless  Steel   Length  /   Width   Height   Demise  Alt   CubeSat   Mass  (g)   KE  (J)   Components   Diameter  (cm)   (cm)   (cm)   (km)   KickSat   Sprite  Deployer  Spring   22.9   6.30   6.30   19.90       0   0   KickSat   Reaction  Control  System   87.8   2.54   2.54   7.62       70.6   0   KickSat   Fasteners   3.0   0.00   0.00   0.00       77.9   0   Note: Components are modeled as stainless steel unless otherwise noted in component name. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 17

Section 8: Assessment for Tether Missions ELaNa-5 CubeSats will not be deploying any tethers. ELaNa-5 CubeSats satisfy requirement 4.8-1. Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 18

Section 9-14 ODAR sections 9 through 14 for the launch vehicle are addressed in ref. (g), and are not covered here. Appendix Index: Appendix A. ELaNa-5 Component List by CubeSat: KickSat Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 19

Appendix A. ELaNa-5 Component List by CubeSat: KickSat External/Intern Melting Temp (Major/Minor Row Number Components) Length (mm) Height (mm) Low Melting Width (mm) Body Type Diameter/ Comment Material CubeSat Mass (g) Name Qty al KickSat 1 CubeSat Name KickSat Yes Demises External - KickSat 2 CubeSat Structure 1 Aluminum 5052-H32 Box 366 100 100 340.5 Yes Demises Major Sprite Deployer KickSat 3 Internal - Major 1 ABS Plastic Box 206.5 96 96 201 Yes Demises Housing Sprite Deployer KickSat 4 Internal - Major 1 ABS Plastic Box 107.6 81 81 175 Yes Demises Pusher Negligible Risk (<1J) Sprite Deployer KickSat 5 Internal - Major 1 Steel Cylinder 22.9 63 63 199 1500 See Error! Reference Spring source not found. KickSat 6 Sprite ChipSat Internal - Major 128 FR4 PCB Flat Plate 5.1 35 35 1.75 Yes Demises External - ABS Plastic and KickSat 7 Antenna 1 Flat Plate 2.1 178 12.7 0.15 Yes Demises Major Aluminum 6061 External - KickSat 8 Solar Cells 100 Gallium Arsenide Flat Plate 0.234 0.155 0.318 - Yes Demises Major Magnetorquer / External - KickSat 9 6 FR4 PCB Flat Plate 33.9 104.8 82.6 2.5 Yes Demises Solar Panel Boards Major Demises Reaction Control ABS Plastic and KickSat 10 Internal - Major 1 Box 87.8 25.4 25.4 76.2 1500 See Error! Reference System Mylar Coated Steel source not found. External - KickSat 11 Antenna Mount 1 Aluminum 6061 Box 10.6 28.6 117.5 36.5 Yes Demises Minor KickSat 12 Batteries Internal - Major 4 Lithium Ion Cylinder 45.6 19.1 19.1 61.9 Yes Demises Microhard KickSat 13 Internal - Major 1 FR4 PCB Flat Plate 55 89 53.4 17.8 Yes Demises MHJX2420 Radio KickSat 14 Battery Mount Internal - Major 1 ABS Plastic Box 29.3 86.8 80.5 21.2 Yes Demises Nexus S (C&DH) KickSat 15 Internal - Minor 1 FR4 PCB Flat Plate 22 80 80 2.5 Yes Demises Board Demises KickSat 16 Fasteners Internal - Minor 14 Stainless Steel Cylinder 3 1500 See Error! Reference source not found. KickSat 17 Cabling Internal - Minor Copper Alloy Yes Demises KickSat 18 Loctite 222 Internal - Minor 1 Acrylic Yes Demises Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)


Document Created: 2013-10-23 14:53:02
Document Modified: 2013-10-23 14:53:02
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